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A B S T R A C T
Regret is a negative emotion experienced upon the realisation that, had
an alternative course of action been chosen, your current situation could
have been improved. Psychologists and behavioural economists have
long been interested in the extent to which both the anticipation and
experience of this emotion can affect choice behaviour, when faced with
the prospect of decision making under uncertainty and risk, where the
resolution of uncertainty can have a significant effect on the degree to
which an individual may regret the choice they ultimately decide to
make.
The literature in this area to date has principally focussed on the
role of regret as an “anticipatory” emotion, whereby simply the fear
of potentially regretting a course of action is sufficient to induce an
individual to think twice about the decision they wish to make. More
recently, however, the question has shifted to study the effects of the
past “experience” of regret on subsequent decision making behaviour.
This thesis both complements and challenges the existing literature in
three ways.
Firstly, a Monte Carlo simulation is used to introduce more realistic
psychological assumptions, about the role of regret as an emotion, into
a standard regret-based decision under uncertainty economic frame-
work, and observes the patterns of behaviour which emerge when the
mathematical formulation of regret is subject to the same biases and
characteristics that we typically find with other emotions. Primarily,
this concerns the degree to which an individual can learn about their
future aversion towards regret from previous regretful experiences.
Secondly, the small number of existing experiments, which aim to
study the role of experienced regret on future choice, are challenged
on the basis that their conclusions depend heavily on assumptions
about the unobservable role regret plays in the mind of an individ-
ual. Indeed, the experimental results can be sensibly explained in a
number of different ways such that opposite conclusions can be drawn.
This problem is akin to the Identification Problem found in standard
economics literature.
Lastly, an experiment is designed and run which demonstrates that
the extent to which the experience of regret affects future choice may
be context dependent and population specific. The results show that we
currently do not have a sufficiently strong theoretical understanding of
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C H A P T E R S

1O B S E RVAT I O N S O N B E H AV I O U R
1.1 introduction
Regret is an emotion which has a long established research history in
psychology. Formally, it be can defined as
“...the negative, cognitively based emotion that we experi-
ence when realizing or imagining that our present situation
would have been better had we acted differently” Zeelen-
berg [104, p93]
Regret is of interest, therefore, because we rarely view our world as
being perfect. The above quote suggests that if it’s possible to imagine a
course of action which would have resulted in even a marginally better
outcome, then there is some negative emotional consequence for the
agent involved, regardless of how good the present situation actually
is.
Within the language of economics, we can incorporate this concept
within the traditional framework of decision making under uncertainty.
In this world, agents face a range of possible actions which will yield
different consequences depending upon the “state of the world” which
materialises. The agent must choose an action, recognising that some
states of the world are more likely to occur than others, and it is unlikely
that one action will always yield the best outcome regardless of the state
of the world which occurs. Within this framework, imagine an agent
has chosen an action, and the uncertainty has resolved, so the agent
now knows which state of the world they are in. Given this state of the
world, the agent will realise that there was at least one optimal action
which would have yielded the best consequence. If the action chosen
was not ex-post optimal, the agent will experience regret, wishing they
had chosen differently.
This concept, at present however, doesn’t lend itself to incorporation
within a standard decision-making framework or model, because the
regret itself is experienced after the agent has made a choice. It is
an “ex post” concept, rather than being useful “ex ante”, when the
decision maker had to make the choice itself. In order to discuss how
considerations of regret could influence the choice of the agent, we
must assume that the agent can forecast and predict potential future
regret resulting from an action, before the action itself has been chosen.
Though this is clearly a strong assumption, this use of regret in an
“anticipatory” sense1 has been the key to incorporating regret within
standard economic decision making frameworks.
1 rather than an ex-post “experiential” sense
3
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1.2 motivating concepts from psychology
1.2.1 Regret
Theoretical History
The first class of models which incorporated anticipated regret were
developed in the early 1980s as part of a wave of research in behavioural
economics in developing so-called “non-expected utility theory” mod-
els2. At this time, an increasing number of experimental studies3 were
demonstrating systematic violations of the behavioural predictions of
Expected Utility Theory (EUT)4 and researchers were searching for
new, descriptive models of behaviour under risk and uncertainty which
better explained the experimental evidence.
A common approach to solving this problem was to modify the
objective probabilities and utilities of the EUT formulation to form
“subjective” estimates, which the agents would then use in a subjective
expected utility formulation. This idea is used in the original form of
Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky [48]) and Rank-Dependent
Expected Utility Theory (Quiggin [70]) amongst others.
Another explanation, which modified the utility function of the agent,
was proposed separately by Loomes and Sugden [58] and Bell [5]. Both
of these models use a concept of anticipatory regret as part of the utility
function of the agent, by recognising that the utility of the agent would
be reduced by the experience of regret, if the action they chose, given
the state of the world which ultimately resulted, turned out to be sub-
optimal. Calculating the expected5 regret associated with every possible
action, modelled as some function of the difference between the utility
obtained from the action chosen and the maximum utility they could
have obtained had they chosen a different action, allows the decision
maker to anticipate the experience of regret associated with any given
action, and hence factor this reduction in utility into their decision
making process6.
However, simply adding a regret term to the standard utility function
is not always sufficient to generate predictions of behaviour, under risk
and uncertainty, which are different from those of EUT. Hence, this
formulation is not always sufficient to explain the experimental evi-
dence which is used to criticise EUT. To generate a regret-based theory
consistent with this evidence, we must make the additional assumption
of regret aversion or, mathematically, we must assume convexity of the
regret function. This implies that large regrets loom disproportionately
in an agent’s mind when compared to small regrets. Though a strong as-
sumption, this does seem to convey the correct intuition when thinking
about decisions when the anticipation of regret may play a significant
role.
For example, the most oft-cited example of a regret-based decision
is when deciding what lottery numbers to play. Most people tend to
play the same lottery numbers every week; the justification being that
although there is no statistical advantage to be gained by playing any
particular set of numbers, there would be a very high level of regret
2 see Starmer [88] for a summary of the non-EUT literature
3 for example, the famous Allais’ Paradox[1]
4 proposed by Bernoulli [10] and axiomatised by von Neumann and Morgenstern [98]
5 that is, summing across all states of the world
6 such a “regret function”, however, does implicitly presume that it is possible to predict the
negative impact of the experience of regret without ever needing to actually experience it
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associated with changing from “your” numbers on a given week, and
then seeing those numbers appear as the winning numbers. If this
feeling of very high regret can be anticipated, it can induce an agent
to choose the same numbers every week, hence insuring themselves
against this possibility. This effect may even be sufficient to keep the
agent playing the lottery over and over, resembling an addiction pattern
of behaviour. This assumption, that the presence of large regrets will
dominate an individual’s attitude, and hence behaviour, towards regret,
can lead us to think of these early theories as ones which primarily
model and capture “Regret Aversion”.
Whilst intuitively appealing, there has been very little development
of regret aversion theories since their early introduction. Aside from
an axiomatisation of Loomes and Sugden [58]’s version (Sugden [89])
and a demonstration of the theoretical similarity to other non-expected
utility theory models (Loomes and Sugden [60]) the theoretical and
experimental literatures have largely relied on other non-EUT models
to progress the research on choice under uncertainty (with Prospect
Theory (Kahneman and Tversky [48]) being the most widely used).
There are two main reasons for this lack of development.
Firstly, when looking to develop theoretical models which run con-
trary to EUT, at least one of the axioms of EUT (von Neumann and
Morgenstern [98]) must be violated. Most non-EUT models violate the
independence axiom (that preferences over two lotteries are maintained
when those two lotteries are mixed with a third “independent” lottery
in the same fashion), but models of regret aversion violate the axiom
of transitivity (if lottery A if preferred to lottery B, and lottery B is
preferred to lottery C, then lottery A must be preferred to lottery C).
Though there is experimental evidence to suggest violations of both
axioms occur in reality, transitivity is widely considered a far more
fundamental component of rational decision making than indepen-
dence, and violations of independence are observed more frequently
in experiments than violations of transitivity. Hence there is reluctance
to use and develop a model which dispenses with transitivity in pref-
erence of one which dispenses with independence (such as Prospect
Theory), when experimental violations of EUT can be explained using
both models.
Secondly, in accordance with the simultaneous development of both
behavioural and experimental economics, there is a necessity to test
new models of decision making (especially under risk and uncertainty)
using experimental procedures. However, for a model which incorpo-
rates an anticipated emotional response, such as regret aversion, this
becomes significantly more challenging. Either you need to design an
experiment in such a way that the only possible explanation for an
observed pattern of decision making is regret7, as specified by the
theoretical predictions of the relevant model, or you need to actually
observe, measure and record the emotion of regret directly, and infer
the link from the relationship between the observed actions and mea-
sured emotional responses. Unfortunately, neither of these options is
straightforward, as discussed subsequently and in the second chapter
of this work, and so the predictive success of a regret aversion model is
very difficult to determine.
7 as opposed to any other related emotions, such as disappointment (Bell [7] & Loomes
and Sugden [59])
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Experimental History
The history of experimental research into regret is covered in detail in
the second and third chapters of this work. The earliest experiments,
which provided useful insights into the process by which regret could
be generated (and circumstances in which it is reduced), are only
mentioned in future sections of this chapter where they have specific
relevance to the motivation for this chapter.
Recent Theoretical Literature
Recently, however, regret has been reintroduced into the economics
literature, with both new theoretical models and experimental insight.
Sarver [83] uses the basic “expected utility minus regret” formulation
of the original regret aversion papers as the second step in a two
stage decision making process. In the second step, the agent calculates
the value of an action in the now traditional fashion; calculating the
“modified” expected utility, given the other actions available, and hence
the possibility of regret. Given a “menu” of actions on offer to the agent,
therefore, the value of the menu can be given by the value of the action
with the highest modified expected utility on offer on that menu, taking
into account the possible regret of other actions available on the same
menu. Sarver’s addition to this process is then the introduction of a
first stage, where the agent must choose between a variety of menus on
offer.
Consider 2 menus of only singleton actions {a} and {b}, and suppose
that the agent prefers the menu with only a to the menu with only action
b. Then it is clear that adding action b to the menu with only action a
on, creating a new menu {a, b}, will have lower value than the menu
with only the preferred action, a, on, as it introduces the possibility of
regret whilst adding no superior actions. However, it is unclear whether
adding the superior option a to the menu containing just b will, in fact,
improve the agent’s situation. Standard economic intuition suggests
that adding a superior action to the agent’s set of options should only
improve their utility, but if the weight of anticipatory regret is strong
enough, which Sarver uses the term “regret aversion” to describe, then
the agent might prefer the menu {b} to the menu {a, b}, essentially
preferring to not have a choice at all.
Though Sarver’s work is in the same spirit as Loomes and Sugden
[58] and Bell [5], and even has an axiomatic derivation in the style of
Sugden [89], it differs from and develops these models by extending
regret aversion from simply choice over actions to choice over menus
of actions.
Another theoretical avenue into which regret has been introduced
is dynamic game theory, with work by Hart and Mas-Colell [32] and
subsequently Hart and Ben-Porath [31], discussing the concept of “re-
gret matching” in repeated games. In a repeated game, if an opponent
is playing independently identically distributed actions, then playing
a regret matching strategy, whereby I switch from an action which I
have experienced regret from in the past, to an action which I would
have been better off playing at those times, with a positive probabil-
ity given by the size of the regret experienced, is a strategy which
ultimately converges to a correlated equilibria, without the need to
compute something equivalent to a best response function.
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This type of research moves us away from anticipated regret to expe-
rienced regret, whereby an individual is responding to emotional cues
in their memory (in this case the regret experienced from choosing a
particular action previously) rather than attempting to predict their fu-
ture emotional state. This approach will be developed and incorporated
later on in the numerical simulation section.
The most recent theoretical literature is that of Hayashi (both in
[2008] and [2011]). These models run in the spirit of the original papers,
by creating “...axiomatic model[s] of choice under uncertainty where
the decision maker may be driven by anticipated regrets” [34, p255]
but differ through the idea that the decision maker is not trying to
maximise “utility minus regret”, as in the case of Loomes and Sugden
and Sarver, but rather trying explicitly to minimize regret, as in the
original idea of Savage [84]. This slight change in axiomatisation and
ideology has the benefit of producing a “smooth” model of regret
aversion [34, Theorem 3], which explicitly parametrises a “coefficient”
of regret aversion, hence allowing the minmax regret model of Savage
to sit as a special case of the Hayashi framework8. Indeed, this helpful
parametrisation of regret aversion will be exploited later on in the
chapter (1.3.1), where the precise specification of the Hayashi model
will be expanded upon. However, the same limitation of the original
models of regret aversion applies, in that Hayashi “... limit[s] attention
to anticipated regrets, that are directly relevant to choice. What about
actual emotion of regret, which the decision maker may feel after
making action and seeing resolution of uncertainty?” [34, p255] It is
this question, and the link between anticipated and experienced regret,
which the rest of the chapter is intending to explore.
Recent Experimental Literature
Experimental research has also progressed to incorporate new tech-
niques, developed in neuroscience, to find novel ways to measure and
observe emotional responses. As mentioned previously, testing a theory
which uses emotions as such an integral component, like regret theory,
is difficult without explicitly observing the emotion the theory claims
is important.
Mellers et al. [63] approach the problem of measuring emotional
responses in perhaps the most obvious, but probably the most con-
troversial, fashion; by simply asking participants in the experiment
to self-report their emotional state. Using a scale of -50 to +50, and a
series of gambles with varying gains, losses and associated probabil-
ities, participants are asked to predict their emotional responses and
then asked to rate experienced emotional responses, using the scale. By
comparing outcomes in which information was only given about the
gamble which was chosen (Partial Feedback) with outcomes in which
information was also given about the gamble which was not chosen
(Complete Feedback), they are able to separate the effects of regret
and disappointment and show that regret is a more powerful emotion
than disappointment, especially when gambles contain losses. They
also claim that subjects’ predictions of their own emotions are generally
accurate, as in the below graph.
8 specifically “...the choice rule gets closer to Savage’s minimax regret choice as α tends to
infinity.”[34, p254]
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Figure 1: Figure 8 from Mellers et al. [63]
Assuming regret will only be experienced when there is Complete
Feedback9, the graph indicates that negative anticipated emotions in
the Complete Feedback case are accurately forecasted, which would
seem to indicate that regret is being correctly predicted. This claim will
be assessed in greater detail when discussing the so-called “Affective
Forecasting” literature in due course.
This approach, however, has several limitations. The obvious criticism
is that, although the results seem to corroborate the standard regret-
based conclusions10, there is no incentive being offered to participants
for truthfully reporting their own emotional states11. In the case of
experienced regret, this is an unavoidable problem, as the subjective
experience of regret may only be known to the person experiencing
the emotion, but in the case of anticipated regret, we would like to
make use of real, incentivised choice behaviour to show that people
9 that is to say, by learning about both the outcome of the selected and unselected gamble,
it permits the comparison of utilities on which the experience of regret is based
10 as an example, “[p]eople feel better about their own outcome if the outcome of the other
gamble was worse” Mellers et al. [63, p336]
11 Whilst not explicitly regret focussed, there has been a significant recent literature in
experimental economics looking at the predictive power of self-reported measures of
emotional states, started by Frans van Winden. A good example of research in this
area is by van Winden et al. [95], which “. . . is concerned with the impact of the timing
of the resolution of risk on investment behaviour, with a special focus on the role of
affect.” In this work, emotions are only captured through self-reports, with measurements
taken at the time of anticipation, experience and recall. Their results show that there
is an “. . . improvement in the predictive power of the model (which) appears to come
from the affect variables”, thus lending weight to the idea that standard economic
incentive compatibility may not be a significant issue when dealing with the impact
of emotions on decision making. However, when dealing with regret specifically (and
in isolation), there are two other key considerations. Firstly, the influence of the role
of individual responsibility on the feeling of regret (as discussed later in the thesis)
gives rise to problems with the role of cognitive dissonance and the interaction with
self-reported measures. If I experience regret, but then manage to explain away the
emotion through reducing my own sense of responsibility, then a self-report of that
experience will be subject to the process of rationalisation, and hence be an imperfect
measure. Secondly, whilst regret has a specific meaning in behavioural economic theory,
it is easy to imagine an experimental participant confusing similar, but distinct, emotions
such as disappointment and anxiety when providing the report. It’s easy to identify
“positive” versus “negative” emotions, when asked, but less so to call out any one specific
feeling over another.
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who anticipate high regret from certain gambles are likely to shy away
from choosing them.
The second criticism is that the scale on which emotion is being
reported is not a specifically “regret” scale, but a much broader “emo-
tion” or “happiness” scale. The link to regret is then inferred from the
responses in gambles where regret is prevalent (Complete Feedback
conditions), under the assumption that regret will form part of the
emotional response to which the scale is referring. The scale, however,
asks explicitly about disappointment12 and so it cannot be automatically
inferred that the anticipated or experienced emotion of regret would
be included or recorded in a subjective affective scale asking explicitly
about disappointment.
For a less subjective approach to the problem, however, we need
to draw further from work in neuroscience. Camille et al. [16] and
Coricelli et al. [19] follow on from the work of Mellers et al. by asking
participants to rate their emotions using a -50 to +50 scale (this time
ranging from extremely happy to extremely sad) after, again, choosing
a series of gambles. Camille et al. identify the orbitofrontal cortex
and amygdala as two areas of the brain which are associated with
reasoning, planning and emotions (and, hence, potentially, anticipated
and experienced regret) and so seek “...to test whether the ability to
experience these emotions is mediated by the orbitofrontal cortex”[16,
p1167] by comparing the subjective affect reports of “normal” people
and people with orbitofrontal cortex lesions. For “normal” subjects, they
find results very much in line with Mellers et al. (Graph C in Figure 2),
but for orbitofrontal patients, the outcome of the non-chosen gamble
has no impact on the subjective affect reports in complete feedback
(regret) conditions (Graph D in Figure 2 ).
This result suggests that “...the orbitofrontal cortex exerts a top-down
modulation of emotions as a result of counterfactual thinking, after a
decision had been made and its consequences can be evaluated”[16,
p1169]. Hence, to move from subjective reports of the experience of
regret towards determining the root processes behind the magnitude
of experienced regret requires further understanding of the role of the
orbitofrontal cortex in decision making.
Coricelli et al. [19] approach this research through the use of func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) of subjects whilst they per-
form the same gambling task as used in Mellers et al.. In addition
to using both Complete and Partial Feedback conditions, to separate
regret and disappointment, they also assign some subjects to a “follow”
condition, where, instead of choosing the gambles, they are simply
asked to follow the gambles which the computer selects. As the expe-
rience of regret is positively linked to the degree of responsibility an
agent feels for the outcome13, subjects in the “follow” condition should
feel less regret than subjects in the “choose” condition, especially in
the presence of complete feedback. In addition, by observing patterns
of brain activity in the “choose” condition compared to the “follow”
condition, it should be possible to identify areas of the brain associated
with the anticipation and prediction of emotion when subjects in the
choose condition are required to evaluate the options available to them.
Again, Coricelli et al. find evidence for the involvement of the medial
12 “[p]articipants...expressed their feelings on a category rating scale that ranged from 50
(extremely elated) to -50 (extremely disappointed).” Mellers et al. [63, p335]
13 the literature on the link between regret and responsibility is comprehensively discussed
in Chapter 3
Figure 2: Figure 2 from Camille et al. [16]
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orbitofrontal cortex, and also support for the role of responsibility in
triggering activity.
Whilst this line of research is fascinating and informative for those
interested in the role of regret in decision making, it seems the direction
of future work in this area will be centered around a better understand-
ing of these specific brain processes and activity through the use of
fMRI and other such neuroscientific techniques. For those of us without
access to such equipment, however, we must look at other questions in
the area of regret.
Future Regret Research
So far we have considered a time line of regret whereby the anticipation
of regret14 must occur before the experience of regret. However, Coricelli
et al., through the design of their experiment, hint at another time line
which may house equally important research questions. By asking
subjects to perform multiple gambling choices in sequence, not only
are subjects assumed to be repeatedly using the anticipation of regret
in their decision making, they are also repeatedly experiencing regret
when their choices are shown to be wrong. We have shown, above, how
the anticipation of regret can have an effect on decision making, but an
equally important question concerns how the experience of regret will
subsequently influence decision making.
If there was no effect from the experience of regret on decision
making, we would expect that subjects who had experienced regret
from their decisions in the gambling task would subsequently behave
similarly to those who did not15. Coricelli et al. approach the answer
to this question by looking at changes in the proportion of choice
attributed to anticipated regret over time in the experiment16 and
whether or not there was fMRI evidence that the experience of regret
in a preceding gamble was changing the pattern of brain activity in the
subsequent trials.
As their results [19, Figure 5, p1259] show, there was an increase
in the role of anticipated regret in choice behaviour later on in the
gambling sequence (after regret had already been experienced), and
an enhanced response in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, at
the time of choice, when there had been an experience of regret in the
preceding gamble, “...perhaps representing an influence of immediate
regret on self-monitoring at decision making.”[19, p1259]
The precise channel through which the experience, not simply the an-
ticipation, of regret can influence decision making is, however, unknown.
Possible channels include a “negative mood” explanation whereby the
experience of regret changes the mood of the decision maker, possibly
reducing their happiness, which then subsequently influences decision
making17. Another possible explanation, more self contained within the
context of regret, is that the experience of regret changes the subsequent
sensitivity to potential future regrets, or, in other words, changes the
degree of anticipated regret aversion which is used in the decision
14 calculated in order to correctly account for the expected reduction in utility, from the
experience of regret, associated with any given action
15 controlling for correlated factors, such as wealth effects
16 with the implicit assumption being that the cumulative effect of experienced regret, as
the experiment progresses, changes the sensitivity to regret, or regret aversion, in later
trials.
17 for a summary of the significant literature on the effect of negative mood on decision
making under risk, for example, see Hockey et al. [37]
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making process. As will be discussed in the next section, this feedback
channel, of the experience of an emotion changing how it is anticipated
to affect a person in the future, is not a new idea. And, indeed, there
is experimental evidence from Zeelenberg and Beattie [105] on expe-
rienced regret in the ultimatum game, Creyer and Ross [21] on the
effect of experienced regret on price setting, and Coricelli et al. [19] on
the effect of experienced regret on future gambling behaviour, which
seemingly lend support to this idea.
As such, this chapter will describe a model which seeks to analyse
the various channels through which experienced regret might influence
subsequent behavior. The following sections provide motivation and
evidence for the way in which I have described these channels in my
model.
1.2.2 Predicted, Decision, Experienced and Remembered Utility
The previous discussion on anticipated and experienced regret hints
at a useful distinction to be made when talking about all emotions. Is
there a difference between what we think will happen to us, what does
happen to us, and what we remember happening to us?
There had been a recent revival in economics in thinking of decision
making as contributing to our affective or hedonic state of mind. The
pleasure and pain we derive from our choices and decisions has been
incorporated into theories like Regret Theory [58][5] and Disappoint-
ment Theory [59][7], but it is interesting to note that this approach is
different and divergent from the standard neoclassical utility theory,
where the concept of utility is used more as a convenient mathematical
representation of the revealed preferences of an individual, as in Samuel-
son [81]. Samuelson’s work, however, was the culmination of a long
process in economics designed to remove any vestiges of psychological
interpretation from analysis; a process which had successfully discred-
ited “...utility as psychological concept [, robbing] it of its only possible
virtue as an explanation of human behaviour”[81, p61].
Kahneman et al. [53] note that this modern understanding of utility
is a far cry from the concept of utility as originally proposed and
developed by Bentham [9]. Bentham expresses,
By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby
it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or
happiness, (all this in the present case comes to the same
thing) or (what comes again to the same thing) to prevent
the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the
party whose interest is considered [9, Ch I.4]
which is much more reflective of utility as a concept to be experienced,
rather than mathematically representing a decision.
Indeed, Kahneman et al. feel it necessary to completely separate
these two concepts as they relate to different ideas. They term the
modern usage as “Decision Utility”, referring to the weight that an
outcome holds when making a decision, and the Bentham concept as
“Experienced Utility”, referring to the subjective hedonic experience of
an outcome. The early 20th century economics literature can, therefore,
be seen as a rejection of experienced utility in favour of decision utility
as the beliefs of the time were
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(i) subjective hedonic experience cannot be observed or
measured
(ii) choices provide all necessary information about the
utility of outcomes because rational agents who wish to do
so will optimize their hedonic experience [53, p375]
By introducing two further concepts, Remembered Utility (the memory
of utility experienced from a particular outcome) and Predicted Utility
(the belief of an agent about experienced utility of an outcome, prior to
choice or experience), Kahneman et al. describe an encompassing time-
line about the process of choice18. Whereas economists would typically
argue that rationality in decision making implies consistency across
all these concepts (“If A gives me a better hedonic experience than B
(Experienced Utility) why would I choose B to A (Decision Utility)?”),
the proposed timeline hints at a different definition of rationality. For
an agent, so long as the option they predict to be better is actually
chosen (so there is consistency between Predicted and Decision Utility),
then they can be considered rational, even if their psychology leads to
mispredictions (so their Experienced Utility differs from their Predicted
Utility) or misremembering (so their Remembered Utility is different to
their Experienced Utility). The extent to which these mispredictions
and misrememberings occur, and the consequences thereof, will be
discussed in the next section, but their existence justifies the position of
Kahneman et al. in seeking to expand the definition of utility in this
fashion.
Further usefulness of this timeline of utility can be demonstrated
by considering dynamic models of decision making, or models of
repeated decision making. In a dynamic or repeated context, there
is information to be gained about an outcome in the current choice
problem (at period t) from the experiences of the past (at periods t− 1,
t − 2, etc.), and, hence, hopefully ensure that Predicted (and hence
Decision) Utility are more closely related to the true Experienced Utility
of the outcome. In Kahneman et al. framework this process happens
through the Remembered Utility of an outcome. If, for example, the
Predicted Utility associated with a decision problem is based, at least
in part, on the Remembered Utility of a previously encountered similar
decision problem, then we have developed a very simple, cyclical
feedback and learning model19.
This development of Kahneman et al. idea is best represented by
Figure 3 from Baumeister et al. [2].
In their work, they discuss a feedback process for emotions, on be-
haviour, that is conceptually equivalent to idea of Kahneman et al.
utility, whereby the “affective residue” from past experience (or the
Remembered Utility) drives the anticipated emotional outcomes (Pre-
dicted Utility) of the options, and hence lead to a choice based on the
desired emotional outcome (Decision Utility). This similarity allows us
to extend the work of Kahneman et al. (and hence the original ideas of
Bentham) to models of decision making which deal in terms of emotion
rather than specifically utility.
18 and this timeline has largely been overlooked in, specifically, economic models of decision
making
19 with the specific details of such models being explored in a later section.
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Figure 3: Figure 3 from Baumeister et al. [2] representing the feedback loop
from Remembered Utility to Predicted Utility
Link to Regret Aversion
And, of course, one such model of decision making which relies on
emotion (in this case, in addition to more familiar ideas of utility) is
Regret Aversion.
As mentioned in the theoretical history section, models of regret grew
out of a literature on non-Expected Utility Theory, which, of course,
grew out of a literature on Expected Utility Theory, and so rely heavily
on the notion of utility in the Decision Utility context as described above.
However, what the recent experimental literature on regret hints at, as
explained previously, is a distinction to be made between anticipated
regret and experienced regret, or, described in the context of Kahneman
et al. [53] and Baumeister et al. [2], Predicted Regret and Experienced
Regret. Making this distinction pushes us away from the traditional use
of regret in economic models, as theoretical notation in describing new
non-expected utility models which display predictions of behaviour in
line with experimental evidence, towards considerations of regret as a
real, tangible, hedonic, emotional concept, which is subject to the same
kinds of psychological, and psychophysiological, patterns of behaviour
as other negative emotions, such as fear and anger20.
Indeed, Figure 3 describes a plausible, and more complete, process
through which considerations of regret can play a role in decision
making.
The stage referring to “Anticipated emotional outcomes of simulated
options” is precisely the kind of Predicted Regret which must be cal-
culated in any standard model of Regret Aversion, and “Select option
based on desired emotional outcome” describes the maximisation of
a non-expected utility model, modified by regret, as in Loomes and
Sugden [58], Bell [5] or, more recently, Hayashi [34]. Indeed, really the
first such model to incorporate regret into decision making in some
fashion, the Minmax Regret principle of Savage [84], follows this same
idea.
However, it is the processes prior to this in the diagram, those of
“Memory of behavior and its outcome at Time 1”, “Affective Residue”
and “If-then rules”, which are of interest to this work, based on the
recent experimental literature. These are the parts of the process which
incorporate the idea of regret as an emotion, not just theoretical no-
20 regret is a good starting point for including “emotions which behave like emotions” in
models of decision making, precisely because we can imagine a fairly simple mathematical
representation as the baseline from which to work and develop. This contrasts with other
negative emotions, such as fear and anger, which offer no such simple representation
and hence are a lot more difficult to incorporate within a standard economic decision
making framework.
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tation, but will prove crucial to the latter stages of the process which
we are more familiar with. At the most basic level, the question is
whether we can predict our own emotional responses (Predicted Re-
gret) without having experienced them first (Experienced Regret), and,
even if we have experienced them first, whether our memories of those
emotions (Remembered Regret) are accurate enough to be beneficial
to us when making future decisions. In the language of Figure 3, is
the affective residue from our past regretful experiences helping us to
better predict21 our future emotional outcomes?
Fortunately, the question of whether people have the ability to use
remembered emotional outcomes to guide their emotional predictions
to be better estimates of their true experienced emotional outcomes,
has been widely explored in psychology under the title of affective
forecasting.
1.2.3 Affective Forecasting
Affective forecasting is an area of research which is principally con-
cerned with the accuracy to which people can predict their own emo-
tional responses to events. More recently, it has expanded to include the
accuracy to which people can remember their own emotional events.
More specifically,
“Affective forecasts can be broken down into four compo-
nents: predictions about the valence of one’s future feelings,
the specific emotions that will be experienced, the intensity
of the emotions, and their duration. People can be accurate
or inaccurate in predicting each of these facets of emotional
experience.” Wilson and Gilbert [100, p346]
The primary focus here will be on the intensity of emotions, and the
various mispredictions and biases which can arise, but future work
could also focus on the specific emotion (regret versus disappointment)
and duration (should regret not simply be formulated as a one-off
reduction in utility, but a stream of utility reduction over time).
For our purposes, one finding in the literature stands alone in terms
of the impact it can have for theories of decision making which rely
on our ability to forecast our own emotions. "The most prevalent error
found in research on affective forecasting is the impact bias, whereby
people overestimate the impact of future events on their emotional
reactions” [100, p353]. The wide range of situations and contexts in
which this effect has been reported supports the impact bias as a robust
finding, and suitable for inclusion in any model about the ability of
people to forecast their own emotions.
As noted previously in Figure 3, a key component of an emotional
prediction will be the memory of that emotion from times it has been
experienced before. “It is well known, however, that memory for past
affective experiences is poor.”[100, p358] One key result which speaks to
this is the so-called “Peak End Rule”22, which states that a subsequent
evaluation of an affective event (after the event has taken place) is
very highly correlated with the average of the Peak affect and End
21 perhaps using some kinds of “if-then” rules or other heuristic
22 first proposed by Varey and Kahneman [96], and subsequently tested by Kahneman
et al. [52], with respect to the pain of cold water, and then famously by Redelmeier and
Kahneman [74] with respect to colonoscopy evaluations and memories
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affect, given by online, or moment-by-moment, reports of the event.
The implication of this rule is that, for example, “...adding a period
of pain to an aversive episode will actually improve its remembered
utility, if it lowers the Peak/End average” [46, p190], clearly violating
dominance. As Fredrickson states,
“The primary lesson to be drawn from the existing em-
pirical literature on the peak-and-end rule is that people
evaluated certain kinds of past affective experience by refer-
encing just a few selected moments. One or two moments,
then, play a privileged role in guiding people’s choices
about which past experiences they would avoid, and which
they would repeat, or recommend to others.” Fredrickson
[25, p588]
“Thus, to the extent that people predict their future online experiences
(how they will feel during a colonoscopy or their next vacation in Paris)
from their recall of their past experiences, systematic errors are likely
to occur.” [100, p359]
An example of this misprediction and misremembering of affective
states comes from Wirtz et al. [102], who use the experience of going
on “spring break” as an environment to assess the types of affective
forecasting errors which can occur. By providing 41 students with PDA
devices, which allow the students to report the magnitude of “online”
affective states, it is possible to compare what the students “thought
spring break would be like” to what the students “actually experienced
on spring break” to what they “remember the experience of spring
break being”. The results of the study are discussed in more detail
in relation to the role of memory in 1.2.5 and Figure 6, however, they
show significant variation in the affective reporting of the spring break
experience depending on the point in time at which the affective report
has to be made.
These empirical results, on the errors which frequently occur when
being asked to predict and recall emotional experiences, guide us
towards creating better and more representative theoretical models
of how people will behave when being asked to do just that, but do
not particularly explain the reasoning behind why such errors will
occur. One hypothesis is that people often fail “...to anticipate [their]
own ability to make sense of the world in ways that minimize its
emotional impact”[100, p384]. If people are able to come to reasonable,
rational, calm and collected justifications for emotional outcomes, then
this should limit both the intensity and duration of negative emotional
events when they do occur. “The fact that the impact bias is by far the
most common error found in affective forecasting research is testimony,
perhaps, to the pervasiveness of people’s tendency to fail to anticipate
their own sense-making processes.”[100, p384]
Link to Regret Aversion
As shown previously, a key component of most regret-based decision
models is the ability to anticipate your regret when choosing option
A, and, ex-post, realising that you should have chosen option B. The
robustness of the finding of an impact bias from the affective forecasting
literature suggests that, when in a position to do this, individuals will
routinely overestimate the negative emotional fallout they will actually
experience.
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As suggested above in 1.2.3, one process through which this bias can
occur is the failure of an individual to anticipate their own ability to
rationalise an emotional outcome, and hence reduce its emotional im-
pact. This is an especially important consideration when talking about
regret, as regret is a process which relies on feelings of responsibility
and self-blame to operate. For example, consider a person who must
decide which of two queues to stand in at the supermarket checkout.
Queue A has more people, but each person in Queue B has more goods.
The individual decides that “more people” dominates “more goods” in
terms of slowing down the queues, and so decides to stand in Queue B.
However, as it transpires, each person in Queue B has more packing of
bags to do, and pays by card instead of cash, which means that Queue
A ends up proceeding quicker. It is easy to anticipate why this person
would feel regret of their decision, as they ultimately chose the wrong
queue. However, the extent to which regret will actually be experienced
by the person will depend on the extent to which they re-interpret
history, and place blame upon themself for not taking into account, at
the time of their decision, information which became salient to them
only after the decision had been taken. That is to say, do they think that
they should have known each person in Queue B would have taken
longer to pack bags, and would have used a card to pay, at the time that
the decision was taken? If they do, then they indeed made a mistake
in their decision making process, as good quality information, which
would have lead to a better outcome, was ignored, and hence they feel
regret. However, if they feel that this situation occurred simply as a
result of chance, and equally there were other things which could have
occurred which would have lead Queue A to proceed slower (more
people in Queue A means more chance of one person having problems
with their payment, which causes a big delay, for example), then the
outcome they experienced was not as a result of a poor choice on their
behalf (regret) but rather the misfortune of bad luck (which is disap-
pointment). Indeed, an economist would likely say that the decision
they took was “rational”, given all the information you had available at
the time, and hence was the best thing you could have been expected
to do, so why would you ever feel that a poor decision had been made?
Thinking in these terms, and in line with the work on affective
forecasting, suggests that people will underestimate their own ability
to rationalise and explain away regret in this fashion, reducing the blame
they will attribute to themself for a “bad” decision, once all outcomes
have been revealed. As a test of this hypothesis, Gilbert et al. [26] ran
an experiment whereby the margin to which people made the wrong
decision was manipulated, and looked at both forecasts and experiences
of regret. In the narrow margin treatment, participants missed out on
a prize (Study 1) or missed catching a train (Study 2) by a very slim
margin. In this situation, it is very easy to imagine how participants
could blame themselves for the outcome (as even a slight change in their
decision making would have lead to a substantially better outcome),
and hence anticipate high levels of regret. In the wide margin treatment,
where participants made the wrong decision by a wide margin, self-
blame is less easy to imagine (as it would have required a radically
different decision process to change the outcome for the better), and
hence the anticipated level of regret is much lower. However, if it’s
true that participants in both groups have an ability to rationalise the
process, leading to absolution and a freedom from blame, then their
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experiences of regret will be small, and much lower than anticipated in
the narrow margin treatment.
The results of Study 1 showed “...that the size of the margin in-
fluenced forecasted regret, p=.009, but not experienced regret, p=.22.
Forecasters overestimated how much regret they would feel in the
narrow-margin condition, p=.02, but not in the wide-margin condition,
p=.39” [26, p347] and the results of Study 2 showed “...that the size
of the margin influenced forecasted regret, p=.04, but not experienced
regret, p=.43. Forecasters overestimated how much regret they would
feel in the narrow-margin condition, p=.004, but not in the wide-margin
condition, p=.09” [26, p348] and hence the results of both studies sup-
port the presence of an impact bias, caused by a failure to anticipate
one’s own ability to rationalise bad outcomes, when dealing with the
emotion of regret.
The consequence of these results, therefore, for decision makers who
make decisions based on anticipated regret, is that there can be cases
where the anticipation of regret leads to a decision maker choosing
“...gambles in which bad outcomes are likely but unregrettable over
gambles in which bad outcomes are unlikely but regrettable.” [26, p349].
This, ultimately, leads to the decision maker “...purchasing emotional
insurance that they do not really need.” [26, p350]
These results provide some interesting insight into theoretical models
which assume “regret aversion”, or the property that large regrets
loom disproportionately in an agent’s mind when compared to small
regrets. If you take this assumption to be inclusive of the impact bias in
anticipated regret23, then the models, though accurately representing
the decisions taken by agents, will not yield decisions which turn out
to be ex-post optimal for the agents, even when compensating for the
true negative effect of the experience of regret on utility. In turn, to
learn about the true affective experience of regret, there would need
a modification of the standard frameworks to explain the difference
between Predicted Regret, and Experienced Regret.
What is left unexplained by the standard theoretical models, therefore,
is why do agents not appear to learn from their mistakes once they ex-
perience regret, or, alternatively, why the impact bias appears to persist.
For example, if you were to apply the standard models to a repeated
decision making context (such as an individual making hourly, or daily,
investment decisions), then an agent would keep making sub-optimal
decisions, repeatedly purchasing emotional insurance that they don’t
need, despite experiencing the realisation that they don’t need it. One
possible explanation is that of standard cognitive dissonance, whereby
an agent is refusing to accept that their beliefs about anticipated regret
are being challenged by experience. This could be reasonably assumed
for “big one off events” where considerable effort has been expended
insuring against the possibility of experienced regret. However, in a
repeated decision making world, it seems implausible to assume that
this dissonance persists in the face of mounting evidence. Can we really
believe that individuals simply do not learn at all from their mistakes,
23 it may well be the case that large regrets, in experience, are not disproportionately larger
than small regrets, but the impact bias works in such a way as to exaggerate the largest
regrets in anticipation, creating the familiar regret aversion assumption. It also could be
the case, however, that large regrets are experienced as disproportionate to small regrets,
but the effect of the impact bias is simply to magnify each regret by a fixed amount
(greater than one) in anticipation, which, again, would be consistent with the assumption
of regret aversion.
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or, equivalently, that the prediction of regret at time period t is in no
way related to the regret experienced at time period t− 1? Thus, the
keys to understanding this dynamic process will be an understanding
of the way learning works (in terms of emotions, and learning about
your own emotional reactions), and, secondly, an understanding of
the way memory stores emotions and emotional events, which can be
recalled in subsequent periods for future decisions, as suggested by
Figure 3, to improve decision making.
1.2.4 Learning
When thinking about learning, we are asking two separate questions.
Firstly, what kind of learning models could describe a process by which
agents learn about their own emotional responses in order that they
may have a better understanding of those responses when faced with a
decision which has emotional consequences in the future? Secondly, if
such a learning process exists, why would agents still retain an impact
bias over time and not “learn” that emotions are lower in experience
than in anticipation. Hence, the first is a question of existence and the
second is a question of convergence.
Regret Matching
Most of the instances of models of learning being used in economics
have been centred in game theory, especially where there is an obvious
dynamic structure (sequential games and repeated games for exam-
ple) and an obvious idea of what the point of the learning should be
(convergence over time to a “rational” equilibria). The main question is
whether a naive individual, who is using a series of learning heuristics,
or if-then rules, to proceed through the game, is comparable to the
typical, fully rational, backwards-induction solving agent we see in
standard theory.
One such model, that, helpfully for us, also involves the idea of
regret, is Regret Matching. As mentioned previously in 1.2.1 the works
of Hart and Mas-Colell [32] and subsequently Hart and Ben-Porath
[31] show that a decision heuristic whereby an individual, when in
a repeated game, switches probabilistically away from actions which
have yielded regret in the past, to actions which would have yielded
better outcomes, is a strategy which converges almost surely to the
set of correlated equilibria of the game [32, Main Theorem]. Though
this is clearly a learning procedure which involves regret, it is not a
procedure which involves learning about regret; instead using regret as
a tool for learning about the game being played (and, as it turns out,
successfully). However, the idea of using a simple, adaptive procedure
where regret provides a level of feedback to improve decision making
in the future, has the same features as the emotional feedback model
of Baumeister et al. as shown in Figure 324, and hence points us in
the correct direction. Indeed, the mechanism underlying this model
is displayed in the title of a book chapter25 written by Hart and Mas-
Colell [33], called “A Reinforcement Procedure Leading to Correlated
Equilibrium”. In this model, the reinforcement occurs through regret
24 that is, regret being transmitted through memory from one decision making period to
the next
25 based on the original Hart and Mas-Colell paper
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reinforcing “good” versus “bad” choices in the game. However, in
keeping with the dynamic of remembered regret being used to inform
about future predicted regret, we would like the reinforcement process
to be working exclusively through the channels of regret.
Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement learning can be defined as “learning what to do ... so
as to maximise a numerical reward signal” where an agent “...must
discover which actions yield the most reward by trying them”(Sutton
and Barto [90, p3]) and is often associated with learning problems which
have feedback information on a choice which can be used to improve
decision making in the future. For example, a trial-and-error procedure
can be thought of as a particularly simple case where the problem
is attempted through “exploring” different options and “exploiting”
information about which options yield reward and which don’t. A
reinforcement learning system typically comprises four sub-elements :
“...a policy, a reward function, a value function and, optionally, a model of
the environment” [90, p7], which, combined, tell the decision making
agent how to act (the policy) to achieve an immediate goal (the reward)
in search of a long-run goal (the value function) given beliefs about
the environment they are in (the model). The simplicity of this idea
originated in psychology through the “Law of Effect” (Thorndike [92])26
but has found recent traction in work on artificial intelligence27 as an
efficient mechanism through which problems can be solved by machines
without the need for external supervision.
Interest in reinforcement learning has grown in recent years alongside
the growth in both behavioural and experimental economics, and is
centred around its explanatory power as a strategy employed in two
player games with repeated interaction. For instance, considering a
repeated game with a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE),
what can reinforcement learning say about the mechanics of behaviour
which might ultimately converge to the MSNE? The review byRoth
and Erev [80] of this literature concluded that, for explanatory power,
“. . . a one-parameter reinforcement learning model outperforms the
equilibrium prediction for all values of its one parameter”[80, p851],
and that a “. . . four-parameter belief-based model . . . improves on
the one-parameter reinforcement model”, based on the aggregation
of 12 experimental studies. A class of reinforcement learning models,
in which agents exhibit a degree more sophistication, is that of rule-
learning, whereby the agent evaluates the behavioural decision rule
implemented, based on the outcome, rather than simply the action
chosen. Stahl [87] formulates an experimental test of this framework,
and finds the “. . . model fits the data much better than random noise
or an error-prone Nash model”[87, p133]. However, both belief- and
rule-learning types of reinforcement learning models have primarily
been studied in the context of game theory rather than decision under
uncertainty, in essence, testing their ability to describe learning about
an opponent rather than one’s own preferences.
The key idea in reinforcement learning is the notion of “evaluation” of
information by the agent. In the case of Regret Matching the evaluation
comes in comparing what happened, to what could have happened,
26 the “Law of Effect” “...describes the effect of reinforcing events on the tendency to select
actions”Sutton and Barto [90, p18]
27 summarised by Sutton and Barto [90]
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to guide future choice strategies. Hence, this is one particular type of
reinforcement learning process. However, despite economics being a
discipline which extensively uses such ideas as policy, reward functions,
value functions and models, the evaluation stage typically only comes
in before a decision is to be made, in order to determine the policy. By
incorporating the idea of reinforcement learning into economic models
(and the similarity of the key elements used in both suggests that this is
perfectly achievable) we can develop economic models where an agent
will use evaluation to learn about their own decision making process,
and not simply use evaluation at the time a decision is to be made.
Link to Regret Aversion
In the standard models of regret aversion, the evaluation phase comes
in evaluating the possible options, based on an anticipation of what
regret will feel like should it be experienced in the future. However, as
the work in affective forecasting tells us, the anticipation of regret is
subject to an impact bias whereby regret will be worse in anticipation
than in experience. Hence, there is a second opportunity for evaluation,
in that better information about regret is made available once it has
been experienced, and so we have the potential to learn about our own
beliefs and predictions at the same time28. In addition, the work in
neuroscience tell us that regret is an emotion which works hand in hand
with learning, as the areas of the brain which appear to process regret,
the amygdala and orbitofrontalcortex (OFC)29, are both connected to
learning processes30.
However, the extent to which there is scope, in a decision making
problem, to learn from regret will be determined by the degree of
uncertainty which exists in the decision making problem itself. In the
case of a “trial and error” process, the reinforcement learning from
regret will solely be towards eliminating options which appear to be
“bad choices” in favour of trying new options which could potentially
be “better choices”. In a trial and error process, nothing is known ex-
ante about the environment in which the decision maker is operating,
and it is through a process of search and reinforcement learning that
one can hope to learn how to make better decisions.
In the intermediate case of regret matching there is a repeated game
theoretic situation where the structure of the game is known to the
agent who is using a regret matching strategy, but levels of uncertainty
are added by the fact there is another player in the game, and it is not
necessarily assumed that the agent has the sophistication or rational-
ity to compute best-response strategies. In this situation, the agent is
reducing the level of uncertainty in the game each period, by learning
(through regret matching) about which strategies yield good outcomes
and which yield bad, so that they can “better respond” as opposed to
“best respond” in the future. In this case, it is not exactly uncertainty
of the game that is being reduced through learning (as the structure of
the game is known ex-ante), but rather uncertainty about the agent’s
28 by thinking “actually, that wasn’t as bad as I thought it would be”
29 as shown by Coricelli et al. [19]
30 “...the OFC integrates cognitive and emotional components across the entire process
of decision making; when it malfunctions, it results in behavior that is maladaptive to
ongoing contingencies” and “...neuroimaging studies assign a fundamental role to the
amygdala in classical conditioning experiments, indicating its role in associative learning”
Coricelli et al. [20, p262]
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Figure 4: Figure 5 from Coricelli et al. [19]. Activity at choice: learning from
the experience of regret. (a) Proportion of choice (+- s.e.m.) related
to anticipated regret in ’complete choose’ trials. Anticipated regret
increased over time as the experiment proceeded.
best-response behaviour, which is limited due to prior assumptions
about rationality.
At the other end of the scale are the repeated gambling tasks used
in Coricelli et al. [19] and Camille et al. [16], which both have the
property of being “decision under risk” tasks as opposed to “decision
under uncertainty”. This is true because the agent is simply playing a
game against nature, where the rewards and associated probabilities
of obtaining them for each option, are fully known prior to each task
undertaken. In such situations as these, any regret which is experienced
from the result of choosing option A as opposed to option B cannot
be used, under reinforcement learning, to learn about the task at hand.
The task is fully described without the need for experience to teach
about the nature of the task. Yet, the results of Coricelli et al.[19] as
given in Figure 4, for example, show that the pattern of behaviour does
change over the course of the experiment as regret is experienced.
Figure 4 shows that the participant appears to be “learning” to choose
options which have lower anticipated regret, as they experience more
regret, but this learning is not linked to learning about the simple
numerical values of the problem (as with “trial and error” and, to a
lesser extent, “regret matching”), given they are always known with
certainty throughout. This suggests that if the learning from regret is
not linked to any objective values in the problem, they must be linked
to subjective experience of the outcomes. Here, regret is not a signal
that a particular option is worse than you previously believed, but
regret may, perhaps, be teaching you that regret is worse than you
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previously believed, and it should be better anticipated and avoided31.
The emotional reaction from making a particular decision is the part of
the task which is unknown, ex-ante, and so the reinforcement learning,
from experienced regret, should be attributed to learning about this
aspect.
The fact that the experience of regret should teach and inform you
about your own future reaction to potentially regretful decisions isn’t
particularly surprising. What is surprising, however, is that, given the
impact bias (Gilbert et al. [26]) states that regret is worse in anticipation
than experience, then we would expect the experience of regret to teach
us to be less sensitive to anticipatory concerns of regret, and not more,
as demonstrated by Coricelli et al. [19]. There are not many children,
for example, upon learning that being thrown into a big pool of water
without aid from a parent is not as scary as first imagined, and can,
in fact, be enjoyed as swimming, suddenly become struck with even
more fear than before when confronted with another, similar, watery
pool-based situation. So, why does the experience of regret appear, in
this experiment, to make us more sensitive towards it in future? There
are a couple of possibilities to consider.
The first is that, as in the case of “trial and error” where regret acts
as a useful evolutionary signal that a particular option should not be
trusted again, then even in cases such as simple decision under risk
where probabilities and outcomes are completely, objectively known
and there is nothing new to be learnt between periods, then we can still
become less trusting of a particular option which has betrayed us in the
past, even though, from a rational standpoint, nothing objectively has
changed from before. You may have thought option A was superior to
option B at time t, but bad luck caused you to experience regret from
choosing it, and so you now believe option B to be superior at time t+ 1.
You may well become aware that the regret experienced in this situation
was not as bad as you expected it to be, but it was still a negative
affective emotion32, which you have no great desire to experience again.
As before, we have a great ability to rationalise our own decisions and
experiences, but, in this case, the rationalisation arises from thinking
we must have made a simple “mistake” in choosing A at time t, and, in
fact, the correct decision all along was to choose B. If B is a safe option,
then this type of behaviour mimics the idea of “once bitten, twice shy”,
and we appear to become more risk averse.
The second possibility to consider, and the one which will be explored
further in the next section, is that the experience of regret is not being
correctly recalled from memory when the next opportunity arises to
make a decision. For whilst it is our experience of regret which will turn
out to be better than expected (due to the impact bias), it is, in fact,
the memory of that experience of regret which will drive our future
decision making under a reinforcement learning type model. If our
memory is incorrectly representing our experience of the emotion, then
the impact bias, for example, could simply be negated if our memory
exaggerates the emotion we experienced. As such, we need a feel for
how our memory will represent the experience of that emotion to our
future selves when they need to decide what decision to take at time
t+ 1.
31 the fact that the proportion of choice attributed to anticipated regret is increasing, as
experienced regret increases, implies an increased sensitivity to regret in later trials
32 in contrast to the positive affective experience of enjoying swimming
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1.2.5 Memory
Given economics is a subject mostly concerned with the prediction and
anticipation of future events and consequences, and hence primarily
forward looking as a science, it is perhaps not surprising that there
has been little consideration within economics for the role of memory,
which focuses on the evaluation and record of events and consequences
past, and hence is primarily backward looking. What maybe considered
more surprising is that given the rise of dynamic models, in all manner
of economic contexts, there has been little attention given to the question
as to whether or not a “history” or “information set” available to a
decision maker is likely to ever be truly representative of their past
experiences, given the need for a conversion process from experience
to memory, storage of experience in memory over time, and then back
from memory to decision making, for these dynamic models of choice
to operate effectively.
Indeed, psychologists have long studied these 3 key phases of mem-
ory - encoding, storage and retrieval - and the levels of imperfection
and bias which can arise in memory through all three stages. Yet,
when economists have sought to incorporate memory into decision
making models, there is a typical idea of the sophisticated agent who
has the capacity to affect their own memory for their own benefit, as
in the case of the agent who engages in “self-deception” (Bénabou
and Tirole [8]) or the agent who engages in “rehearsal” (Mullainathan
[64]). This approach sits more comfortably with the standard economic
view of a rational agent, for whom very little is beyond their sphere
of understanding or control, but sits contrary to the vast majority of
psychology research where an agent is subject to their own imperfect
memory processes, such as in the famous case of “Flashbulb Memories”
(Brown and Kulik [13]) where it is not the intention of the agent to
have a heightened memory for specific emotional events, but rather
an uncontrollable, hormonally driven33 response mechanism. As such,
I will discuss memory from the perspective of a naive agent who is
subject to the encoding, storage and retrieval process without having ex-
plicit control over which experiences are encoded, stored and retrieved
accurately.
Memory and Emotion
The relationship between emotion and memory was hinted at previ-
ously with reference to Flashbulb Memories, but, as Figure 5 indicates,
this is only part of “...one of the fastest growing areas of research in
psychology and related disciplines” (Uttl et al. [94, preface])
There are two distinct areas of importance in researching memory
and emotion. The first is the impact of being in an emotional state
on memory of events (as epitomised by Flashbulb Memories), where
the “...emotion acts as a mental “highlighter” increasing the salience
of information from the environment and from memory” [94, p39].
The second is the difference between memory of an emotional event,
memory of a neutral event and memory of the emotion itself, and it is
this area which will be most useful to the work at hand. For instance,
“...there are some differences in how people remember emotionally posi-
tive and emotionally negative effects” [94, p30], “[e]motional memories
33 the role of the hormone Cortisol in the formation of memory in stressful or emotional
situations is discussed in Diamond et al. [23], for example
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Figure 5: Figure 1.1 from Uttl et al. [94]
also seem to be long lasting” [94, p17] but “[r]ecent research shows that,
like memory for neutral information, emotional memories are subject
to fading over time and biases in the direction of current goals and
experiences” [94, p39]. Furthermore, the “...particular emotion that one
is experiencing will have a large influence on what kind of information
is deemed of central importance” [94, p6] so there is merit in investigat-
ing links between memory and emotion with reference to the specific
emotion of interest.
Memory and Regret
As such, there are some studies which investigate the memory for
specific emotions and specific emotional events, such as regret and
regretful events by Beike and Crone [4]. Regret is of interest to them
because “[p]eople continue to experience painful regret years after
they experience an undesired outcome (Wrosch et al. [103])” yet “[t]he
persistence of the experience of regret is puzzling, as people normally
exhibit reduced emotional responses over time to remembered life
experiences (Walker et al. [99])” [4, p1545]. This reduced emotional
response over time is known as the “fading affect bias”, yet it seems as if
regret has a different pattern of fading affect to other emotions. Indeed,
they found that “[e]xperienced regret faded significantly over time only
for regrets of inaction” [4, p1548], implying that the typical fading
affect pattern of negative emotions does not hold for regrets caused
by action. By manipulating the instructions surrounding framing and
association of memories of regret they demonstrate that “[t]he fading
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Figure 6: Figure 1 from Wilson et al. [101]
affect bias for regret was...disrupted when participants construed the
life regret as open then attempted to forget regret-related thoughts, and
when participants construed the life regret as closed then attempted to
remember regret-related thoughts” [4, p1548], showing that memory
for regret may be highly contingent on the context in which it was
experienced and rationalised, in the same way the affective forecasting
literature shows how the experience of regret differs from anticipation
through the same channels.
Biases in Memory
The fading affect bias, described above, is just one of many ways in
which memory can distort an event or experience from the true event
or experience as it was first encountered. And whilst Beike and Crone
provide “...evidence that different negative emotions exhibit different
patterns of fading affect” [4, p1549] there has been significant research
into consistent trends and patterns in memory bias which are robust to
different context. The Peak-End Rule, as discussed in 1.2.3, for instance,
whereby a few selective moments of an experience are remembered as
representative of the entire experience, has been replicated widely since
1992.
With regards to memory of emotions, one recurring theme has been
the “Retrospective Impact Bias” whereby emotions tend to loom larger
in memory than in experience34. Wilson et al. [101] analyse this effect
with regards to the 2000 US Presidential Election, and study the pre-
dicted, experienced and remembered happiness of supporters of both
George Bush and Al Gore.
34 compared to the standard Impact Bias, where emotions loom larger in anticipation than
experience
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As Figure 6 shows, Bush (who won the election) supporters both
anticipated and remembered stronger positive emotions than were
actually experienced, and Gore (who lost the election) supporters both
anticipated and remembered stronger negative emotions than were
actually experienced.
In a similar vein, Wirtz et al. [102] ask students who are on their
spring break to give predictions, online accounts and memories of their
subjective experience of the vacation.
In keeping with the results of Wilson et al., Figure 37 shows that
students appear to both over-anticipate and over-remember their own
subjective emotions of the vacation. In addition, students were also
asked about their desire to repeat the vacation, and “...the best predictor
of participants’ desire to repeat the break - indeed, the only predictor -
was remembered experience.” [102, p522].
The main consequences of these two findings are that “[a]lthough
on-line measures may be superior for estimating experience, retrospec-
tive global evaluations may be superior for predicting people’s future
choices” [102, p522] and “[t]he fact that retrospective measures may be
a better predictor of future choices than on-line evaluations, while at the
same time being less accurate, points to the likelihood that individuals
often make choices that fail to optimize hedonic experience” [102, p522].
Thus the biases which appear in memory of emotions appear to lead to
sub-optimal choices in the future.
Link to Learning and Regret Aversion
In any adaptive learning process, where prior information is used to up-
date current beliefs, it is the memory, or, more specifically, the retrieval,
of that information at the time of updating, which will determine the
overall result of the learning process. As described previously, because
of the Impact Bias, there is an opportunity for learning about regret
(and other emotions) once it is experienced, in realising that the emo-
tion was not as bad as was previously imagined. Yet the results of the
few studies35 which explore this ability to learn about regret seem to
suggest an opposite pattern; that the experience of regret makes you
more sensitive to it, and not less.
The above research on memory addresses this apparent paradox
through two channels. Firstly, the lack of “fading affect” for most regret
and regretful memories ensures that the emotion will always appear
vivid in a person’s mind upon retrieval. The consequence of this is
that the worst regrets will stay with a person for a very long time
after the experience, so an individual trying to learn (consciously or
subconsciously) about their own experience of regret will have the
process dominated by the very worst regrets which refuse to fade in
their mind. This could skew the frame of reference for the individual to
one of “always expecting the worst” and hence give rise to the impact
bias, which can be modelled as regret aversion, in future decisions
involving anticipated regret.
The second channel is the Retrospective Impact Bias36 whereby the
memory of the emotion itself is unrepresentative of the emotion expe-
rienced, and, as with the Impact Bias, the intensity of the emotion is
exaggerated. In the case of regret, this equates to the memory of regret
35 Coricelli et al. [19], Camille et al. [16]
36 Wilson and Gilbert [100], Wirtz et al. [102]
Figure 7: Figure 1 from Wirtz et al. [102]
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being significantly worse than was actually experienced, and more
in line with the initial prediction, which, itself, was an exaggeration.
Hence, given that learning about regret, for the purposes of future
choice, takes place based on the memory of regret, then any learning
will be more in line with confirming the impact bias to the individual,
rather than refuting it.
As noted by Wirtz et al., the consequence of this process for future
choice is that choices will persist in being sub-optimal for the individual,
who will continue to purchase needless emotional insurance, despite
experience which should teach the individual of this very fact. The
combination of the memory biases and learning processes seeks to
reinforce mistakes in choice and not expose them.
1.2.6 Merging These Ideas
The above literature provides evidence that agents use anticipatory
regret in order to make decisions, but have an experience of regret
which differs from their prediction. They also use information from their
past experiences to help guide future choice, but, in the case of regret,
their memories are often unrepresentative of their true experience,
and so fail to learn that they make errors in their affective forecasting.
However, these errors in prediction and memory, and the type of
learning they seek to engage in, appear to have specific patterns which,
in the language of economics, can be translated into functional forms
and mathematical representations. This enables us to revise traditional
models of Regret Aversion to better reflect how an agent could use
anticipated regret in a dynamic context, given this new information
about how the emotion of regret behaves. The rest of this work will
offer suggestions and models of how this can be achieved, and the
predictions of behaviour which arise from those models.
A Real World Example
The evidence provided so far suggests that the existing theoretical
literature does not sufficiently represent all that is known about the
process of how regret can influence behaviour. However it is yet to be
demonstrated that these failings actually hinder any kind of real world
application, or hinder our understanding about real world empirical
data. Indeed, if it is the case that regrets are context specific (so that the
regret experienced from one type of decision is never used to inform
about regret in any other type of decision) then a static model (as exists
currently) may be sufficient, as the feedback mechanism proposed
previously is broken down. As such, I will limit applications of this
type of approach to repeated decisions where an individual is engaged
in a repeated choice problem, and hence the context of the decision
remains the same, as this is the simplest case for where this type of
dynamic approach would be relevant.
There are, however, many different situations where an individual
is engaged in a repeated, uncertain decision making process. An in-
vestment trader, for example, must make decisions on a very frequent
basis about which stocks and commodities to buy and sell. A gambler
must decide whether to keep playing with the money they have just
won, or keep playing to recoup their losses. One could even make the
argument that the most successful traders or gamblers are the ones who
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Figure 8: The Main Road
Figure 9: The Side Road
are able to take the “emotion” out of their decision making process, so
considerations of regret (and any unnecessary purchasing of emotional
insurance) are negated.
However, as an example which can demonstrate the concept in the
simplest fashion, I have chosen a problem more familiar to me and
perhaps other people who commute on a daily basis.
My girlfriend lives in Birmingham, and I will drive to see her, usually
arriving after work around 7pm. She lives down a side road (SR), which
has limited parking at that time, but the side road is a short walk from a
main road (MR), which typically has lots of parking at that time. When
approaching I am faced with decision problem over where to try to
park.
I can park on the main road, as in Figure 8, and walk to the house,
which takes about 3 minutes. Or, I can turn right down the side road,
as shown in Figure 9, and try to find a parking space down there.
1.2 motivating concepts from psychology 31
Space only on MR Space only on SR Space on both No space on either
p = 0.7 p = 0.03 p = 0.25 p = 0.02
Stay on MR -3 -13 -3 -13
Go down SR -6 0 0 -16
Park in CP -10 -10 -10 -10
Table 1: Parking Example
The problem is that I cannot see whether there is a space down the
side road before needing to make a decision about whether to turn
down the side road, or stay and park on the main road. Indeed, if I do
turn down the side road and there is no space to park, I am forced to
follow a very long, winding road to simply get back to the main road,
which takes an additional 3 minutes.
Occasionally, there will be no space, either on the main road or the
side road. In which case, I need to park in car park (CP) which is a 10
minute walk from the house, and a 3 minute drive from the main road.
As such, the decision problem I face can be reduced to the payoff
matrix in Table 1, where payoffs represent the total time lost getting to
the house from the decision.
By attaching probability weights to the states of the world (given in
columns) there are several ways to calculate the optimal action. Suppose
the probabilities are given as per the payoff matrix. Then maximising
the expected value says I should stay on the main road, as I would if I
was risk averse. However, if I was loss averse I might make the decision
to go down the side road. Alternatively I could progress as suggested
by Hayashi [34], computing the probability weighted expected regret of
every action37.
So if these models can explain decision making in this situation, why
is a dynamic anticipated regret aversion model needed? Well, this is a
repeated decision problem, as I visit my girlfriend about twice a week.
Yet sometimes I will park on the main road, and sometimes I will go
down the side road. The payoff and regret matrices are not changing,
yet, given my choice is varying, it suggests the optimal action is also
changing.
At the most basic level, it may simply be the case that I am indifferent
between all three options. In the case of indifference, then any decision
rule used to make the choice is utility maximising and hence optimal.
As such, assuming indifference would not allow us to compare the
predictive capability of one decision rule versus another, so I will
assume complete indifference across the actions does not exist here.
One possibility is that I am subject to some kind of “noisy” or “fuzzy”
preferences38 which could explain this type of switching behaviour.
However, the existence of something akin to an error term in the
decision rule could be tested by looking at the correlation of the error
terms across time periods. Uncorrelated error terms might indicate
that preferences are simply noisy or fuzzy, but correlated error terms
indicates that there is a missing piece to the puzzle. This is, however,
a theoretical example rather than an empirical one, so I will assume
that there is some information conveyed by the choice in the previous
period which influence the decision taken in the subsequent one.
37 the mathematics of which are detailed later on page 34
38 for example, as given in Butler and Loomes [15]
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Under this assumption, another explanation is that the previous
experience of the decision problem is providing additional information
about the payoff matrix and associated probabilities. For example, if I
start without knowing the payoffs exactly, or subject to some degree
of error, I will need to experience each consequence at least once to
accurately complete the payoff matrix. Similarly, if the probabilities
are unknown, I will take frequency information, about the state of the
world, from each experience to update beliefs about probabilities. But
both of these explanations suggest some kind of convergence towards
stable long-term decision making behaviour.
In contrast, if I use a regret-minimising framework, in the spirit of
Hayashi, where my beliefs about anticipated regret come from my
memory about past regretful experiences, then I can have varying
preferences, which may not converge towards stable behaviour, if the
memory is imperfect or biased in any way. This the idea which will
be explored in the next section, with specific forms of the model being
derived from the psychological motivation provided earlier.
1.3 model
1.3.1 The Static Regret Model
As presented in the introduction and motivation, there have been several
recent models of regret-based decision making which adopt a different
approach to the traditional methods of Loomes and Sugden [58] and
Bell [5]. The model of Hayashi [34], as previously discussed in 1.2.1,
uses an axiomatic approach to derive a model of “regret minimisation”
which will be used by an agent obeying those axioms when faced with
a decision under uncertainty.
The most widely used, and arguably most significant, result of this
paper is the first application of the framework to “Minmax regret
with multiple-priors”[34, p244], which is a generalisation of Savage’s
“Minmax Regret Choice” model [84]. Hayashi’s approach describes
“...a general model in which regret aversion and likelihood judge-
ment over states coexist” in contrast to Savage’s “...model of complete
ignorance”[34, p243] of the likelihood of states.
However, it is the second result of Hayashi’s paper which is of more
interest to this particular research. By replacing one axiom from the
first result with a slight modification39 and relaxing an assumption40
that agents are necessarily regret averse41, he derives a model of choice,
by regret minimisation, which is a “Smooth model of regret aversion”
[34, p253, Theorem 3]. Specifically,
Theorem 3. Assume |Ω| > 3. The choice function ϕ satis-
fies Axioms 1, 2, 3-5, 8 if and only if there exists a mixture-
linear, continuous and non-constant function u : ∆(X) → R,













39 formally, replacing Axiom 7 (Constant-regret independence of regret premium) with
Axiom 8 (Eventwise separability of regret premium)
40 Axiom 6
41 in the Loomes and Sugden sense
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Here, Ω represents the set of states of the world, X the set of pure
outcomes, and ∆(X) the set of lottery outcomes over X. f and g are
actions available to the decision making agent from the set of possible
actions B, and p(ω) is the probability of any particular state of the
worldωoccurring. u is a standard utility function, and, as such, u(g(ω))
represents the utility the agent will receive from choosing action g if
state of the world ωoccurs. Therefore, Theorem 3 states that the agent
will choose an action from B as follows:
1. For a given action f, calculate the maximum regret you could suffer
if state of the world ω occurred. This is given by the maximum
difference in utility between f and any other action g in state of
the world ω. This difference in utility, raised to the power of α,
represents the regret you would suffer if you chose act f and state
of the world ω occurred.
2. Repeat stage 1 for all states of the world world ωΩ. This gives the
regret which occurs in each state of the world, should you choose
action f42.
3. Calculate the “expected regret” of action f by weighting each of the state
specific regrets, calculated in stage 2, by the probability that the state of
the world occurs, p(ω), and summing them up. Doing this gives the
agent the regret they can expect to feel, on average, from choosing
action f.
4. Repeat stages 1-3 for every action which the agent can take (B). This
given the “expected regret” for every action available.
5. Choose the action which offers the “minimum expected regret” from
stage 4. This is then the “regret minimising action” for the agent.
This differs subtly from the Loomes and Sugden framework as, instead
of maximising a modified expected utility function, with the modi-
fication being a reduction in utility from regret, from which we can
observe actions and infer the associated degree of regret aversion, we
are, instead, minimising an expected regret function, with the degree of
regret aversion being explicitly captured by α, and forming an integral
part of the decision making process.
Indeed, α works in this model as one would expect from the original
definition of regret aversion. If α > 1, then the individual is “regret
averse” (and has a convex regret function) in the sense that large regrets
weigh heavily in the mind of the agent compared to small regrets, and
so the agent will tend to avoid choosing actions which could result in
large regrets. This equates to Assumption 3 of Loomes and Sugden,
and hence is consistent with the majority of observed empirical and
experimental violations of expected utility theory. If α < 1, however, the
agent is now “regret loving” (and has a concave regret function), which
corresponds to Assumption 2 of Loomes and Sugden. This would also
predict violations of expected utility theory “...but in the opposite direc-
tion to those generally observed” [58, p810]. Furthermore, as Hayashi
notes “...α = 1 corresponds to regret neutrality, which is the case of
subjective utility maximisation”[34, p244]. Knowing, therefore, a utility
function, complete payoff matrix, associated state probabilities and
regret aversion parameter, an agent can always calculate the expected
42 bearing in mind that this regret will be zero if f is the optimal action to take for a given
state of the world, and will always be> 0
34 observations on behaviour
Regret Space only on MR Space only on SR Space on both No space on either
Matrix p = 0.7 p = 0.03 p = 0.25 p = 0.02
Stay on MR 0 13 3 3
Go down SR 3 0 0 6
Park in CP 7 10 10 0
Table 2: Regret Matrix for the parking example
regret minimising action (or actions) and will choose this action if
Hayashi axioms are satisfied.
As a specific numerical example of this procedure, consider the
parking example presented previously on Table 1. In this example,
there are three actions (with state-dependent utilities) and four states
of the world (with associated probabilities). By following stages 1 and 2
above, we can calculate the regret matrix which details, for every action
and state of the world, how much better off you could have been had
you chosen the optimal action for that state of the world.
The regret matrix in Table 2 tells me how many minutes I could have
saved had I chosen the optimal action for that state of the world. For
simplicity, this measure of time is assumed to be the utility.
To calculate the “expected regret” however, we must first make an
assumption about α, or the parameter of regret aversion. This parameter
tells me how severe is the regret that I anticipate I will experience for
a given utility difference, or, in other words, how sensitive I am to
potential regrets.
By assuming that α = 1, for example, we impose regret neutrality.
Doing so gives the following “expected regrets” for each action
• ER(Stay on MR) = 0.7× 0α + 0.03× 13α + 0.25× 3α + 0.02× 3α=
0.03× 13+ 0.25× 3+ 0.02× 3 = 1.2
• ER(Go down SR) = 0.7× 3α + 0.03× 0α + 0.25× 0α + 0.02× 6α=
0.7× 3+ 0.02× 6 = 2.22
• ER(Park in CP) = 0.7× 7α + 0.03× 10α + 0.25× 10α + 0.02× 0α =
0.7× 7+ 0.03× 10+ 0.25× 10 = 7.7
Hence, the action which yields the minimum expected regret is “Stay
on the main road”, which, as we assume α = 1, is equivalent to the
action chosen by maximising expected utility.
However, if we consider the same problem for an individual who
is “regret averse” (in keeping with most experimental evidence), and,
for example, assume a parameter of regret aversion α = 2, then the
expected regrets for each action are as follows
• ER(Stay on MR) = 0.7× 0α + 0.03× 13α + 0.25× 3α + 0.02× 3α=
0.03× 169+ 0.25× 9+ 0.02× 9 = 7.32
• ER(Go down SR) = 0.7× 3α + 0.03× 0α + 0.25× 0α + 0.02× 6α=
0.7× 9+ 0.02× 36 = 7.02
• ER(Park in CP) = 0.7× 7α + 0.03× 10α + 0.25× 10α + 0.02× 0α =
0.7× 49+ 0.03× 100+ 0.25× 100 = 62.3
As such, for this regret minimising agent, the regret minimising action
is to “Go down side road”. As the agent is now more sensitive to large
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regrets, the largest potential regret, (of staying on the main road, where
there is no space, hence parking in the car park, only to realise there
was space in the side road all along), weighs very heavily in the agent’s
decision43. However, if α remains fixed, then if this problem is repeated
over and over again (as described in the motivating example on Page 29)
then the agent will choose the same action, whatever that may be, over
and over again, under the regret minimising framework. To develop a
model where an agent can make different decisions in each stage of the
repeated problem, we must introduce a feedback loop from the past to
the present which allows one, or more, of the parameters in the model
to vary.
1.3.2 The Dynamic Regret Model
As discussed by Loomes and Sugden, a regret-based model, which
either incorporates regret loving, or, more usually, regret aversion, can
predict and be used to explain observed violations of Expected Utility
Theory. Indeed, Hayashi model does this for values of α either greater
than or less than one. Hence, applying the static model, presented above,
will not provide much new insight, even when applied to much wider
contexts, over and above Loomes and Sugden original observation,
when considering patterns of behaviour and decision making.
To make best use of the model, therefore, we must look beyond the
static decision making framework to a dynamic one. Assuming that
the payoff matrix and associated state probabilities are exogenously
given to the individual, this leaves two possible options for adapting
the static model into a dynamic one.
Firstly, we can let the utility function of the agent, u(.), vary over time;
specifically as a result of previous decisions and consequences. This
approach brings us into the realm of endogenously determined tastes
and preferences, the implications of which are discussed by Houthakker
and Taylor [40] with regards to habit formation, by Pollak [69] with
regards to welfare analysis, and by Hammond [29] with regards to long-
run choice behaviour. As this approach has been extensively researched,
without the need to introduce regret as a additional component, unless
there is a reason and method to link experienced regret (which Hayashi
model creates) to an endogenously determined utility function44, there
is little to be gained from using this approach with Hayashi framework.
The second approach is to instead think of the parameter of regret
aversion, α, in Hayashi’s model, as being endogenously determined.
This approach has a number of advantages, and is much more in
keeping with existing psychological research which was presented in
the motivation.
Conceptually, the idea is that in each period, t, the decision making
agent determines how regretful large “utility gaps” are, compared
43 of interest with this result is that the regret averse agent (when α = 2) chooses a different
action than would a risk averse agent (who would choose to stay on the main road),
indicating that, though linked concepts, theories of regret and risk aversion can lead to
very different predictions of behaviour. For example, a risk averse individual is unlikely
to play the lottery, but a regret averse individual fears seeing “their numbers” come up
when they haven’t bought a ticket, and so continues to play.
44 a plausible feedback link between experienced regret and the utility function involves a
“psychological hangover” effect whereby the experience of a highly regretful decision
reduces the utility obtained from any payoff in subsequent periods. However, supposing,
for instance that the utility of any payoff is reduced by a fixed amount, this will not
change the outcome of Hayashi model as the constant reduction term will drop out.




Table 3: Monetary Example
to small “utility gaps”. Using this terminology, a “utility gap” is the
difference in utility between a outcome you obtained, and an outcome
you could have obtained, had you chosen differently. Suppose an agent
is faced with two actions, A and B, and two states of the world x and y,
and receives monetary payoffs as given in Table 3.
In this example the utility gap between actions A and B, in state
of the world x, is |u($4) − u($6)| (a small utility gap), and, in state of
the world y is |u($10) − u($1)| (a large utility gap). The agent, however,
does not experience the utility gap, per se, but rather the regret that
this utility gap generates.
Suppose, therefore, that the experienced regret that the utility gap in
state x generates45 is R1, and the experienced regret that the utility gap
in state y generates46 is R2. Then if R1 and R2 are approximately similar,
or close in magnitude, to the agent, then the regret obtained from a
large utility gap is similar to the regret obtained from a small utility gap.
That is to say, the size of the utility foregone does not seem to translate
to the level of regret experienced. However, if R2 is significantly larger
than R1, then the size of the utility gap is positively impacting the level
of regret experienced. In the terminology of Loomes and Sugden, this
second case displays more regret aversion than the first and, in the
terminology of Hayashi, this translates to a larger value for α.
Hence, in order to determine a value for α that would represent
the degree of anticipated regret aversion which an agent would use
in the Hayashi model, we need to find a way of estimating how “bad”
large regrets loom on the agent when compared to small regrets, at
a given time period t. The static model assumes this is a preference
parameter for the individual; in effect saying the individual knows
their own affective response to a utility gap before the outcome of the
decision itself. However, the evidence presented in the motivation, from
affective forecasting, learning models and neuroscience, suggest that
an individual will look to information in the past, where available, in
order to better estimate such a parameter for use in decision making.
In short, the degree to which you anticipate large regrets will outweigh
small regrets is determined, at least in part, by the degree to which
large regrets outweighed small regrets in the past.
Modelling Memory
Returning to the monetary example in Table 3, for an individual
who is using past experience of regrets to guide future anticipated
regrets, if they wanted to know the regret which would be experienced
from a small utility gap of |u($4) − u($6)| and a large utility gap of
45 that is, the regret from choosing action A, observing state of the world x, realising your
payoff is £4, and additionally realising that you would have obtained £6 had you chosen
action B
46 that is, the regret from choosing action B, observing state of the world y, realising your
payoff is £1, and additionally realising that you would have obtained £10 had you chosen
action A
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|u($10) − u($1)| the ideal, “best-case” memory to use would be the
remembered regret from previous utility gaps of exactly this size. That
is to say, the individual has experienced these exact situations before,
and has a good memory of the experienced regrets which resulted. This
situation is, however, not particularly realistic, and hence interesting,
for a few reasons.
Firstly, it requires the individual to remember the precise context in
which the regret was experienced (i.e. the precise cause) in addition
to the experienced regret, and not simply the experienced regret itself.
This is similar to expecting an individual to be able to give a precise
account of why they were unhappy on a particular day last week, when
it is more likely that they will simply remember by associating the time
period (the day) with a particular affective state (“I was unhappy on
Tuesday last week”).
Secondly, it requires the individual to experience precisely the same
choice problem more than once. Though the initial motivating example
on page 29 was framed in this fashion, it is more realistic that there will
be at least some elements of randomness in a “real-world” repeated
problem. For example, when considering which road to drive down
when parking at my girlfriend’s house, the exact time spent walking
to the house will not only depend on my choice of road, but where
exactly a parking space is available on the road, and hence the payoffs
in the decision matrix may be distorted by this element of randomness.
In such cases, where an individual wants to appeal to the “similarity”
of past experience in order to make future decisions under uncertainty,
the theory of “Case-Based Decisions” (Gilboa and Schmeidler [27])
already provides a framework to analyse these problems, so it will not
be explored further here at this time.
Thirdly, even if it were the case that the dynamic problem of interest
was a repeated decision, where the payoffs and/or actions were not
distorted by randomness, then learning about the experienced regret
that results from each action and each state of the world would simply
require each outcome in the payoff matrix to be experienced once, and
we are in no different a context to when it was the payoffs themselves
which needed to be experienced once to be discovered. The regret
is simply an extra component of the utility function which is learnt
through experience. The individual is not, however, learning about
their own regret reaction to utility gaps, and hence learning about α,
but rather learning about their own reaction to very specific situations.
They would, for example, not be able to apply what they have learned
if one of the payoffs in the matrix was changed, as they would if they
were learning about αinstead.
The three points made above, in conjunction with the initial mo-
tivation about memory and reinforcement learning, suggest that we
need to consider a model of memory whereby it is just the magnitude
of the regret (and the time period in which that magnitude was ex-
perienced) which is remembered, and not the context which caused
the regret to arise. This gives the individual, engaged in a repeated
decision making problem, a memory stock of regrets at each time period
where a decision was taken, realised, and experienced. We can then
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make assumptions about that memory stock which reflect the patters
of memory of emotions analysed in the motivation47.
Modelling Learning and Feedback
As described above, what is required from a learning and feedback
model is a method for transforming the memory stock of regrets48 into
the anticipated parameter of regret aversion, α, for use in the decision
problem at time period t. As discussed on page 32, the coefficient of
regret aversion α should be
• < 1 when it is anticipated that large utility gaps will not yield
much more regret than small utility gaps (which can be thought
of as regret loving or regret seeking behaviour, even though the
individual does not “seek” or “love” regret using the normal
definitions of the words, or, alternatively, that the regret function
is concave)
• = 1 when the individual is making a decision under the assump-
tion of regret neutrality (and so the individual has a linear regret
function) so large regrets do not loom disproportionately larger than
small regrets to the individual
• > 1 when the individual is regret averse 49 (and so the individual
has a convex regret function) so large regrets do loom dispropor-
tionately larger than small regrets to the individual
Hence, in keeping with the literature on reinforcement learning, as
described on page 20, the memory stock of the individual should
reinforce the belief that they are
• Regret Loving (and hence give them a value of α < 1) if and
only if they have a memory stock where large regrets are not that
much more severe than small regrets
• Regret Neutral (and hence give them a value of α = 1) if and only
if they have a memory stock where large regrets are directly in
proportion to small regrets
• Regret Averse (and hence give them a value of α > 1) if and only
if they have a memory stock where large regrets loom dispropor-
tionately larger than small regrets.
This then becomes a reinforcement learning type procedure, because
each new regret experienced (after a decision has been made, resolved
and experienced) will add to the memory stock and reinforce the belief
of the individual, either in the direction of becoming more regret averse
or more regret loving, depending on what new information it provides
to the individual about how the individual experiences and feels large
regrets compared to small regrets.
This procedure creates a feedback loop, in keeping with the original
ideas of Baumeister et al., as displayed in Figure 3, whereby the affective
residue of the decisions at t − 1, t − 2, t − 3 etc., help inform and
47 for example, a individual whose memory fades over time (a reasonable assumptions) can
have a discount factor applied to their memory stock so that more recent regrets loom
larger than older regrets.
48 that is, the remembered magnitude of regret experienced at time t− 1, t− 2, t− 3, etc.
49 as experimental evidence suggests most people are
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direct the decision making of the individual at time t. In addition,
it is a learning procedure whereby the individual is seeking to use
information about past experienced regret, not simply to learn about
their emotional response to a very specific situation50, but to learn
about their entire “taste” for regret, as given by α, so that they can
make better decisions in the future.
As such, what is needed to create a predictive, dynamic mathematical
model, is a function which can map the memory stock of regrets to α in
such a way that it has the three properties of Regret Loving, Neutrality
and Aversion described above.
Mapping M to α
The prior intuition indicates that, at each time period t, the memory
stock of the individual, Mt, will consist of the magnitude of regrets
experienced at times t− 1, t− 2, t− 3 etc., where the individual can
remember at which time period each regret was experienced51, but
cannot remember the precise utility gap which led to the regret52. Thus,
the individual can be thought of as “boundedly rational”, as they are
attempting to infer helpful information from their past, in order to
guide future behaviour, but there are cognitive limitations, beyond
the control of the individual, on what information is stored in their
memory. As such, there are a couple of ways of graphically visualising
this information.
Firstly, the regrets can be thought of as simply ordered by time. This
approach is useful when wishing to apply time specific transforma-
tions to the memory stock to reflect biases or limitations. For instance,
consider a time-ordered memory stock of regrets (given for 30 time
periods) as given in Figure 10.
In this situation, we may wish to impose a “fading affect” transfor-
mation, whereby regrets fresh in the mind (at t = 28, 29, 30), still have
their full affect, but those which are further back are subject to fading
affect. For instance, if affect was to fade by 5% each period, then the
transformed memory stock at period 31 would be represented as in
Figure 11.
This representation of the memory stock, however, is not particularly
helpful when estimating a value for α as it compares “new” to “old”
regrets, and not “large” to “small”, as is required when discussing
degrees of regret aversion. As such, a more helpful representation is to
order the memory stock by magnitude of regret, not time, so that small
regrets appear first, and large regrets appear last. Doing so with the
memory stock example above gives the graph in Figure 12.
50 A related literature is that of Case-Based Decision Theory byGilboa and Schmeidler [27].
Whereas many of the concepts used in that literature are similar to the ideas presented
here (using rules to take information from the past to inform decision making in the
future, for example), the notable difference is the move away from specific “cases”. The
Gilboa and Schmeidler approach is to look back into the memory stock for a “similar”
case to the current decision being faced, and use the similarity to guide the future
decision making. This approach of linking specific decisions to specific cases from the
memory stock contrasts with the approach of Baumeister et al., whereby it is the affective
residue of the memory stock which guides future decision making behaviour. Whilst
both approaches are equally meritorious, simply recreating Gilboa and Schmeidler’s
work, but using the concept of cases to modify Regret Theory, as opposed to Expected
Utility Theory, doesn’t appear to add much value to the existing literature on the subject.
This belief guides the choice to work with the approach of Baumeister et al. here, helping
to bring an element of economic modelling to a previously under-developed area.
51 hence knows the ordering of the regrets
52 and hence does not know the cause of the regret
Figure 10: A randomly generated memory stock of regrets, ordered by time
Figure 11: Memory stock of regrets with fading affect
Figure 12: Memory stock of regrets ordered by magnitude
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1.3 model 41
If the regrets contained in the memory stock at time t = 31 are
ordered by time to give the vector M31 = (R1, R2, ... , R29, R30) where
Ri is the memory of regret experienced at time i, but retrieved at time
t = 31, then we can likewise create a vector of regrets, retrieved at time
t = 31, but ordered by magnitude











where RO1 = min {R1, R2, ... , R29, R30}








Hence, what is needed is a function which maps
f : R30 → R+
so f(MO31) = α31, where α31 is the coefficient of regret aversion,
based upon the memory of regrets experienced in the preceding 30
periods, to be used in the Hayashi decision making framework at time
t = 31.
In Hayashi’s theoretical model, α transforms utility gaps into experi-
enced regrets, so the α31 generated by f must somehow relate utility
gaps to experienced regrets, despite the fact that the memory stock
M31 does not store information on causality, and hence utility gaps.
As such, the individual must make an assumption about utility gaps,
from their memory of experienced regrets, and the assumption I sug-
gest is that the difference in utility gap which caused regrets ROi and
ROi+1 is independent of i. In essence, this assumption is saying that the
increase in regrets in the ordered memory stock were the result linearly
increasing utility gaps. Hence,
• if the increase in experienced regret is proportionate throughMO31,
then large experienced regrets were only proportionately worse
than small experienced regrets, and so the individual is “regret
neutral”
• if the increase in experienced regret is increasing through MO31,
then large experienced regrets were disproportionately worse
than small experienced regrets, and so the individual is “regret
averse”
• if the increase in experienced regret decreasing through MO31,
then large experienced regrets are not that much worse than small
experienced regrets, and so the individual is “regret loving”
Thinking graphically, this translates into a “line of best fit” which can
be draw through the graph of ordered memory stock. If the line of best
fit is linear, then experienced regret is increasing proportionately to
the “assumed” increasing utility gaps, and so the individual is regret
neutral. Equivalently, if the line of best fit is convex, the individual is
regret averse, and if it is concave, the individual is regret loving. For
example, fitting a power function to the ordered memory stock graph
in Figure 11 yields a coefficient of 1.28, suggesting that this individual
is slightly regret averse, and this is shown in Figure 13.
However, there are other types of functions which could equally be
thought of as representing the degree of experienced regret aversion in
the ordered memory stock, and can be thought of as more intuitive for
a nondeclarative memory process53. For instance, we could focus on the
53 it seems unlikely that a subconscious learning-from-memory process, as described, would,
in each time period, compute the equivalent of a least squares regression to find the
implied coefficient of a power function on their ordered memory stock. In keeping with
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Figure 13: Ordered memory stock of regrets with line of best fit
extremes of the memory stock, compared to the average. If the memory
of the individual is regret neutral, then the difference between the
largest and the median regret, and the difference between the median
and the smallest regret, should be approximately equal (as regret would
be linearly increasing over the ordered memory stock). Hence, taking
the ratio of the these two quantities gives an approximation for the
degree to which the jump from median to largest regret outweighs the
jump from smallest to median54. If this number is greater than one,
then, again, this implies regret aversion, and if less than one it implies
regret loving.
A similar intuitive approach to the problem is found by calculating
the sample skewness of the memory stock, which answers the question
“are the bulk of the regrets in the memory large or small?” Again, this
question is a more intuitive feeling that the individual could have, rather
than explicit calculation as in the case of the estimated power function,
and so is more appealing to be a candidate for the function which maps
M to α. It would relate to the degree of regret aversion, as an individual
who has a positively skewed memory stock is used to experiencing
mostly small regrets, but would have the occasional large regret (in the
long right tail) which stands out as significantly different to the norm.
This is similar to the regret averse individual who fears the occasional
large regret which looms in the large right tail, and so if the memory
stock has positive sample skewness, this should translate to an implied
value of α > 1. On the other side, a negatively skewed memory stock
would translate to an individual who is used to experiencing large
regrets, and hence can be thought of as regret loving, translating to an
the literature on reinforcement learning, a simpler function which gives rise to a feeling
about the memory stock, such as “the worst regret is disproportionately bad” or “most
of the regrets are below the average” seems more plausible.
54 this can be slightly modified to move from “largest” to “larger” regrets (so not completely
dependent on the extremes of the ordered memory stock) by replacing the median with
the mean in the above calculation, though this comes at the expense of adding a notion
of an “average” to the memory stock, which may not necessarily be one of the regrets
actually experienced.
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implied value of α < 1. The obvious problem here is that the sample
skewness, calculated from the memory stock, does not only map to the
positive reals (as required for the function f), and does not give a value
of α = 1 when the distribution is symmetric. As such an additional
transformation will need to be included if we are to use this estimate
of α (as discussed later on in 1.4.3).
These different functions have slightly differing psychological inter-
pretations and limitations, and hence all could justifiably be used in the
dynamic model to map M to α. In setting up the dynamic model which
will be used to study behaviour, it is possible to use any of them, but
if they all have approximately the same impact in the model (i.e. the
model is robust to changes in the precise map from M to α), then it will
be only down to personal preference over the psychological justification
as to which one should be used. As such, the results section (specifically
1.4.3) will include a discussion on the consequence of using each of the
three maps.
Completing the Feedback Loop
Once the map from M to α is specified, it is then simply a case of using
α in the Hayashi framework at time t, resolving uncertainty to calculate
the experienced regret (subject to any impact bias transformations) re-
sulting from the decision made, encoding the new regret to the memory
stock, applying any time specific transformations to the memory stock
as we move from period t to t+ 1, then reapplying the function f to the
memory stock to calculate the new α to be used at time period t+ 1.
The specific decision problem we will analyse using this approach is
outlined in the next section.
1.4 simulation
1.4.1 Aims and Purpose
The aim of creating such a model of dynamic regret aversion is twofold.
Firstly, it is intended as a theoretical model of how existing models of
regret aversion can be extended to better portray the true behaviour of
the emotion (regret) which we wish to incorporate in models of decision
making under uncertainty. It does this by using existing psychological
and neuroscience research to, in essence, make the emotion of regret
behave more like an emotion in the models.
Secondly, having shown above how it is theoretically possible to
develop such a model, we would like to explore the welfare, actions
chosen, and patterns of behaviour exhibited by such an individual
who is making decisions under risk using the dynamic regret aversion
framework. In addition, we would like to explore the extent to which
those observed patterns of behaviour are robust to changes in the
various functional form specifications of the individual components
of the feedback loop, and which components of the feedback loop are
critical for various “non-standard” patterns of behaviour.
The use of simulation techniques
The specific methodology for answering the above questions is detailed
in subsequent sections, but, in short, it relies on the use of a Monte
Carlo simulation approach to analyse patterns of behaviour, rather than
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analytically solving a system of dynamic equations to demonstrate a
precise relationship, or convergent pattern, for behaviour over time, as
a function of the various components of the feedback loop. Though
obviously an analytical solution would be preferred, and the first best
option, the degrees of freedom in the model, and the complexity of
the interlinking parts of the feedback loop, prevent this from being a
realistic proposition. Hence simulation methods are the only suitable
approach for a problem of this order.
1.4.2 Framework
Developing on the Static Regret Model
In the simulation, a decision maker will be faced with a repeated
decision under uncertainty, where the specific payoffs associated with
each action and state of the world will vary in each period, but maintain
a constant structure (outlined in the next section). This represents a
decision maker who has to make the same type, or category, of decision
on a regular basis, but where the exact problem being faced in any
given period is never the same. In each period, there are several stages
of the learning and feedback processes to construct, before the decision
maker can use the Hayashi choice rule. Thus, the decision making
process works as follows
1. The memory stock from the end of the last period is transformed
by any “storage” processes and biases55.
2. A value of α, the degree of anticipated regret aversion, is con-
structed from the memory stock generated in stage 1, according
to the specific function f being employed.
3. The decision maker chooses an action, given the complete pay-










p(ω), where the value
of α is given by stage 2.
4. Uncertainty is resolved, and the decision maker obtains utility
according to the action chosen in stage 3 and the state of the
world which was experienced.







, where ω is the state of
the world experienced, c the action chosen in stage 3, and αe
is the degree of experienced regret aversion, as implied by the
degree of anticipated regret aversion from stage 2, but subject to
any “impact” transformations57.
6. Re is added to the memory stock, subject to any “encoding” trans-
formations58.
55 for example, fading affect
56 as in 1.3.1
57 for example, an impact bias
58 for instance, it may make sense that “zero” regrets, i.e. where the ex-post optimal action
was the one chosen, should not be added to the memory stock, as there was no experience
of regret to remember
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Payoff Matrix ω1 ω2 ω3






$-Bet 0 0 2β
Table 4: Simulation Payoff Matrix
This procedure then “loops” back to the start, and is replicated in every
period of the repeated decision problem.
P-Bet, $-Bet and Insurance
The above procedure could be applied to any repeated decision problem
under uncertainty where the complete payoff matrix, and associated
probabilities, are specified at each stage. However, the problem I will
analyse using this approach builds on the example (on page 29) dis-
cussed previously.
In the example of which road to try and park down, there was
one “risky” option, going down the side road, one “safer” option,
staying on the main road, and one “full insurance” option, of parking
in the car park. These three options translate to three commonly used
options for participants in behavioural economics experiments; the
P-Bet (a high probability, low reward “safer” option), the $-bet (a low
probability, high reward “risky” option), and “full insurance” (where
every state of the world will yield the same payoff if the insurance
is taken). Comparing the preferences of people for P-Bets compared
to $-Bets has been used extensively in experimental economics when
studying decision under uncertainty59, and hence it is appropriate to
use this framework here when considering a simulation representative
of a single decision making agent who is faced with multiple rounds of
a decision problem. A “full insurance” option is also added, as, in this
simulation, the decision making agent is forced to participate in the
problem in each period, and does not have the choice whether to opt in
or opt out as they, most likely, would in a real world scenario. Hence the
“full insurance” option represents a decision to not participate in any
risky behaviour, though this does not exempt them from experiences of
regret, as they still observe the resolution of uncertainty, regardless of
the fact that their outcome will no longer depend on the state of the
world60.
Thinking in such terms, the payoff matrix for the decision making
agent can be thought of (under certain parameter restrictions) as in
Table 4.
For example, if p(ω1) = p(ω2) = p(ω3) = 1/3, so all states of the
world, ωi, are equiprobable, and β > 0, then each action has the
same expected value61, but the P-Bet offers a medium reward with
high probability (β with probability 2/3) compared to the $-Bet which
offers a high reward with low probability (2β with probability 1/3)62.
59 for example, Lichtenstein and Slovic [56] is one of the earliest uses of the technique
60 by saying they observe they resolution of uncertainty, this implies that although they can
decide not to participate in the risky gamble, they cannot bury their head in the sand at
the same time.
61 EV = 2β/3
62 typically in experiments a $-Bet will have a higher expected value than a P-Bet, as, if
they were equal, any typical risk-averse person would always take the P-Bet. However,
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Regret Matrix ω1 ω2 ω3












$-Bet βα βα 0
Table 5: Simulation Regret Matrix
From this position, and by assuming, for simplicity, the utility of each
outcome is simply given by the payoff in the matrix (so u(β) = β),
it is possible to calculate the Regret Matrix, by calculating, using the
Hayashi procedure, by how much better off the person would have
been had they chosen the optimal action for a given state of the world,
compared to the action they actually chose63. This is shown in Table 5.
Again, following through with the Hayashi procedure, we can cal-
culate the Expected Regret of each action as follows (again assuming















• ER($-Bet) = 23β
α
In this case, the “expected regret minimising” action will depend on
the coefficient of regret aversion α, but not on the parameter β. As
such, plotting the expected regret functions as a function of α will
graphically show the intervals of α in which each action will be chosen.
For example, for β = 1, Figure 14 shows the expected regret associated
with each action.
Results under the Simple Static Regret Model
Figure 14 shows that:
• For α < 1 the P-Bet is the regret minimising action.
• For α = 1 all three actions give the same expected regret64 and
hence the individual is indifferent.
• For 1 < α < 2 full insurance is the regret minimising action.
• For α = 2 the individual is indifferent between the $-Bet and full
insurance.
• For α > 2 the $-Bet is the regret minimising action.
throughout this work, we wish to make the distinction between risk and regret aversion,
so no such assumption of risk aversion is needed or made, hence the expected values are
the same.
63 compared to the Regret Matrix given in the initial motivating example on page 29, the
parameter of regret aversion α has now been included in the matrix in Table 5, to specify
that these are no longer merely utility gaps, but experienced regrets.
64 When α = 1, the individual is regret neutral, and hence will choose the same action as
they would under maximisation of expected value, as described by Hayashi [34, p244].
As all three actions have the same expected value by construction, the individual is
indifferent between all three actions when α = 1.
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Figure 14: Expected Regret graph for β = 1
These results of the static model highlight several points. Firstly, the
distinction between risk aversion and regret aversion is noticed in even
this most simple of contexts. Regardless of the size of β, by taking a
regret approach as a opposed to a risk approach (utility is linear in
payoffs), the most regret averse person (for α > 2) takes the most risky
option (the $-Bet), as opposed to the full insurance option (which any
risk averse person would take). Secondly, the degree of “riskiness” in
the option chosen is neither increasing or decreasing in α. The regret
loving person (α < 1) would choose the P-Bet, changing to a lower
risk option (full insurance) as α increases beyond 1, before moving to
higher risk option again (the $-Bet) once α exceeds 2. Lastly, in this
specific simple context, it’s not possible to have the regret minimising
action change simply as a result of varying the magnitude of β, or, in
other words, the perceived significance of the problem at hand. It is
only through variance in α that we can construct a situation where the
regret minimising action will change, supporting the need for a model
which allows α to vary when seeking explanation for behaviour where
the problem at hand has a familiar and unchanging structure65.
1.4.3 The Repeated Problem
Varying β through λ
In this simulation, β represents the magnitude of the problem facing
the individual. If β is small, then the consequences for each action are
small, and hence the degree of regret associated with each action - state
of the world combination (as given in Table 5) is small. If, however, β is
large, then the consequences for each action are large, and hence the
potential negative emotional consequences from regret are large.
65 as was the motivation in the parking example given earlier on page 29
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As previously discussed, in the repeated problem, some variability in
β is needed to distinguish between learning about regret (for which this
framework is appropriate) and learning about a very specific situation
(where it is not) . Yet, the precise nature of the variability can take many
forms. For instance, we could imagine that the problem being repeated
has a true, underlying value for β, say βˆ, and hence the variability
could be a degree of “noise” associated with the observation of βˆ in
each time period. In this instance, we could think of the problem being
given by βt = βˆ+ εt, where εt is simply a normally distributed error
term. Looking at the dynamic properties, using regret, of a system
like this, would give insight into how people react to situations where
they under or overestimate the severity of a problem (i.e. |εt| is very
large), if they also make a bad decision, and hence experience regret,
in the situation. That is to say, we could look at the consequences of
compounding an error in judgement (large |εt|) with an error in action
(and experiencing regret) on future choice. There is, however, a problem
with seeking to answer this question in the current framework, and
that is the parameter β is assumed to be > 0 in order to consider the
three action problem (P-Bet, $-Bet and Full Insurance) in terms of gains,
and not losses. As such, any assumption made on the distribution of εt
would have to include a restriction so that βˆ+ εt is positive, and this
adds an extra layer of complexity in specifying the exact problem in the
simulation model.66
A different interpretation to consider is that βt represents the severity
of any uncertain decision faced on a period by period basis (be this
annually, weekly, hourly etc.) and the three options are simplifications
of a range of behaviours open to the individual; i.e. they can choose to
behave very riskily ($-Bet), mildly riskily (P-Bet) or very safely (Full
Insurance) in each period. In this context, it doesn’t make as much
sense to assume that there is an “average” degree of severity, βˆ, around
which there is some variance67, but rather that the majority of decisions
are small and inconsequential (low β), but occasionally there are more
severe decisions (high β) which can have a large impact on welfare
and emotions. This, more realistic, specification of the problem, is also
beneficial as there is a natural, analogous, mathematical distribution for
β; the exponential distribution. By using the exponential distribution,
it also allows us to fully characterise the problem at hand with only
one parameter, λ, the rate parameter of the exponential distribution68.
λ, therefore, also represents the likelihood of getting a highly important
problem in any time period (decreasing in λ).
As such, throughout the different stages of the simulation, we will
take βt to be given by a random draw from the exponential distribution,
with parameter λ to be specified in each such case. Of interest will be
the degree to which λ, or, in essence, the severity of the environment
in which the decision maker is operating, will impact their behaviour,
emotions and welfare.
66 Whilst the current set-up could be modified to allow for negative values of β, as in the
motivating example, experimental evidence on loss aversion has shown significantly
different behaviour when a problem is framed as a loss when compared to gain. Con-
sequently, in this stylised computer simulation, only positive values are considered to
abstract from the discussion of loss aversion.
67 and, if the variance is normally distributed, this implies that decisions of very low
consequence are as likely as those with very high consequence, which seems fairly
improbable in most contexts
68 under the exponential distribution, for instance, the mean is 1/λ and the variance 1/λ2
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The Baseline Dynamic Model
For the purposes of comparison to results later on, it is important to es-
tablish a baseline dynamic model and note the behaviour which results
under the simplest possible conditions. The baseline model enables
us to specify parameters which will be kept constant throughout the
simulations (such as the use of the exponential distribution mentioned
in the previous section) and hence also the specific parameters which
will be changed over the course of the different simulations. The specific
outcomes of the model, which are of interest for describing welfare,
emotions and patterns of behaviour, will also be introduced, to be used
as a reference point against which all subsequent changes, which arise
from differing the model parameters, can be judged.
The secondary aim of the baseline model is to present what happens
when the static, three action model (as presented in 1.4.2) is repeated in
the simulation without the introduction of any period to period feedback
loop from regret. As such, this can be thought of as a summary of
what the existing Hayashi model tells us, on average, about a P-Bet/$-
Bet/Full Insurance decision problem. The absence of the feedback loop,
however, creates the need to make assumptions regarding αt for use
in the Hayashi model in each time period. As explained previously
in 1.4.2, when p(ω1) = p(ω2) = p(ω3) = 1/3, the action chosen will
depend entirely on α, and not on β (and hence λ if β is drawn from
the exponential distribution). Hence, if αt = α and so fixed over time,
then just one action will be chosen in every period of the simulation,
and there is no more information to be gained from the repeated
model compared to the one-shot model. Even if αt is drawn from a
distribution, it is simply the proportions of that distribution which lie in
the three intervals (0 < α < 1 ; 1 < α < 2 ; α > 2) which will determine
the proportions of each action which are chosen in the simulation. For
example, consider a simulation of 10000 repetitions of the three action
problem, where αt is drawn from a uniform distribution in the interval
(0, 3). In this simulation, each action would be expected to be chosen
1/3 of the time, however the value of λ, representing the severity of the
decisions facing the individual, will determine the experienced utility
and experienced regret. In addition, assumptions made regarding the
nature of any impact biases (i.e. the difference between αt, used to
calculated expected regret, and αet , used to calculate experienced regret)
will impact the level of regret ultimately experienced by the decision
maker over the course of the simulation.
This intuition can be summarised by Figure 15 which shows the
results of the baseline model69 being run 10000 times for a range of
values of λ.
As λ increases, the mean of the exponential distribution from which
βt is drawn falls hyperbolically, and hence the average per period payoff
falls hyperbolically too. As the results of the 10000 period simulation
fall very close to the theoretical prediction, this suggests that 10000
periods is a large enough sample from which to draw accurate, per
period conclusions.
We can also graphically represent the average per period regret expe-
rienced in the simulation, but, as previously stated, this will depend
on assumptions made about the nature of the impact bias, or how the
αt used in the Hayashi decision calculation differs from the αet which
69 the baseline model has αt drawn from a uniform distribution in the interval (0,3) and
p(ω1) = p(ω2) = p(ω3) = 1/3
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Figure 15: Average Per Period Utility by λ
actually generates the regret experienced. For example, if αt = αet , then
the assumption is that there is no impact bias and regret is experienced
exactly as it was predicted. In this case average per period regret is as
shown in Figure 16.
As with the average per period utility, the average per period ex-
perienced regret falls as λ increases, but the rate of fall is faster for
experienced regret, and the magnitude is also much larger for λ < 1.
The implication of this is that, for low values of λ, or, intuitively, more
severe decision making problems, the magnitude of experienced regret
far outweighs any potential gains from experienced utility. Indeed, if
“total experienced utility” is composed of the per period payoff minus
the experienced regret then the individual is, on average and for values
of λ < 2, experiencing “negative” utility, as indicated in Figure 17.
There are, however, other types of models of the impact bias that we
can consider which better reflect the experimental evidence presented
previously in 1.4.2. For instance, we can assume that the predicted
coefficient of regret aversion, αt, is unrelated to the experienced coef-
ficient of regret aversion αet , by assuming that experienced regret is
proportional to the utility gap regardless of what was thought when
taking the decision. This implies that αet = 1.
As an intermediate case, we can assume that the anticipated coeffi-
cient of regret, αt is an exaggeration of the true experienced coefficient
of regret, so that utility gaps are neither as “good”, or as “bad”, as they
seem in anticipation. This can be achieved by setting αet =
√
αt so that
coefficients in excess of 1 are scaled back, and coefficient less than 1 are
scaled up.
The results of making such assumptions about the impact bias are
seen in Figure 19.




αt is sufficient to remove
the “extreme” nature of regret seen when λ gets small, and, therefore,
is a good representation of the impact bias whereby the individual’s
own ability to rationalise, but not predict this rationalisation, leads to
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APPER − Alpha−e = Alpha APPER − Alpha−e = 1
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TEU − Alpha−e = Alpha TEU − Alpha−e = 1
TEU − Alpha−e = root(Alpha)
Figure 18: Average Per Period Experienced Regret (APPER) and Average Per
Period Total Experienced Utility (TEU) for different assumptions
about the Impact Bias
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APPER picking P−Bet APPER picking Insurance
APPER picking $−Bet
Figure 19: Average Per Period Experienced Regret for each type of action
Keeping αet =
√
αt also allows us to see the emotional residue of
regret that the individual would associate with each type of action cho-
sen in the problem. As seen previously, regardless of β (and hence λ),
it is the coefficient of anticipated regret aversion which will determine
the action chosen in each period of the simulation (1.4.2), and so this
could be expected to translate to associating the P-Bet with the smallest
experiences of regret70 and associating the $-Bet with the largest experi-
ences of regret71. However, by looking at the average regret experienced
when each type of action is chosen, in Figure 19, we can see that this
is conditional on the size of λ and hence the severity of the problem
facing the individual.
For values of λ < 2, or fairly severe problems, it is indeed the case
that the $-Bet is associated with the highest average per period expe-
rienced regret of all three actions, and so the individual would likely
associate the act of “risky” gambling (choosing the $-Bet) with high
levels of regret compared to the other actions. However, when λ > 2,
the severity of the problems facing the individual are reduced so that a
higher proportion of utility gaps are less than 1. Hence, raising them to
a power of a number > 1 has the effect of reducing the magnitude of
regret, not enhancing it. This effect is a consequence of the numerical
simulation approach taken in this chapter, and the use of the exponen-
tial distribution to construct the framework of the simulation. Clearly,
the utility gap being less than magnitude 1 has no economic interpreta-
tion, but the numerical effect of having these utility gaps dominate the
simulation (when λ > 2) is to generate a model which has a counter-
intuitive interpretation. As such, we will restrict much of the analysis
which follows to values of λ which are less than 2 in order to maintain
the general idea of a more regret averse individual suffering from utility
gaps more than a less regret averse individual.
70 when the P-Bet is chosen, αt < 1, hence
√
αt < 1, hence any utility gaps are raised to
the power of a number less than one to calculate experienced regret




2, hence any utility gaps are raised
to the power of a number greater than
√
2 to calculate experienced regret
1.4 simulation 53
Constructing the Memory Stock
In the repeated problem, the Memory Stock is constructed by adding
the experienced regret in a specific period, Rt, to the set of regrets
from all previous periods Mt = (R1, R2, ...Rt−2, Rt−1) to create the
Memory Stock which is to be used in the next decision period, Mt+1 =
(R1, R2, ...Rt−2, Rt−1, Rt).
However, at each decision period, there must be assumptions made
on the nature of both “storage” of and “recall” from that memory stock.
For example, a “fading affect” bias implies that the magnitude of the
affect, given by Rt, will fade over time. Mathematically this can be given
by a discount function applied to the memory stock, and a typical form
of discounting used in economic models is exponential discounting.
This implies a constant discount rate of δ such that the experience of
regret at period t, but recalled at period s, where s > t, is given by
Rst = δ
s−tRt. This means, for example, that the experience of regret in
period t, when recalled 1 period later at t+ 1, has already faded by a
factor of δ72.
In terms of “recall”, it is necessary to make assumptions on the cogni-
tive limit of the individual in terms of the amount of information from
the memory which can be recalled at any one time. As discussed previ-
ously, the first stage of this is that the individual does not remember
the cause of the regretful experience, only the magnitude and time of
the regret, but it further seems unreasonable to assume that regrets of
100, 200, 300 periods ago are recalled when facing a decision at period
t73. As such it is necessary to place a time limit on the memory stock
to be used in each decision period. Furthermore, as we are interested
in the extent to which the experience of regret influences future regret
aversion, it does not make sense to include “zero” regrets in the recalled
memory stock, because, as the optimal was decision was made in any
such period in which zero regret was experienced, there is no informa-
tion to be gained on the scale of experienced regret74. This requires us
to prevent zero regrets from appearing in the recalled memory stock,
so, when discussing a map from “The last x periods of regret to αt”
this is technically interpreted as “The last x periods of non-zero regret to
αt”.
For example, if we study the properties of the sets of recalled Mem-
ory Stocks, where, in each period, they are composed of the last 10
non-negative regrets, as they were constructed in the baseline dynamic
model (so the memory stock is not impacting future decisions, sim-
72 assuming a constant discount rate is, of course, a first step approximation of how memory
of regrets could fade over time, and one that should be tested empirically against other
comparable discount methodologies, where the discount rate could vary both by the size
of the regret and also the time lapse. It is chosen here for both mathematical simplicity
and connection to existing economic literature where an exponential discounting model
is by far the most common approach. The second step would be a model whereby the
most meaningful regrets stay in memory the longest, perhaps even indefinitely, and small
regrets fade to zero very quickly.
73 equivalently, this can be thought of as there being a “time limit” on the storage of
memories.
74 zero regrets are not deemed informative, because the principle of the model is that the
agent uses information about the past experience of regret to inform them of their likely
aversion to future regret. In that sense, an experience of zero regret is informative in that
it informs the agent that a zero utility gap results in a zero regret. Beyond that, it makes
sense to exclude zero regrets from the memory stock for the same reason that positive
utility gaps (“joy”) are excluded from the memory stock. We are using the memory stock
only for the purpose of calculating the coefficient of regret, and so it is a subset of the
complete memory and history of the decision making process chosen specifically to
inform that calculation.
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Estimated Power Coefficient Skewness
Min/Max (Median)
Figure 20: Average outcome of candidate mapping functions (f) from the Mem-
ory Stock (M) to α
ply being constructed), then, on average, the three different mapping
functions proposed earlier in 1.3.2 produce widely differing degrees of
anticipated regret aversion.
Figure 20 shows that a mapping from M to α, generated by the Max/-
Median/Min ratio method, where M is constructed through accumula-
tion of experienced regrets from the baseline model, encoded using the
experienced regret model of the impact bias, given by αet =
√
αt , will
produce, on average, values of α between 10 and 12, for all reasonable
values of λ. If, therefore, we were to use values of α, generated using
this process from the memory stock, as part of the regret-minimising
decisions made in subsequent periods, then the expectation would be
that the decision maker is exceptionally regret-averse, and so chooses
the $-Bet, as shown in Figure 14, virtually all the time. Similarly, whilst
the Estimated Power Coefficient method generates, on average, values
of α, much closer to those assumed in the baseline model75, they are
still, on average, in excess of 2, and so the same problem, of picking
the $-Bet too frequently, will be apparent. Lastly, the Skewness method
appears to generate, on average, values of α which are in the middle of
the range of values assumed by the baseline model, but, however, we
must also be concerned with the variance of these values, as they will
imply the proportion of choices which are the P-Bet, $-Bet, and Full
Insurance.
Given the baseline model draws values of α uniformly from the
interval (0, 3), it is immediately clear from Figure 22 why the Max/-
Median/Min ratio function would be an inappropriate choice as the
function which translates the Memory Stock into future values of α in
the dynamic model with feedback. That is, when the Memory Stock
is generated simply as a function of regrets experienced as a result of
random choices76, then this mapping produces values of α which are
wildly different to those assumed in the baseline model, and, conse-
quently, any difference in choice behaviour, or welfare, resulting from
the use of this mapping in the dynamic model would be primarily at-
tributed to the use of the Max/Median/Min ratio, and not the process
of affective feedback which the dynamic model is created to capture.
As shown in Figure 22 and Figure 21, the Skewness function and
Estimated Power Coefficient produce more variance in the output.
However, the Estimated Power Coefficient produced very few values
below 1, and hence would imply that the decision maker would never
be “regret seeking” and, therefore, would never choose the P-Bet in the
75 uniformly distributed between 0 and 3
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Figure 21: Proportion of Memory Stocks which produce values of less than
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Skewness < 1 1 < Skewness < 2
Skewness > 2
Figure 22: Proportion of Memory Stocks which produce values of less than one,
between one and two, and greater than two, when sample skewness
is calculated
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Figure 23: Proportion of Memory Stocks which produce values of less than
one, between one and two, and greater than two, when ratio of the
difference between Max and Median and the difference between
Median and Min is estimated
simple three option model. Thus, a baseline model, which assumes αt
is drawn from a uniform distribution in the interval (0, 3) will produce
a memory stock which, when a power coefficient is estimated, emits
“beliefs” about αt+1 which, on average, are not reflective of the “beliefs”
about regret aversion, αt which were used to make decisions. In the
case of the Estimated Power Coefficient, a decision maker who chose
each bet one third of the time, will be wondering why their memory
stock is telling them that they should have chosen the P-Bet77 with a
probability of close to zero.
The Skewness function, therefore, is a more viable candidate function
to use in the dynamic model, because it produces sufficient variance
in the output that the beliefs of the individual, about their parameter
of regret aversion, would be reasonable. Figure 22 shows that, when
decisions are taken according to a parameter of regret aversion which
is drawn from the uniform distribution on the interval (0, 3), then the
sample skewness of the memory stocks of regret, coming from these
decisions, for values of λ between 0.5 and 2, would always imply that
the frequency of each decision taken should be between 20% and 50%,
which is not far from the actual frequency of 33% for each option.
Calibrating the Baseline Model
Ideally, however, we would want to construct a baseline model, whereby,
when a function is applied to the memory stock to generate “endoge-
nous” parameters of regret aversion, it produces a distribution of param-
eters which is exactly equivalent to the distribution of parameters which
seeded the decisions in the baseline model. That is to say, if we seed the
baseline model with parameters of regret aversion, drawn uniformly
from the interval (0, 3), then the function used emits a distribution of
77 that is, when the memory stock emits a value of α < 1
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“endogenous” parameters which is the same uniform distribution. If
this was true, then the function used is a very “believable” method for
the individual to estimate their own aversion to regret, and we could
construct a fully dynamic model with affective feedback.
It is incredibly unlikely, however, that it would ever be possible
to find a psychologically justifiable function which emits a uniform
distribution from the memory stock when applied. Hence, a second-
best solution is to find a baseline model whereby the proportion of times
that each decision is taken by the individual is equal to the proportion
of times that the individual would take the decision if their parameter
of regret aversion was given by the function applied to the memory
stock. For example, if the baseline model used a uniform distribution
on the interval (0, 3) to generate the parameter of regret aversion, this
would imply that each option is chosen one third of the time. However,
as Figures 21, 22 and 23 show, none of the three proposed functions
produce parameters of regret with equal proportions in the intervals
less than 1, between 1 and 2, and greater than 2, and hence would
result in the decision maker choosing each option an equal proportion
of the time. As such, we must move away from assuming that, in the
baseline model, the parameter of regret aversion is drawn uniformly
in the interval (0, 3) to an distribution which has a lower chance of
producing a value of α less than 1.
One simple way to do this is to increase the lower bound of the
uniform distribution from which the exogenously generated parameters
of regret aversion are drawn. Consider drawing from the uniform
distribution on the interval (z, 3) where 0 < z < 1. Then the proportion
of α’s generated in the intervals 1 < α < 2 and α > 2 will be the
same, and equal to 13−z , which will be greater than the proportion
of α’s < 1, which equals 1−z3−z . However, as Figure 24 shows, when
calculating the difference between the proportion of α’s generated
by the sample skewness of the memory stock, in each of the three
intervals (< 1, between 1 and 2, and > 2) and the proportion of α’s
in each of the three intervals, generated by draws from the uniform
distribution on the interval (z, 3), there is no value of z for which all
three interval differences are equal to zero, implying there will always
be small differences in the beliefs about regret aversion elicited by
the memory stock, compared to if these beliefs were just exogenously
given at random, simply as a result of using the sample skewness as
the function to transform the regret in the memory stock to a future
parameter of regret version.
However, as Figure 25 shows, these differences (when summed across
all three intervals by using the absolute value of the differences), are
minimised when z is approximately equal to 0.678. Though the sum
is still strictly positive at this point, the results suggest that random
draws from the uniform distribution on (0.6, 3) will produce 10 period
memory stocks of regret, when regret is experienced according to
αet =
√
αt , which will, when the sample skewness of these memory
stocks is taken, produce endogenously determined parameters of regret
aversion which would predict the same pattern of choice, on average, as
given by the random draws from the uniform distribution on (0.6, 3). In
shorthand, the “seeding” of the baseline model on this interval produces
78 for values of z around 0.6, the results of the 10000 period numerical simulation tend to
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Figure 24: Proportion of α’s generated by sample skewness minus proportion
of α’s generated by uniform draws from interval (z, 3), for three
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Figure 25: Sum of absolute values of differences in proportions between sample
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Figure 26: Histogram of sample skewness of 10 period memory stocks gener-
ated by one run of the 10000 period baseline model (seeding from
the interval (0.6, 3))
“consistent” beliefs, according to the sample skewness memory function,
and hence is a good choice for the baseline analysis of the model.
Skewness Correction
The above arguments present a compelling case for using the sample
skewness as the function for translating the memory stock of regrets to
the next coefficient of regret aversion, but there is an obvious issue with
using the sample skewness. Whilst the coefficient of regret aversion, in
the Hayashi model must necessarily be greater than zero, the sample
skewness may well be less than zero. Indeed, Figure 27 shows that
there is a small, but significant (less than 0.5% of values), left tail of
skewness values which fall below zero.
Whilst the simplest solution would be to simply replace the skewness
metric with one of the other candidate metrics, discussed earlier, in
the model whenever skewness falls below zero, test analysis shows
that the probability of the other metrics falling in the interval (0,1)
whenever sample skewness is below zero, it very close to zero. Thus,
this replacement method would generate parameters of regret aversion
wildly in excess of what the spirit of the model suggests they should
be. Consequently, the replacement method chosen is, when sample
skewness falls below zero, to replace it with a random number drawn
uniformly on the interval (0,0.2). Doing so constrains the sample skew-
ness to be strictly positive, hence being able to be used as a parameter
of regret aversion in the Hayashi model. Using this replacement method
transforms the original histogram in Figure 27 to a new histogram in
Figure 27.
Definition of the baseline dynamic model
Thus, following all of the above analysis, the baseline dynamic model
is constructed by running a 10000 period simulation of the simple static
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Figure 27: Histogram of sample skewness from Figure 26 modified by trans-
forming negative values to random numbers in the interval (0, 0.2)
model, given on page 45, where the parameter of regret aversion used
in each period is given by drawing from a uniform distribution on the
interval (0.6, 3). After the decision is taken in each period79, if a strictly
positive regret is experienced, it is experienced according to an impact
bias, given by αet =
√
αt. This experienced regret is then added to the
memory stock of the last 10 strictly positive regrets, replacing the regret
which was experienced the longest time ago.
Results of the baseline dynamic model
As stated earlier in 1.4.3, the magnitude of λ in the dynamic model will
determine the severity of the environment in which the decision maker,
who happens to be a regret minimiser, is operating. This will determine
both the size of the average reward to decisions taken, and also the
average regret experienced. In addition, by defining Total Experienced
Utility as the Payoff minus Experienced Regret, in each period, we can
get a baseline measure of “welfare” as it exists in this model, and how
it varies with λ.
As shown in Figure 33 , for all values of λ between 0.5 and 2, the
average per period Payoff is less than the average per period Experi-
enced Regret. This implies that average per period Total Experienced
Utility is negative in the baseline model, or, more intuitively, the fact
that the decision maker has the potential to experience regret from
their decision, even accounting for the effect of the impact bias (that
regret is worse in anticipation than experience) turns a potentially fi-
nancially profitable repeated gambling scenario, into a negative overall
experience, using the regret minimising model of Hayashi. The degree
to which the experience will be negative is controlled by λ, the rate
parameter of the exponential distribution. When λ is small, this implies
the mean number drawn from the distribution is large, and hence the
79 i.e. the decision maker has chosen between the P-Bet, $-Bet and Insurance according to











Figure 28: Average Per Period Payoff, Experienced Regret and Total Experi-
enced Utility as a function of λ in the baseline dynamic model
consequences, both for payoff and experienced regret, are large. How-
ever, the growth rate of experienced regret exceeds the growth rate of
the average payoff, and hence the Total Experienced Utility becomes
more negative.
Given, in the baseline model, the parameter of regret aversion is
drawn from the uniform distribution on the interval (0.6,3), and that
the decision maker will choose the P-Bet if α < 1, this implies that the
P-Bet will be chosen in the baseline model approximately 1/6 of the
time. Similarly, the Full Insurance and the $-Bet will be chosen 5/12 of
the time. This was chosen so that the modified skewness metric on the
memory stock would emit a similar pattern of α ′s when random truly
parameters of regret aversion were put into the model. Thus, anything
aside from small deviations in this behavioural pattern, when the affec-
tive feedback mechanism is introduced into the model, are attributed to
the feedback mechanism, and hence the process of experienced regret
affecting anticipated regret aversion, and not the choice of metric on
the memory stock80.
1.4.4 The dynamic model with regret feedback loop
Simply replacing the exogenously given parameter of regret aversion,
drawn from the uniform distribution on the interval (0.6,3), in the
80 A fair challenge would be to wonder whether the choice of the estimating function (in
this case, the modified skewness metric over the max/median/min ratio or estimated
power coefficient) is responsible for driving the results found, rather than any effects due
to the creation of the regret feedback loop. As discussed in this paragraph, the choice of
the modified skewness metric was precisely to minimise the role of the function itself, as
putting random α ′s into the baseline dynamic model gives you a distribution back out
equivalent to what you put in. As the other functions investigated could not be calibrated
to have that property, it’s not possible to describe the effect of the choice of estimating
function on the results, as you are unable to make an “apples to apples” comparison. An
interesting follow-up would be to find other candidate estimating functions which can be
calibrated to have the same baseline property as the modified skewness metric, to then
empirically demonstrate the sensitivity of the results to the estimating function.
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Figure 29: Patterns of choice in the dynamic model with regret feedback loop
baseline dynamic model, by the modified skewness metric81, calculated
over the last ten strictly positive regrets which the decision maker
experienced, modified by the impact bias so that αet =
√
αt, gives the
pattern of choice behaviour shown in Figure 29 when evaluated over
different values of λin the range (0.5,2)82
The pattern of behaviour is clear from Figure 29 and markedly differ-
ent from the behaviour of the randomly seeded baseline model in Figure
27. Firstly, what was previously the least commonly chosen option; the
P-Bet; has now become the most often chosen option, ranging between
being chosen 40% and 60% of the time, depending on λ. Indeed, there
is a clear positive trend in the probability that the P-Bet is chosen, with
a unit increase in λ, being associated with a 7 percentage point rise in
the frequency83. This increase in the probability of choosing the P-Bet
comes at the expense of both the $-Bet and Full insurance options,
which each fall to between 20% and 30% of the options chosen. Both of
these options are negatively related to λ84. This behaviour implies that
the distribution of the parameter of regret aversion, generated by the
modified skewness metric, is much different to that produced by the
random baseline model.
Figure 30 shows the distribution of αt generated by the dynamic
model, with regret feedback loop, when λ = 1. It is then immediately
clear that the reason for the change in behaviour is due to the increase
in prevalence of parameters of regret aversion very close to zero.
Figure 31 shows that, when the skewness metric is left unmodified
in the dynamic model with regret feedback, approximately 14% of
the observations fall below zero. Hence, in the modified skewness
metric, transforming all such observations to fall in the interval (0,0.2)
condenses a significant proportion of the distribution a very small space.
However, whilst it is clear that a decision maker whose memory stock
81 modified so that negative values are replaced by a random number drawn from the
uniform distribution on the interval (0,0.2)
82 running each simulation over 10000 periods and taking the average, per period behaviour
83 significant at the 1% level
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Figure 30: Histogram of αt generated in the dynamic model with regret feed-
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Figure 31: Histogram of skewness of memory stocks, generated in the dynamic
model, with λ = 1
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is negatively skewed should be considered “regret averse”, any similar
transformation of negative skewness into the interval (0,x) , where
x < 1, still leaves the P-Bet as the most frequently chosen option85.
Hence, whilst the process produced slightly unhelpful metrics, in terms
of the precise magnitude of the switch towards the P-Bet as a result of
the feedback process, the qualitative result of a shift towards the option
associated with parameters of regret aversion below 1 is consistent.
The reason for this shift towards the P-Bet is that, when the feedback
mechanism is introduced, if the coefficient of regret in any given period,
αt, is less than one, then, as shown in Table 5, in case where the decision
maker does experience regret, it will be given by (2β)
√
αt , which,
because of the exponential distribution given by λ, is unlikely to be a
particularly large number. Indeed, in the event that the decision maker
chooses the P-Bet, and experiences regret, their per period average
experienced regret is as given in Figure 19. Secondly, as picking the
P-Bet will result in the experience of regret only if state of the world
ω3 occurs, there is a 2/3 probability that no regret will be experienced,
and hence the coefficient of regret aversion αt+1 equals the coefficient
of regret aversion αt. The combination of these two effects implies that,
should the memory stock reach the point where the implied coefficient
of regret aversion is less than one, then it is very likely to remain so
for the foreseeable future, and hence tell the regret minimising agent
to keep picking the P-Bet. This compares drastically to the baseline
dynamic model, when the probability of picking the P-Bet, given the
P-Bet was picked in the last period, was only equal to 1/6.
Indeed it is possible to estimate the probability of observing the
same option chosen, regardless of which option that would be, in two
successive periods in this dynamic model, and compare this to the
probability of observing the same behaviour in the baseline model,
which is exactly equal to 3/886.
Figure 36 shows that the proportion of “repeat choices” is increasing
in λ, but generally falls between 86% and 91% of all choices being
the same as in the previous period. This is increasing in λ, because
increasing λ reduces the probability of the decision taken in any one
period being severe enough87 to generate a regret large enough to give
a high positive skew to the memory stock of the individual, hence
making it more likely that the memory stock in any one period will be
similar to the memory stock in the previous period, (and, in particular,
having a skewness of less than one giving rise to selecting the P-Bet
again) hence increasing the probability of repeat choice.
This increased probability of repeat choice, from the baseline model
of 0.375 to between 0.86 and 0.91, suggests that the process of feedback
from experienced regret to anticipated regret gives rise to an individual
getting “addicted” to one particular type of behaviour (such as the P-
Bet) before a sufficiently negative regretful experience happens to them
to shock and skew their memory of the emotion in a new direction,
giving them reason to change their behaviour to another action.
In addition, because the P-Bet is selected when the coefficient of
regret aversion is below 1, and the individual becomes addicted to the
choice of the P-Bet, keeping the experienced coefficient of regret aversion
85 data not shown, but indicated through simulation
86 the probability of observing the same option chosen in successive periods in the baseline
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Figure 32: Proportion of periods during which the option selected was the same
as the previous period, in the dynamic model
below 1, the average per period regret experienced is kept low. This is
shown in Figure 33 , indicating that the average per period payoff is
only marginally below the average per period experienced regret for
values of λ < 1, and, for values of λ > 1, the average per period total
experienced utility (TEU) is actually positive.
This compares favourably with the baseline dynamic model, where
the average per period total experienced utility was negative for all
values of λ, suggesting that the addiction to the P-Bet, resulting from
the feedback loop, actually generates a positive impact on the welfare
of the individual by keeping their sensitivity to regret lower than in the
baseline model.
The role of discounting
The dynamic models used so far have simply assumed that, once
an experienced regret is in the memory stock, it stays at the same
magnitude in memory until it becomes the 11th most recent regret, at
which point it drops out of the memory stock altogether. It is reasonable
to assume, however, that the main effect of the passing of time is to
dilute the magnitude of the experience of regrets which still remain
in the memory stock. To this end, it is possible, within the simulation,
to introduce a simple model of exponential discounting, and a time
discounting factor, δ, such that the ith oldest regret in the memory
stock is discounted by a factor of δi88, where 0 < δ < 1.
Figure 34 shows that the pattern of behaviour observed in the “first
look” at the dynamic model with regret feedback loop, of a strong
preference for the P-Bet, is changed by the effect of imposing time
88 this is subtly different to assuming a regret which was experienced i periods ago is
discounted by a factor of δi. In the version used in the dynamic model, periods which
produce zero regret add nothing to the memory stock, and, hence, do not impose any
additional time discounting on the memory stock. The impact of this slight difference on
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Figure 33: Average Per Period Payoff, Experienced Regret and Total Experi-
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Figure 34: Impact of exponential time discounting of memory stock on pattern
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Figure 35: Average Per Period Payoff, Experienced Regret and Total Experi-
enced Utility as a function of δ in the dynamic model with regret
feedback loop, for λ = 1
discounting on the memory stock of regrets. For any time discounting
factor of less than 0.9, the P-bet becomes the least frequently chosen
option, with a shift towards both the Full Insurance and $-Bet options.
Furthermore, if the discount factor is lowered further, there is an even
greater shift away from both the Full Insurance and P-Bet options
towards the $-Bet. The reason for this shifting pattern of behaviour
is obvious, in that by exponentially discounting the memory stock of
regrets which have happened in the past, the average magnitude of any
regrets already in the memory stock is significantly reduced, and so the
“newest” regret which is added to the memory stock is more likely to be
in excess of those already in the memory, and hence increase the skew
of the memory stock, which translates to an increase in the coefficient of
regret aversion used in the decision making of the next period, resulting
in an increased probability of selecting the $-Bet. Indeed, this increase
in the coefficient of regret aversion translates into an increase in the
average per period experienced regret, and hence an fall in average per
period total experienced utility, as shown by Figure 35.
Furthermore, Figure 36 shows the proportion of repeat choices as a
function of δ, in the dynamic model with regret feedback loop when
λ = 1. The prevalence of the P-Bet, when δ is close to 1 implies that
it is likely that the decision maker will be “addicted” to the P-Bet,
but the increased prevalence of the $-Bet when δ tends towards 0
implies the decision maker becomes “addicted” to the $-Bet instead.
The consequence of the decision maker discounting past regrets is that
new regrets loom relatively large in the memory of the individual,
hence making them averse to subsequent regrets. This then manifests
itself through a pattern of addition to the $-Bet, whereby the individual
fears missing out on the big payoff from the $-Bet if they do not choose
it. This compares to the case when δ is close to 1, and the decision
maker places the value of the latest regret into context alongside the
regrets in their recent past. By doing this, they become desensitised
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Figure 36: Proportion of periods where the option selected was the same as the
previous period, in the dynamic model, for λ = 1, as a function of δ
to the large regrets, hence choosing the P-Bet in subsequent periods.
Given this desensitisation to regret in anticipation then translates into
a desensitisation to regret in experience, the effect on overall total
experienced utility is positive as a result of becoming addicted to the
P-Bet as opposed to the $-Bet, despite them offering the same expected
value.
1.5 conclusions
1.5.1 Comparing the baseline dynamic model to the dynamic model with
regret feedback loop
The baseline dynamic model studied the per period average behaviour
of a regret minimiser (who behaves according to the smooth model of
regret aversion given by Hayashi) when faced with a decision between a
P-Bet, $-Bet and Full Insurance (with the expected value of each option
being the same, and drawn from an exponential distribution), in 10000
consecutive periods, where the anticipated coefficient of regret aversion
used to make the decision was drawn from a uniform distribution on
the interval (0.6,3), and the experienced coefficient of regret aversion was




In contrast, the model with the regret feedback loop assumes that the
anticipated coefficient of regret aversion is not exogenously given in
each period, but rather endogenously derived from a metric applied to
the last 10 strictly positive regrets that the regret minimiser experienced,
where the magnitude and time of the regret are stored in memory, but
not the precise utility gap which gave rise to the regret. This metric
is a modified skewness (modified to produce only positive numbers),
which, when applied to the regrets generated in the baseline dynamic
model, gives a distribution of numbers which closely resembles the
distribution of the numbers which seeded the baseline model.
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1.5.2 Total Experienced Utility
A notable result from this analysis is that, both in the baseline dynamic
model and the model with regret feedback loop, the average per period
payoff which results from choosing one of the three options tends to be
less than the average per period experienced regret, even accounting
for the effect of the impact bias. This pattern holds until the proportion
of P-Bets taken in the dynamic model is sufficient that the typical
experienced coefficient of regret aversion is below 1, and hence the
effect of any particularly large utility gaps, arising from the use of
the exponential distribution in the model, is greatly reduced by the
coefficient of regret aversion falling below 1.
The net effect of these factors is that Total Experienced Utility (TEU),
which equals the payoff minus experienced regret in any given period,
is negative, or only very marginally positive, for almost all scenarios
considered in the analysis. This suggests a significant issue with using
any model similar to the Hayashi model, in that by exposing the deci-
sion maker to the possibility of (ex-post) regretting their decision, that
a situation such as this in which, from a purely monetary perspective,
they can only be strictly better off as a result of having the opportunity
to choose between the three options, turns into an experience which
is ultimately negatively impacting their overall quality of life. In short,
they would have preferred to have never been offered the opportunity
to win free money, even in a situation where they can always choose
Full Insurance and guarantee themselves a strictly positive payoff in
each stage, because the fact that they always view the resolution of un-
certainty, no matter what their choice, implies that they will, on average,
experience a level of regret which outweighs the benefits of the positive
payoff. In the language of Sarver, the decision maker in this simulation
would tend to have a preference for a “menu” of zero choices over a
“menu” of three choices, all of which give strictly non-negative payoffs
in every state of the world89.
It seems incredibly unlikely, however, that an individual would ever
turn down a menu of gambles which, in monetary terms, is only ever
Pareto improving, even accounting for the possibility of the experience
of regret from not choosing the ex-post superior option every time.
Thus, the model of smooth regret aversion, created by Hayashi, which
transforms utility gaps into the experience of regret through the coeffi-
cient of regret aversion, is arguably not an accurate representation of
the way in which both the experience and anticipation of regret should
be modelled as it applies to real world decision making.
1.5.3 Discounting
In this simulation model, discounting of past emotional memories, or
“biases” in storage, contribute in a standard way towards increasing the
likelihood that the $-Bet will be chosen by the regret minimising indi-
vidual. By reducing the magnitude of the past emotional experiences,
any new regret which is experienced will appear disproportionately
larger than the past experiences, hence giving the decision maker the
impression that they are disproportionately affected by large regrets
89 noting that, as in the model of Sarver, we are concerned with “...maximi[sing] the
expectation of ... utility minus regret”[83, p269], but, unlike Sarver, we are concerned
with more than just “...simple linear forms of regret”[83, p281]
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(when, in fact, they are simply “newer” regrets), and so making them
more regret averse in the future. This is equivalent to a decision maker
who acts in a very “hot” state, overreacting to the most recent events
in an attempt to take action to stop them from happening again in the
future90.
This result highlights the value of any individual being able to appro-
priately reflect on a recent negative experience before making another
decision under risk or uncertainty. Individuals who encounter such
decisions on a regular, repeated basis91 would do well to take accurate
records of the decisions they take and the consequences that resulted
from those decisions. The effect of keeping accurate records, and as-
sociated emotional consequences, could then be seen in this model
as the elimination of the “fading affect” so that, should a new regret
arise as a result of a decision, it is able to be properly contextualised
alongside similar regrets in the past. This transforms the context of
the next decision from being in a “hot” state, of overreacting to the
last experienced regret, to a “cold” state, of careful consideration of
the relative magnitude of all regrets in the memory stock / diary. This
effect lowers the coefficient of regret aversion, and hence reduces the
probability of taking the $-Bet in any given period. By keeping diaries
and journals, the salience of past regretful experiences is increased, so
as to eliminate the bias of relying on the most recent experience to
determine the aversion towards regret.
1.5.4 On the use of Monte Carlo simulation methods
The approach of this chapter, in using Monte Carlo simulation methods
to analyse the effects of endogenising the parameter of regret aversion
in a dynamic version of the Hayashi regret minimiser model, has both
advantages and disadvantages.
The primary disadvantage is that the specific functional forms, em-
bedded in the model, and skewness metric, used for the generation of
the coefficient of regret aversion, are entirely arbitrary representations
of the spirit of the literature on affective feedback. They were chosen so
as to keep the model both simple and maintaining some resemblance
to the behavioural ideas they represent. However, it is not possible to
examine the effects of imposing such restrictions on the simulation
without other, alternative functional forms to compare them against,
which may be just as arbitrary without any discernible improvement in
the degree to which they represent the underlying intuition.
Where there is a clear economic literature on a specific function
(for example, the use of exponential discounting to represent fading
affect) then it is possible to analyse the behavioural consequences of
the model with respect to changes in a given parameter value. How-
ever, in some cases, such as with the skewness metric applied to the
memory stock, this is a new approach which does not have a existing
associated methodology as to how best to consider marginal changes in
90 There is a parallel of this argument in Case-based Decision Theory (Gilboa and Schmei-
dler) where decisions are taken according to a similarity function, which is implicitly
affected by the length of time over which “cases” are drawn from in the history or
memory of the agent. If you were to restrict the history of “cases” to only very recent
events, you may see a similar result where an agent is actually reacting to “recency” as
opposed to “similarity”.
91 for example, those working in financial investment environments, or those who frequently
gamble for leisure
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the way the metric is applied92. Indeed this version of the simulation is
restrictive by considering only the case of three possible betting options,
by considering only the case where the expected value of all options
is the same, and by considering only the case where each state of the
world is equally likely. For considering deviations to these assumptions
would require a completely new behavioural analysis conditional on
the values chosen for every other parameter in the model.
The advantage of this simulation approach is that it permits a glimpse
into the non-linear world of regret and affective feedback where it is
clearly not possible to analytically solve the dynamic model, especially
when there is no clear and obvious functional form for how the coeffi-
cient of regret aversion should evolve over time. This contrasts with the
work of, for example, Houthakker and Taylor, who study the evolution
of patterns of consumption over time, analytically, using a differential
equations framework, where the complexity of the model is deliber-
ately kept low in order to be able to apply the differential equations
techniques.
As such, given the progression of economic modelling towards non-
linear and dynamic models, the use of simulation techniques may
be the only way to conduct meaningful analysis when the degree of
complexity in the model (in this case given by the number of different
psychological concepts which are integrated) becomes large. However,
once the underlying mechanics of the model are constructed, given
sufficient structure as to how a particular insight or idea should interact
with the framework of the model, it is quick and easy to incorporate
new ideas and generate new data which provides a “first look” at the
types of behaviour which could emerge in such a world. Whilst these
first looks may not be perfect, they can be at least indicative of answers
which can then be further investigated empirically and experimentally.
92 for example, the decision to change all negative skewness values to be random numbers
in the interval (0,0.2) makes sense in the baseline model, given the distribution of numbers
it produces, but it less sensible in the model with affective feedback
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2.1 introduction
2.1.1 Approaching Experiential Regret Aversion Experimentally
Behavioural economics, developed from psychological foundations, and
methods of experimental economics, have long enjoyed a close work-
ing relationship. As behavioural economics is often associated with a
“descriptive” account of human decision making, once we are able to
describe such behaviour using economic modelling, it only makes sense
to test whether human decision making conforms to the predictions
of these models. When the models relate to areas of individual deci-
sion making (for example, behavioural models of individual decision
making under uncertainty, such as Prospect Theory (Kahneman and
Tversky [48]), the most natural environment to test the models in is a
laboratory, where each observable aspect of the decision to be made
can be controlled and calibrated, and any possible unobserved aspects,
which may correlate with the main variable of interest, can be indirectly
controlled through randomisation, both within and across treatment
groups.
As the original models of Regret Theory (Loomes and Sugden
[58],Bell [5]) were developed at the same time as, and became a part
of, the class of non-Expected Utility Theory models, such as Prospect
Theory, they were obvious candidates for experimental testing in a
laboratory setting.
This approach, however, raises several questions, some of which have
been more widely addressed in the literature than others.
• Firstly, in order to test the usefulness of a regret-based theory
of decision making under uncertainty, there needs to be at least
one defining characteristic of the theory, which makes a testable
prediction about decision making, observable under laboratory
conditions.
• Secondly, in order to compare the usefulness of a regret-based
theory against at least one other non-EUT model, there must be
a prediction of the regret-based model which can differentiate it,
and is also observable in a laboratory setting. For instance, it is not
sufficient to say that the regret-based model predicts violations
of transitivity (as many models do so also) or that the decision
maker will make a calculation of expected anticipatory regret
ex-ante (as this is not observable in a laboratory).
• Thirdly, if one of the defining characteristics of the theory is
that individuals do consider the anticipated regret of a potential
decision, then, if techniques and methods are developed such
that both anticipated and experienced emotions can be measured
in some way1, then specific laboratory tasks which generate ob-
servable actions in support of regret-based theories, should also
1 such techniques might include self-reports, or, perhaps, psycho-physiological measures
such as fMRI and cardiovascular measures
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receive support from emotional measures when they are applied
to the same tasks2.
The first and second points were approached by economists and psy-
chologists in the 1980s and 1990s, and a wide range of results have
been found, especially when comparing competing non-EUT theories,
some of which will be touched on in subsequent sections. The third
point is an area which has not been approached by either economists
or psychologists, and, broadly speaking, corresponds to ensuring that
models of decision making which use emotions as an integral compo-
nent are checked to make sure that the emotion in question behaves in
the model as it does in reality, given our present understanding of that
emotion3. This point will be explored in the current chapter.
As the principle focus of this work is on Experiential Regret Aversion,
or how the experience of regret subsequently impacts anticipatory
regret aversion, subsequent discussions will be limited to experiments
which attempt to answer whether or not the experience of regret does
affect future anticipation of regret and use the typical models and
experimental methods in regret theory as a given, rather than exploring
experiments which approach the first two questions directly. Such
experiments lie at the cutting edge of experimental work in regret
theory and have important consequences for our understanding and
development of future regret-based theories. As such, it is important
to determine whether the results of such experiments are correctly
interpreted, especially given the challenge of both measuring regret, and
separating regret from other similar emotions in decision making (such
as disappointment, as in Disappointment Aversion (Bell [7], Loomes
and Sugden [59]). It is to this question which we turn first.
2.2 existing experimental literature
2.2.1 From Economics
The importance of non-EUT theories being supported by experimental
evidence is clear from the original Regret Theory of Loomes and Sugden
[58], as they extensively discuss the implications of their theory for
“...choices between pairs of statistically independent prospects.”[58,
p810], as evidenced by multiple experimental results of Kahneman
and Tversky4. They describe how previously observed experimental
results are well supported by the predictions of Regret Theory, and later,
Loomes et al. [62] and Loomes and Taylor [61] design new experiments
to show that, when including the “regret aversion”5 assumption in
Regret Theory, the theory predicts violations of transitivity in a specific
direction, which are observed in laboratory tasks as significantly more
prevalent than violations in the counter direction.
2 that is to say, if a laboratory task produces results which suggest a regret-based decision
model may have been used (through the idiosyncrasies of the theory), then it would lend
weight to the conclusion if an direct measure of regret could be also be found in the same
task.
3 at the most simple level, this could correspond to ensuring that measures of regret are
increasing in the magnitude of utility which is foregone from making a “bad choice” in
lab tasks.
4 including the most commonly observed deviations from EUT, such as the “common ratio”
and “common consequence” effects
5 that large regrets loom disproportionately large in the mind of the decision maker when
compared to small regrets
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Figure 37: Figure 1 from Hey and Orme [36]
This early approach to experimental testing of Regret Theory mirrors
the experimental testing of other non-EUT theories at the time. This typ-
ically includes theoretically demonstrating that a specific, non-random
pattern of behaviour, which we can observe in the laboratory (such as
a preference reversal in the case of violations of transitivity), does not
necessarily lead to contradictions in the theory itself. That is to say, the
experimental evidence is not incompatible with the predictions of the
theory. This approach can be thought of as the “Economist’s approach”,
whereby it is not the process of decision making which is being analysed
for it’s compatibility with the theory, but rather the observed behavioural
outcome of decision making which is being studied.
As stated in the introduction, taking this approach enables you to
not only consider the predictive power of the theory on its own (for
example, you could state that, in an experiment, 82% of participants
made decisions which are consistent with the predictions of Regret
Theory), but also allows you to compare similar theories, by designing
experiments which lead to outcomes which would be compatible with
one theory but not with another. An example of this approach is in
Hey and Orme [36] where they ask participants to make a very high
number of decisions in problems such as the one presented in Figure
37.
Typically, such problems will include choosing between a “safe” (the
right circle in this case) and “risky” (the left circle in this case) option,
and, empirically, the frequency with which the safe option was chosen
over the risky option will be the dependent variable in a regression.
In the case of theories considered by Hey and Orme, all “...imply a
valuation of the left-hand gamble relative to the right-hand gamble”,
and estimating a set of parameters, which create an estimated prefer-
ence function unique to each theory, allows us to test the parameters
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as implied by the theories. By comparing the frequency with which
individuals satisfied the restrictions placed upon the parameters by
the theories, we can estimate which theory appears to “best fit” the
observed decisions. In this experiment, Regret Theory performs very
much in the middle of the pack, as significantly less predictive than
Expected Utility Theory, and marginally less so than models which use
“rank dependent utility functions”.
One paper that seeks to use data from such studies to its fullest
extent is by Harless and Camerer [30], who construct a meta-analysis
based upon 23 data sets involving similar choice problems to the one
presented in Figure 37. Though this approach is incredibly useful for
attaining statistical significance in results, it does not include results
for Regret Theory, so can offer no more information, for our purposes,
than already provided by Hey and Orme. This does, however, demon-
strate a problem with Regret Theory in calculating usefulness based
solely on empirical methods from decision frequency data. As regret
theory posits comparison between actions, in each state of the world,
it necessarily implies a significant number of parameters to estimate
in such regressions, which reduces the likelihood of significant results
(and, hence, the likelihood that they would receive publication).
These two papers summarise the limited extent to which the “Economist’s
approach” can help provide information about the descriptive capabil-
ity of Regret Theory. Other non-EUT theories are often preferred over
Regret Theory in economics, specifically because it is difficult to esti-
mate empirically simply based on observable choice data (and, hence,
extend out of the lab into the real world), and other theories appear to
offer a better predictive power6. As such, the mid 1990s saw the end of
extensive experimental testing of Regret Theory using observed choice
data, but, at the same time, a new literature was beginning to emerge in
psychology which designed experiments to investigate the nuances of
decision making behaviour, using the implied process and assumptions
of the original form of Regret Theory as the theoretical basis.
2.2.2 From Psychology
The early 1990s saw an uptake in interest about regret from researchers
in psychology, based, in part, on the success of the theory in explaining
previously observed experimental results (as detailed in Loomes and
Sugden [58]) which showed behaviour violating the predictions of Ex-
pected Utility Theory. A wide range of experiments were subsequently
designed which took the assumptions and predictions of Regret Theory
as a given (specifically, the assumption of regret aversion) and sought
to demonstrate behaviour which would lend support to the implied
process behind Regret Theory (rather than empirically testing the pre-
dictive capability of the theory as economists had done). The typical
experimental design followed the format
1. Create two treatment groups, A and B
2. Subjects in both groups are asked to make a decision under
uncertainty or risk
3. One action which treatment group A could choose, however,
exposes them, potentially, to more regret than the equivalent
6 for instance, rank-dependent theories such as discussed by Quiggin [71]
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action for treatment group B7, under the hypothesis that the
primary reason the actions differ is linked to regret
4. Under the assumption of regret aversion, those subjects in group
A will be sensitive to the presence of the large regret, and hence
choose the action which is linked to the large regret with lower
probability than the equivalent action is chosen by subjects in
group B
This approach has both benefits and limitations when compared to the
economist’s approach. For example, a limitation is that it is not a direct
test of whether the individual uses Regret Theory in order to make a
decision, but rather a test of whether the experimental manipulation
is itself linked to regret, under the prediction of Regret Theory that a
difference in exposure to regret will lead to a difference in behaviour.
The primary benefit, however, is that the experimental manipulation,
which creates the distinction between group A and B, helps provide
an insight into which components of a decision might be considered
crucial for both the anticipation and experience of regret, and hence for
predicting real world situations under which Regret Theory might be a
good model to approximate human decision making behaviour.
For instance, consider a simple hypothetical experiment in which
there are two players. Player 1 must correctly call the outcome of a
coin flip, which is conducted by player 2. In treatment A, player 1
must call before player 2 flips the coin. In treatment B, player 2 flips
the coin, observes the outcome in private, then provides “cheap talk”
information to player 1, by saying “the coin was a head, but I might
be lying”, and then asks player 1 to call. Suppose in both cases that
player 1 calls heads, but the coin was a tails, and hence player 1 loses.
In treatment A, it is easy to imagine that player 1 might feel very little
regret for making the wrong call, under the logic that “It was only
ever a 50/50 shot, and it didn’t make any difference what I called. The
fact that I lost was as a result of bad luck, not a bad call”. However
in treatment B, player 1 may be expected to feel more regret as the
construction of the experiment is such that the call became more a
question of whether player 1 thought player 2 would lie to them or not,
rather than simply the call of a coin. Player 1 may feel “I had a decision
to make as to whether or not to believe player 2, and, as the uncertainty
had already been resolved, I made a bad decision. I feel regret because
I should have known player 2 would lie to me.”
In such an experiment, Regret Theory would make no distinction
between the regret experienced in treatments A and B, because the
decision would be represented the same way, in both cases, as in the
following payoff matrix
lands heads lands tails
Subject chooses heads Utility of Winning Utility of Losing
Subject chooses tails Utility of Losing Utility of Winning
7 this is often achieved my manipulating the amount of ex-post information available to
subjects, or manipulating the magnitude of the consequences of the action
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and hence the regret experienced, from making the wrong call, would
be the same8 in both treatment groups. However, the evidence drawn
from the experiment, and in particular the survey of the players after-
ward, would suggest that such concepts as “degree of responsibility
for outcome” and “ability to rationalize the outcome” may play a sig-
nificant role in the amount of regret experienced by the player, and
hence in the amount they would anticipate in any Regret Theory style
expected anticipated regret calculation.
Indeed the level of responsibility an individual feels they have for
the outcome of a decision has been shown to be highly related to regret.
Zeelenberg et al. [109], for example, summarise the results of four
papers which aim to directly explore the relationship between regret
and responsibility, which show that “...regret and responsibility are
positively related” [109, p149] and “[a]lthough it may be possible to
experience regret in the absence of responsibility...the evidence suggests
that such cases are the exceptions rather than the rule.” [109, p152]
These results present a significant challenge to Regret Theory, despite
not being a direct empirical test of the theory itself, as the results
suggest the effect of regret on an individual can be mitigated in a
manner not captured by simply considering a payoff matrix form of the
decision problem (as above). Indeed, similar results have been found
experimentally by Ritov and Baron [78] in investigations of the so-
called “omission bias”, which posits that regrets arising from actions, as
opposed to inactions, are considerably worse in the eyes of the decision
maker “...because acts tend to be seen as more causal than omissions,
and blame, including self-blame and regret, depends on perceptions
of causality9.” [78, p119] Again, Regret Theory makes no distinction
between action and inaction (in essence, a frame of reference), and
hence this experimental result suggests both a limitation and possible
extension of the theoretical framework.
Furthermore, the link between responsibility and regret has been
studied in applied consumer research as far back as 1992. Simonson [85]
specifically analysed the problem facing consumers between buying
based on “brand name” and buying based on “price”10, under the
assumption that anticipated regret may play a significant role in the
consumer’s decision;
“The amount of regret and responsibility that the con-
sumer would feel in each situation is likely to depend
on whether the consumer selected the well-known or the
cheaper alternative. Specifically, it might be argued that
the more expensive option is the safer bet and the norm,
whereas the cheaper option is more of a gamble. If the
consumer selected the more expensive alternative, and it
failed, then the responsibility for the failure would rest on
the manufacturer or the retailer rather than on the decision
of the consumer. Conversely, if the consumer took a chance
and chose the cheaper alternative and it failed, then the
consumer might feel responsible for the failure and be more
8 that is, the regret from both calling heads and the coin landing tails, and calling tails and
the coin landing heads, would be R(Utility from Losing - Utility from Winning) as given by
the Loomes and Sugden version of Regret Theory
9 and, by extension, responsibility
10 for example, why would you consider spending £100 more on a Sony television than a
Beko when they appear to be similarly in technological capability?
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likely to regret the decision (“I should have known better”)”
Simonson [85, p107]
The results of Simonson’s study demonstrate that considerations of
regret play a large role in consumer decisions and indicate “...that the
person who selects the lesser-known brand and fails is seen as more
responsible for the outcome.”[85, p115] and “...that manufacturers of
better-know brands ... might increase their market shares if they can
cause consumers to anticipate how they would feel if that made the
wrong decision.” [85, p116]. These results show that not only is the
anticipation of regret important for real-life consumer decisions (as
hypothesised in Regret Theory), but that the nuances of the process, such
as the role of responsibility, are incredibly important to understand
for finding situations under which Regret Theory might provide a
descriptive account of human decision making behaviour. These specific
characteristics and context of the decisions being taken, and how they
link to regret-based models of decision making, are further explored in
Chapter 3.
As such, the psychologist’s approach to the experimental study of
regret, whilst arguably not as rigorous as the economist’s approach, will
ultimately provide a greater body of evidence for suggesting the future
direction of regret-based theories. Such experiments, for example, have
also resulted in findings about the temporal nature of regret (Gilovich
and Medvec [28], Richard et al. [75]) and the effect of feedback on
anticipated regret (Josephs et al. [45], Zeelenberg et al. [107], Zeelenberg
and Beattie [105]), neither of which are explicitly incorporated into
the typical Regret Theory framework. These findings have led to new,
process driven, regret-based theories, which aim to incorporate the results
of experimental research directly into the mathematics of the theories,
resulting in the likes of Feedback-conditional Regret Theory (Humphrey
[41]) and Decision Justification Theory (Connolly and Zeelenberg [18]).
2.2.3 Experiential Regret Experiments
As discussed in both the introduction and other chapters of this work,
the primary focus of this research is the effect of experienced regret
on future anticipated regret and, consequently, choice behaviour. The
theoretical motivation for this research is provided in the first chapter,
but, in addition to addressing the question theoretically, the above
experimental approaches provide a basis upon which is it possible to
design an experiment, or series of experiments, to address the question
directly.
Designing such an experiment requires two main components. Firstly,
the experiment must have a mechanism through which experienced
regret can be created and experienced by the subjects in the experiment.
In the simplest case, supposing there are two groups of experimental
subjects - A and B - there must be a way to cause group A to experience
more regret than group B. The second essential component is a method
of measuring the subsequent relative attitudes, of the two treatment
groups, towards regret (i.e. how they subsequently anticipate regret)
after they have been exposed to the different levels of experienced regret.
Both of these two components have significant technical, theoretical
and experimental challenges associated with them, and a discussion
of these will follow in later sections. However, to date, there have been
a small number of experiments conducted which have attempted to
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answer the question of the impact of experienced regret on subsequent
choice.
Zeelenberg and Beattie [1997]
The first experiment which looked into the impact of experienced regret
on subsequent behaviour was Experiment 3 of Zeelenberg and Beattie
[105]. Experiments 1 and 2 in this paper had looked at the impact of
expected feedback on subsequent behaviour (as discussed previously),
but Experiment 3 took this one step further by looking at the impact of
experienced feedback on subsequent behaviour. By extension, when the
experienced feedback informed the participant that they would have
done better had they made a different decision, this created experienced
regret.
The precise experimental design used in this research was a version of
the ultimatum game. In the game, each player must make a decision on
how to split 100 Dutch Guilders between themselves (as the proposer)
and another person in the game (as the responder). The responder then
chooses whether to accept the split (in which case each person keeps
their share) or reject the split (in which case, they each get nothing).
In reality, every subject in the experiment was a proposer, and the
responding was done by the experimenter, although subjects were
unaware of this.
In generating the regret, subjects were split into two treatment groups.
In the high regret group (HRG), subjects were told that their offer had
been accepted, but the responder would have still accepted even if they
had offered 10 Guilders less. In the low regret group (LRG), subjects
were told that their offer had been accepted, but the responder would
have still accepted even if they had offered 2 Guilders less. The idea
here is that those subjects in the HRG were led to believe that they had
left 10 Guilders on the table. That is, they could have made a decision
(to offer 10 Guilders less) which would have improved their payoff by
10 Guilders11. In contrast, those in the LRG were led to believe that
that they left very little money on the table, in that they could have, at
most, only offered 2 Guilders less and still had their offer accepted. As
this was the only difference between the two experimental groups, it is
reasonable to assume that those in the HRG experienced more regret
that those in the LRG, as those in the HRG made a “bad decision” (they
made an offer far in excess of the minimum acceptable offer) and those
in the LRG made a “good decision” (they made an offer which was just
above the minimum acceptable offer). This assumption is supported by
subjective measurements of “experienced regret” which the participants
were asked about after they received the results of the feedback12.
There was then a second stage of the experiment, whereby each par-
ticipant was asked to play the role of the proposer in the 100 Guilder
ultimatum game again13. The hypothesis of Zeelenberg and Beattie was
11 and, by extension, they could also have offered 9 Guilders less and received 9 Guilders
more, 8 Guilders less and received 8 Guilders more, etc., but not 11 Guilders less, as that
offer would have been rejected.
12 as stated in the paper “[t]his was done by presenting the participants on the computer
screen with the feedback and asking them to indicate, on 7-point scales, how much regret
they experienced and how good they thought their offer was in retrospect.” [105, p73]
13 in round 2, each participant was informed that they were now playing against a different
responder from round 1 (again, in reality, they were playing against the experimenter),
and that the average minimum acceptable offer in round 1 was 22 Guilders. This was the
same for both groups.
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“...that participants in the [HRG] would lower their offers more than
participants in the [LRG]... because of the regret they experienced over
the first offer”, thus describing the hypothesised impact of experienced
regret on subsequent choice behaviour. Their reasoning for this hypoth-
esis can drawn from the results of Experiment 2, where Zeelenberg
and Beattie conclude that “[t]his behaviour [of making lower offers]
represents regret aversion because lower offers result in less regret if
accepted.” Thus, combining the hypothesis and the reasoning together
implies that their belief is that the experience of regret, from stage one
of the game, works to increase regret aversion in stage two of the game.
Indeed, the offers in stage two were lower for those in the HRG
(mean of 26.34 Guilders) compared to those in the LRG (mean of 34.69
Guilders, significant difference at the 1% level), confirming their hypoth-
esis that the impact of experienced regret is to make the subjects more
regret averse, using the implication of the results from the ultimatum
game in Experiment 2.
Creyer and Ross [1999]
The second experiment on the impact of experienced regret was con-
ducted in 1999 by Creyer and Ross, who, like Zeelenberg and Beattie,
seek “...to [measure] the experience of regret and its affects on subse-
quent behaviors.” [21, p380] They achieve this through “...varying levels
of outcome feedback in order to measure the experience of regret and
examine its effects on subsequent decision making.” [21, p380].
Their specific experimental approach14 shares many similarities with
Zeelenberg and Beattie. In this experiment, the subjects must propose
an offer “...in an attempt to win an order to produce 1000 silicon chips
for a hypothetical electronics firm... [choosing] from among a set of 11
bids, ranging from $80,000 to $130,00015.” [21, p387]. Again, similar to
the Zeelenberg and Beattie experiment, there was a chance that the offer
could be rejected (and, hence, earn the salesperson no commission); this
time framed as the fact that there would also be competing offers from
other firms in the marketplace, with the firm offering the lowest bid
winning the contract. Additionally, the bonus earned by the salesperson,
should the contract be won, depended positively on the bid made.
“[T]he bonus ranged from $5000 to $15,000, for the $80,000 and $130,000
bids respectively.” [21, p387]
Immediately, one can see the theoretical equivalence between the
two experiments. Both require the subjects to make a decision under
uncertainty, where a better offer to the other player16 leads to a higher
chance of acceptance, and obtaining a strictly positive payoff, but at
the expense of an overall lower payoff to the subject. Also, as in the
Zeelenberg and Beattie experiment, there was a second round of the
game, which commenced after participants had received feedback on
the outcome of their offer from the first stage. Two of the treatment
groups used by Creyer and Ross were directly equivalent to the HRG
and LRG in Zeelenberg and Beattie’s experiment. Their HRG was
framed such that the subject had won the contract, but the next nearest
14 specifically, Experiment 2 in their paper
15 as one might expect, given the scale of the numbers, the actual payments made to the
participants in this experiment were scaled down to payoffs for participants of between
$1.50 and $4.50.
16 it is worth noting that in the Zeelenberg and Beattie experiment, a “better offer” corre-
sponds to a “higher offer” to the other person, but in the Creyer and Ross experiment, a
“better offer” corresponds to a “lower price” being offered to the electronics firm.
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offer of a competitor was substantially17 higher, indicating that the
subject could have offered a significantly higher price, increasing their
own bonus payoff, and still won the contract. The LRG, by comparison,
was framed such that the next nearest offer of a competitor was only
minimally above, indicating that the subject could have only marginally
increased their own bonus payoff by making a different offer, and hence,
overall, they made a good decision.
In the second selling scenario, where Creyer and Ross measure the
effects of first stage regret on subsequent choice, the subjects faced
an essentially equivalent contract-offer scenario, but with a different
range of payoffs and bonuses18 to the first stage. Their hypothesis is
that “...the decision maker experiencing regret [from the previous stage]
should be more likely to choose the option [in the second stage] which
maximises his or her chances of a positive outcome in a subsequent
decision, even if that option provides a lower pay-off.” [21, p386/7]19.
Indeed, their results show that “... the post-manipulation [second stage]
bid was lower (i.e., the bid had a higher probability of acceptance)
when regret was experienced, compared to when little or no regret
was experienced”[21, p390] and that the difference in second stage bids
between the HRG and LRG was significant at the 5% level. Whilst their
written conclusion is not framed in terms of a change in regret aversion
in the second stage, the implication from their hypothesis is that the
decision maker who experiences regret becomes more regret averse,
wanting to maximise their chances of a positive outcome in the second
stage, hence lowering their offer.
Raeva and van Dijk [2009]
A third experiment which looks directly at the effects of experienced
regret on subsequent choice is by Raeva and van Dijk [73], who move
away from the framework of Zeelenberg and Beattie and Creyer and
Ross, instead studying the impact “...of experienced regret on a different
subsequent choice, i.e., on a subsequent choice where no direct mapping
between the choices is present, but only a remote resemblance.” [73, p4]
Indeed, the channel by which they propose that such an effect would
take place is also different from the previous two experiments. They
“...assume that the mechanism by which experienced regret influences
anticipated regret is linked to influencing the subjective probability of
experiencing regret” [73, p4], which stands in contrast to the previous
experiments by, firstly, very explicitly stating the component of antici-
pated regret which will experience a change as a result of experienced
regret, and, secondly, emphasising the role of probability weighting in
the anticipated regret calculation at the expense of the regret function
itself20.
17 indeed, the HRG in this experiment is called the “Substantial” regret group for this
reason.
18 the eleven bids in the second stage ranged from $100,000 to $162,500, and the bonuses
ranged from $6000 to $18,000.
19 the difference between this hypothesis, and the hypothesis of Zeelenberg and Beattie,
will be widely explored in subsequent sections
20 as the anticipated regret calculation, used in Regret Theory, has both a regret function
and associated probabilities (i.e. “I think if I choose option A, I have a 30% chance of
experiencing high regret”), there are two channels which changes due to the experience
of regret can operate. Most work (as is implicitly assumed in Zeelenberg and Beattie [105]
and Creyer and Ross [21]) assumes that this channel is the regret function, but Raeva and
van Dijk explicitly assume the other.
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As in the previous experiments, this experiment has two stages. In
the first stage, the regret is generated by a complete feedback vs partial
feedback manipulation. All subjects could choose between two 50/50
gambles, both of which had a 50% chance of winning €1 and a 50%
chance of winning €10. Those in the regret condition (RC) chose one
of the two gambles, won the €1 prize, and then learned that, had they
chosen the other door, they would have won a €10 prize. Those in
the no-regret condition (NRC) chose one of the two gambles, won the
€1 prize, but did not learn what they would have received had they
chosen the other door21. This is a slightly different approach to the
other experiments, which compare “high vs low regret” as opposed to
“positive vs absent regret”, but the implications should be similar, under
the assumption that there is simply more regret being experienced in
one group compared to the other.
The second stage, however, is a fundamentally different task, where
participants are asked to give a certainty equivalent value for a gamble
which has a 50% chance of winning €100 and a 50% chance of win-
ning €100022. Their hypothesis is that “...the direction of adjustment is
downwards23 when the subjective probability of regret is changed due
to experienced regret24.” [73, p5]. However, they also manipulate the
second stage by using both complete and partial feedback conditions,
such that there are now four treatment groups overall (RC-complete,
NRC-complete, RC-partial, NRC-partial). The idea is that if the impact
of the experience of regret works through the channel of subsequent
anticipated regret, then the impact will be different in situations where
regret can be avoided compared to situations where regret can be once
again experienced25.
The results of this experiment can be summarised by the mean
certainty equivalent values of each of the four groups, as presented in
Figure 38.
The results, in contrast to the hypotheses, suggest that the only
situation in which there was a significant deviation in the reported
certainty equivalents of the four groups, was in the condition where
there was both regret experienced in the first stage, and there was
21 the implication is that both groups will experience disappointment (as they both “lost”
their chosen gamble) but only the group which saw the better result from the other
gamble will experience regret. It is plausible, however, that, once the subjects in the NRC
observe the fact that they only received €1 from their gamble, they might wish they had
chosen the other, under the assumption that they wouldn’t have done any worse (they
would have obtained the same result with a 50% probability), but could have done better
(they could have gained an extra €9 with a 50% probability). This issue of “counterfactual
thinking”, leading to regret, has been widely discussed in much of the complete vs partial
feedback literature, without any general conclusion as to either the presence or level of
regret under such circumstances.
22 the question is framed in terms of the popular TV show “Deal or No Deal” where a
contestant has reached the last stage with only the €100 and €1000 prizes remaining, and
must decide what is the minimum offer from the banker that they would accept.
23 i.e. those in the RC will report a lower certainty equivalent than those in the NRC
24 their assumption is that the experience of regret from the first stage, as a result of
making the wrong decision in a 50/50 gamble, implies that they will anticipate a higher
probability of losing the 50/50 gamble again, and hence experiencing the regret of
“choosing the wrong gamble/box” again in stage 2. This implies that the gamble is less
attractive in stage 2, when compared to the certainty equivalent, and hence they would
accept a lower value for certain to restore equivalence.
25 here, the hypothesis is that, if the lottery is still resolved after the certainty equivalent is
taken (in the complete feedback condition), then the certainty equivalent is less attractive
compared to the partial feedback condition, as it also exposes the decision maker to the
possibility of regret. Hence, the decision maker will require a higher certainty equivalent
value, to be indifferent between the money-for-sure and the gamble, when complete
feedback is provided.
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Figure 38: Figure 3 from Raeva and van Dijk [73]
complete feedback provided about the results of the second stage.
However, the direction of this one significant result is consistent with
their explanation of how the experience of regret would influence
the certainty equivalent values when comparing the non-regret to the
regret conditions in the complete feedback case, as they did predict
that it would be lower in the regret condition. As such, their proposed
mechanism, through which the experience of regret would increase
sensitivity to the possible experience of a “similar” regret again, using
an increase in the subjective probability of that regret, is lent support
by the result. Though the other results run contrary to the predictions
of Raeva and van Dijk’s formulation of regret theory26, there is an
indication that the presence of anticipatory regret, which is the only
difference between the partial and complete feedback conditions in
stage two, can be influenced by regret experienced in a previous stage.
More work would need to be done, however, to conclusively determine
that this is due to a change in subjective probabilities associated with a
specific type of regret, rather than a change in the regret function itself.
Coricelli et al. [2005]
One last experiment, which looks at the impact of experienced regret
on subsequent choice behaviour, is by Coricelli et al. [19], who use
neuroimaging approaches to additionally investigate the activity of the
brain when decisions under uncertainty are made. In their experimental
design, subjects are asked to make a long sequence of choices, which all
involve a decision between two independently resolved gambles. The
gambles are presented as “spinning wheels”, whereby a fraction of the
circle corresponds to an outcome, and the probability of that outcome
being randomly picked is the fraction of the circle it takes up. At each
stage, subjects view both wheels (corresponding to the two gambles),
and, again, there are two conditions of partial and complete feedback. If
the subject is making a decision in a complete feedback trial, they will
select the gamble, and then view the outcome of both the selected and
unselected gamble. If they are making a decision in a partial feedback
trial, they will view the outcome of only the gamble they selected.
By arranging this experiment as a long series of gambles, rather than
a two-stage, two group experiment, there is a benefit of being able to
26 which is based, qualitatively, on Bell [6]
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Figure 39: Table 2 from Coricelli et al. [19]
generate a much wider range of experienced regret throughout the
experiment, but at the expense of direct control of the variables which
are being changed. As such, a regression analysis the most appropriate
approach to generating useful results, and Coricelli et al. construct a
panel logit model, with individual random effects, and initially specify
the model with the choice between gambles as a function of anticipated
disappointment, anticipated regret and expected value27. The results
are given reproduced in Figure 39.
The results indicate that their formulation of anticipated regret is a
significant determinant of individual choice in this experiment, even
when controlling for the expected value of the respective gambles.
However, in addition to measuring the effect of anticipated regret on
choice, they also seek to investigate the effect of experienced of regret
on choice. This is constructed in two ways. Firstly, by separating the se-
quence of choices into the first, middle and final thirds, they show that
the “...proportion of regret-avoiding choices increased over time with
the cumulative effect of the experience of regret.”[19, p1259] Secondly,
by using neuroimaging techniques, they show that the “...[e]xperience
of regret in a previous period profoundly influenced choice-related
activity, enhancing responses in right dorsolateral prefrontal (DLPFC),
right lateral OFC, and inferior parietal lobule”[19, p1259] and that
cumulative regret, calculated as the average payoff of all unselected
previous gambles minus the average realized payoff of all previous
gambles, “...at the time of decision making involved similar anatomical
regions...as that elicited by regret at the time of outcome feedback.”[19,
p1259]. Their interpretation of these various results is that “...the ex-
perience of regret has a major impact on the process of choice that is
expressed at two levels, with a net result of biasing subjects to forgo
choices that might lead to future experience of this highly negative
emotion"[19, p1260], which, again, can be understood to imply that
the experience of regret works in such as way as to make the decision
maker more regret averse in the future.
27 they “...parameterized regret as the absolute value of the difference between the lowest
and highest outcome across gambles.” [19, p1258]
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Conclusions from existing experiential regret literature
All four experiments indicate that there is a significant relationship
between past experiences of regret, and subsequent regret aversion.
Indeed, all four experiments arrive at a similar conclusion; that the
experience of regret from a previous decision (or previous decisions),
will make a decision maker more sensitive to the potential of regret
being experienced again in the future. Or, in the language of traditional
Regret Theory, they become more regret averse.
However, despite all four papers reaching the same conclusion, all
four papers’ conclusions are based on different assumptions about the
process through which the experimental subjects’ behaviour is being
influenced. Indeed, these assumptions are so critical to the conclusions
being drawn, that simply switching the assumptions of one paper with
another could lead to a completely opposite set of conclusions being
drawn from this experimental literature. As such, it could be argued
that these experimental results are not robust, as it is possible to make
entirely plausible, and psychologically justifiable, alternative assump-
tions about the individuals in the experiments, and draw fundamentally
different conclusions from the data they obtain. It is to this discussion
of the robustness of the experimental results of each paper that we turn
next.
2.3 limitations of existing experimental literature and
experimental results
To begin a discussion of the limitations of the existing experimental
literature, we must first explore the assumptions, implications and
limitations of the traditional regret theories which the experiments are
based on. In all formulations of Regret Theory, there are both explicit
and implicit assumptions, which are, to differing extents, justified
through psychological evidence. It is to these assumptions which we
turn first.
2.3.1 Assumptions of Regret Theory
The original theoretical expositions of Regret Theory, from Loomes and
Sugden [58] and Bell [5], both contain broadly similar assumptions
relating to the regret components of the theory, and, as such, it is
sufficient to discuss these with respect to just one of the papers (in this
case, Loomes and Sugden [58]) in order to communicate the essence of
their mathematical assumptions in terms of psychological intuition.
The assumptions made about regret in the Loomes and Sugden paper
can be broadly split into three categories. These are
• Assumptions which are wholly uncontroversial, and necessary
for the basic structure of the theory.
• Assumptions which are explicitly discussed, with regards to both
their intuitive and mathematical nature, but are debatable, and
consequently alter the predictions of the theory depending on
whether they are included or not.
• Assumptions which are implicitly made, in terms of their psycho-
logical underpinnings, but appear uncontroversial when written
down mathematically. These are assumptions which, essentially,
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appear to fall into the first category, but merit discussion in the
second category, given the consequence they have for, for example,
experimental results.
As an example of an assumption which fits into the first category is
that, holding constant the outcome which did result from your decision,
“...the more pleasurable the consequence that might have been, the
more regret...is experienced.” [58, p808] This assumption implies that,
if you experience regret as a result of a decision, then the regret you
experience would get worse as you increase the “utility” or “pleasure”
of the outcome which would have resulted, under the same state of the
world, had you made a different decision. For example, if you were
betting on a horse race, which had only two horses, the “favourite”
and the “outsider”, and you chose to bet £10 on the favourite, but the
outsider was the horse that won, then the regret you would experience
would increase as the odds of the “outsider” got longer. You would
experience more regret if the outsider had odds of 100-1, than if it had
odds of 20-1, than if it had odds of 5-1.
An example of an assumption which falls into the second category
is that a function Q(ξ) = ξ+ R(ξ) − R(−ξ), where R(.) is the regret
function defined over the chosen and unchosen outcomes, “...is convex
for all positive values of ξ”[58, p810]. As Loomes and Sugden discuss,
“...there seems to be no a priori reason for preferring... [this] assumption
to the others” [58, p810], which are also mathematically stated in the
paper, but “...a choice between them should be made mainly on the basis
of empirical evidence.” [58, p810] Indeed, the paper explores existing
evidence relating to decision under uncertainty, and finds that “[r]egret
theory yields a wide range of firm predictions that are supported by
experimental evidence” under the assumption “...that Q(ξ) is convex
for all ξ > 0.” [58, p817]. As such, the “convexity assumption”, as it was
recast in Loomes and Sugden [60], appears to have large amounts of
experimental evidence supporting its existence. Should an individual
wish to challenge the assumption, they would need to demonstrate
why the existing empirical evidence is misleading, and present new
evidence to support an alternative assumption. Given it is unlikely that
evidence will be found to overturn decades of research which all point
in the same direction, it is fair to say that this assumption is robust, and
safe to include when making conclusions from experimental results.
It is, however, the third category which produces the more interesting
assumptions, both in terms of their importance for the theoretical
predictions of regret theory, but also the conclusions which can be
drawn from experimental results, where the experiment was designed
around the basic principles of regret theory. The primary assumption to
be discussed, which will lead to a detailed explanation of the limitations
of the existing experimental literature and their conclusions, is implicitly
contained in the formulation of the regret function by Loomes and
Sugden, but also by other similar formulations of regret theory. As
stated before, the “regret-rejoice function”28 of Loomes and Sugden
“...assigns a real-valued index to every possible increment or decrement
of choiceless utility”[58, p809] and is written as R(cij − ckj) where cij
is the utility the person would receive from simply being gifted the
outcome of action i, in state of the world j, without having been asked
to make a choice29. By calculating regret as solely dependent on the
28 referred to throughout, for simplicity, as the regret function
29 the use of the letter ’c’ refers to the idea of ’choiceless’ utility
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difference between the utility of what you received and what you missed
out on, there are important implications for even very simple decision
making problems, which involve a choice between only a few options.
For example, consider the simplest possible decision under uncer-
tainty problem, which involves two actions and two states of the world.
state of world x state of world y
Option A 5 5
Option B 0 10
where the numbers represent the specific choiceless utility associated
with the outcome of, for example, option A in state of the world x.
Suppose, in addition, that each state of the world is equally likely, and
so p = 0.5 for each. In which case, the original formulation of regret
theory informs us that the decision maker will weakly prefer option A
to option B if, and only if,
1/2 (5− 0+ R(5− 0) − R(0− 5))+1/2 (5− 10+ R(5− 10) − R(10− 5)) > 0
⇒ 1/2 (5− 0+ R(5) − R(−5)) + 1/2 (5− 10+ R(−5) − R(5)) > 0
From analysing the last line of the mathematics, two things stand out.
The first is that the solution has simply degenerated to the Expected
Utility solution of indifference, which is predictable given the numbers
are constructed such that the expected utility of option B is equal to
the “full insurance” of option A. Secondly, however, we can notice that
the regret terms also cancel out in the mathematics, which implies that
considerations of anticipated regret can’t influence the decision, one
way or another, under this formulation. This implies, for example, that
an experiment which found that significantly more people preferred
option A to option B, would rule out anticipated regret as a possible
explanation, on the grounds that the difference in choiceless utility
between option A and option B in state of the world x is equivalent
to the difference in utility between option B and option A in state of
the world y. Even though there are two possible sources of regret in
this experiment, they are deemed to cancel each other out for decision
making purposes30.
Another non-trivial consequence of this formulation of Regret Theory,
contained within the above example, is that there will always be, in
non-trivial decision making problems, at least two sources of potential
30 the purpose of this example, as will become clear, is not to argue with the theoretical
assumptions of Loomes and Sugden [58], but rather to point out that there are dangers to
be had, and mistakes to be made, when designing experiments based upon the theoretical
models, given they use assumptions, often implicit, which have important consequences
for the interpretation of the experimental results. Indeed, the updated version of Regret
Theory from Loomes and Sugden [60], places significantly less restrictions on the form
of the regret function, and still derives broadly the same predictions as the original
theory. Yet, more commonly, it is the “difference” or “utility gap” functional form of
the regret function which is imposed when explanations for experimental results are
given. Indeed, even the updated version of Regret Theory assumes that regret is simply a
function of the utility obtained and the utility foregone, which implies that two decision
under uncertainty problems which are mathematically equivalent, in terms of utilities
and probabilities, should yield the same choices. As shown in Chapter 3, however, this is
not necessarily the case.
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regret, acting in opposite directions on the decision maker. This can be
shown by considering the most basic form of the problem of decision
making under uncertainty; the case where there is both a decision to be
made (at least two options) and at least some uncertainty (at least two
states of the world). The simplest version of this problem is, therefore,
the 2x2 version, where there are two actions and two states of the world.
Consider the following payoff matrix
state of world x state of world y
Option A j k
Option B l m
where j, k, l, and m refer to the choiceless utilities of the outcomes
in the payoff matrix. For the purposes of making decision under un-
certainty, we are interested in comparing option A to option B, and,
hence j & k to l & m. Working on a case-by-case basis, there are several
possible scenarios.
Cases of Indifference
Clearly, when j=l and k=m, we have absolute indifference between the
two options, as they are equivalent, so there is no decision to be made.
Hence, the case is not interesting.
Cases of Stochastic Dominance
Similarly, when one option stochastically dominates the other, there
is also little interest in the problem, as the dominant option is both
the only choice for maximising utility and avoiding regret. Such a case
occurs when
1. l > j & m > k
2. m > k & l = j
3. j > l & k > m
4. k > m & j = l
Non-trivial Decisions
The only two cases left are the non-trivial decisions when either
1. l > j & k > m or
2. m > k & j > l
In case 1, notice that, focusing on state of the world x, the anticipation of
regret would favour option B over A, but, focusing on state of the world
y, the anticipation of regret would favour option A over B. Similarly,
in case 2, focusing on state of the world x would favour option A over
B, but focusing on state of the world y would favour option B over A.
Hence, in both cases, the decision maker must consider two different
experiences of regret, which act in opposite directions on the decision
maker. In addition, the two competing directions of regret will always
exist in any non-trivial decision under uncertainty problem which has
more than two actions or more that two states of the world, as you can
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always isolate the aspect of the decision which makes it non-trivial,
by considering the two “best” actions, and consider the states of the
world (for which there will be a minimum of two) where there is a
trade-off between the two actions. As such, any discussion referring to a
decision-making problem under uncertainty, whether in an experiment
or otherwise, which refers to anticipated regret, must both identify and
analyse more than one source of anticipated regret to give a complete
picture of the process through which regret can affect a choice between
actions.
Implications of the assumptions
Combining these two oft-overlooked implications of Regret Theory
leads to the construction of examples where the discussion of an ex-
perimental result, should the example be analysed in the laboratory,
depends very heavily on how these assumptions are incorporated into
the design. For example, consider a betting problem, where there are
two possible bets which can be made (a High and Low bet), but also
the option to abstain from the gamble altogether. Further consider that
there are only two states of the world, which correspond to “winning”
and “losing” if you made the bet, but have no consequence if you




Low Bet L -L
High Bet H -H
Consider that a person who chooses the Low Bet is exposing themself
to two different forms of regret. Should the person win the bet, they
would receive a payoff of L, but experience a degree of regret from
not choosing the High Bet instead. Under the original form of Regret
Theory, this regret would be a function of the difference in choiceless
utility between H and L. Alternatively, should they lose the bet, they
would receive a negative payoff of -L, but also experience a degree
of regret from not choosing to Abstain. Again, under original Regret
Theory, this would be a function of the difference in choiceless utility
between 0 and -L.
As such, if the above situation was observed in an experimental
setting, where an person chose the Low Bet, it would not be possible
to attribute the choice of the Low Bet to anticipated regret, without
knowing more details about the choiceless utility of H, L, -L and 032,
and the nature of the regret function, or, in other words, the individual’s
attitude towards regret. A typical argument for why the Low Bet was
chosen could be:
The individual chose the Low Bet, because they consid-
ered the state of the world where they would lose, and
realised that the regret from knowing they should have
abstained, instead of making the low bet33, was less than
31 0 < L < H
32 though it’s not unreasonable to assume that the choiceless utility of 0, i.e. no deviation
from the status quo, is 0
33 R(−L− 0)
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the regret which would have resulted from taking the High
Bet, losing, and realising they should have abstained34. This
desire to avoid the large regret is anticipated regret aversion,
and so we attribute the decision to make the Low Bet, in
preference to the High Bet, to it.
Indeed, it is not sensible or logical to posit that the situation where
the individual takes the High Bet and loses generates less regret than
the situation where the individual takes the Low Bet and loses35, so
at least some of the above argument makes perfect sense. However, as
discussed earlier, there is always more than one source of regret acting
on any decision under uncertainty. In this case, you could make an
alternative argument regarding the individual’s choice of the Low Bet
as follows:
The choice of the Low Bet, in preference to the High
Bet, makes little sense when you consider the effect of an-
ticipated regret aversion on the decision. Considering the
state of the world where the individual wins, they expose
themself to potential regret if they choose the Low Bet36,
but can prevent this from occurring by choosing the High
Bet, knowing it would be the best choice if they win, and
hence giving zero regret37. Assuming the individual is re-
gret averse, therefore, the effect of this anticipated regret
aversion should, instead, push them towards the High Bet.
As such, anticipated regret aversion is not an explanation
for the decision in this case.
The second explanation applies the same logic as the first, but simply to
the other potential source of regret which occurs when the individual
wins instead of loses. Again, it is inarguable that there is more potential
regret, in this state of the world, from choosing the Low Bet as opposed
to the High Bet, so that part of the explanation holds up. Yet, despite
both arguments appearing to be valid, they are clearly contradictory.
One states that anticipated regret aversion is a possible explanation for
the choice, and the other says that this is not the case.
Clearly, the problem arises because we are considering each state of
the world in isolation. The fact that this is a decision made under un-
certainty necessarily implies that there is a positive probability of both
winning and losing occurring, and so to completely neglect one expla-
nation, in favour of the other, can only be done if you can demonstrate
that the expected regret, consisting of both magnitude and probability
of occurring, from one state dominates the expected regret from the
other state in the decision making process of the individual. It is not
sufficient to simply observe the Low Bet being chosen, and pick one of
the two explanations for the choice, without justification as to why one
particular source of expected regret is dominant.
34 R(−H− 0)
35 another way to think of this point is that, even in the situation where the individual takes
the Low Bet and loses, they experience some rejoicing from realising that they would have
been worse off had they taken the High Bet. In the case where they took the High Bet
and lost, this rejoicing does not exist.
36 R(L−H)
37 R(0)
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From Discrete to Continuous Choice
The above example demonstrates how difficult it is to use anticipated
regret aversion as an ex-post explanation for choice behaviour in dis-
crete choice problems. This framework can then be extended to the
more common real-world situation of problems of continuous choice
under uncertainty. This framework naturally extends the above discrete
choice gambling example, to one where an individual must decide how
much money they wish to gamble.
In such a situation, the two sides of regret are even more obvious than
they are in a discrete choice case. For any positive amount of money,
x, that you choose to gamble, if you win the gamble, there is regret
from thinking that you should have bet more than x, and if you lose,
there is regret from thinking that you should have bet less than x. This
duality of regret makes assertions such as “x was the regret-minimising
choice” or “anticipated regret aversion caused the individual to gamble
x” incredibly difficult to justify, as doing so requires explicit knowledge
about the regret function of the individual in both the winning and
losing state of the world. For example, if you argue that the individual
bet £0, because this protected them from regret in the situation where
they lost, and hence was regret-minimising, then I could counter that
the individual would experience regret in the state of the world where
they won (knowing that any positive bet would have been superior)
and challenge you to demonstrate why the regret in the losing state
dominates the regret in the winning state for this individual, and hence
makes £0 the regret minimising choice.
Extending the problem further takes us to a world where not only is
there a continuum of actions, but also a continuum of states of the world.
Consider a situation where an individual must complete a task which
takes an unknown amount of time t to complete. In addition, before the
task commences, the individual must also make a prediction p about
how long the task takes to do, in order to hire out a work space. There
is, however, a cost associated with a misprediction, which is increasing
in the extent to which the prediction is wrong. If the individual under-
predicts the task completion time, or if p < t, then they will have to pay
a higher rate38 for the additional work space time needed to complete
the task. If the individual over-predicts the task completion time, or if
p > t, then the individual will have paid too much for the work space,
given it was completed in a shorter than anticipated time. Clearly, regret
will be zero, only if the individual manages to complete the task in
exactly the amount of time they predicted, and they will neither pay the
high rate nor over-book the work space. However, the regret-minimising
prediction, p, is not necessarily the expected completion time. If the
individual fears one of the two sources of regret much more than the
other (say, the increase in rate, for exceeding the work space booking,
is very high), then it may be worth the individual being pessimistic
(higher p) in their prediction of the task completion time, so as to make
the probability, of experiencing regret from knowing they could have
avoided the high rate, by stating a higher value of p, much smaller.
Equivalently, if the individual is more worried about paying too much
up front for the work space, and exposing themself to the possible
regret of the task taking a shorter amount of time to complete than
expected and knowing they could have saved money by stating a lower
38 that is, for booking the additional work space at short notice, the marginal cost is higher
than it would have been had they booked the correct amount of time in advance
2.3 limitations of existing experimental literature and experimental results 93
p, then they would submit an optimistic (lower) prediction for p to
reduce this chance. Again the two sources of regret act in opposite
directions on the choice, and it is not possible to say that the choice
of p which was ultimately made was regret-minimising without both
acknowledging and detailing the magnitude of impact of both sources
on the decision which was made.
This world of both continuous choice and continuous states of the
world, incorporating regret, need not even have financial costs as the
source of potential regret. In a situation where reputation is involved,
so making accurate predictions is a source of pride and/or a future
indication of quality, then it need not necessarily be the case that
over and under predictions generate the same feelings of regret, even
from the same magnitude of misprediction. An experiment designed to
explore this idea, and give data to show the heterogeneity in the impact
of regret on decision making, will be explored later. In addition, such
a framework can be easily applied to more commonplace economics-
based models of decision making to give new theoretical results and
ideas. Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay [24] apply this very idea to the world of
auctions, giving both theoretical predictions and experimental evidence
as to the role that different sources of regret can have on individual
decision making. In the case of the auction, this corresponds to the
amount an individual wishes to bid for an object (the “prediction” in
the language of the above example) given the uncertainty as to what
the highest bid of the other bidders may be (the continuum of states of
the world).
2.3.2 An identification problem
The argument above has a natural analogy in the traditional economics
world; that of the identification problem, for example as seen in estima-
tion of the price elasticity of demand.
For those unfamiliar with the problem, a sensible approach to esti-
mating the price elasticity of demand would appear to be observing
a market over time and plotting the market price against the quantity
demanded at different time intervals. By estimating the slope of a line
of best fit through these points, you would appear to have a good
estimate of the elasticity.
However, whilst you certainly directly observed the demand and the
market prices, there was an element of the equation which was not
observed; that of supply. As the market price is determined jointly by
demand and supply, any estimate of the price elasticity of demand
which does not account or control for the impact of supply (and indeed
the wide range of variables which determine market supply) on price
will likely be incorrect.
The same identification problem occurs when attempting to measure
the effect of experienced regret on anticipated regret. Whilst there are
certain aspects of the problem you can directly observe (for example,
the action which is chosen such as to minimise regret, and perhaps even
the magnitude of regret which was experienced, through neuroscience
techniques), there are parts of the equation which will jointly determine
the action chosen, but are largely unobservable. In the regret case, this is
the anticipated regret associated with each action on offer as part of the
choice. As explained, because there is no way to isolate just one of the
anticipated regrets, and the choice made is the result of comparing at
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least two unobservable anticipations of regret, then directly observing
a regret-minimising action does not give you the causality between
experienced and anticipated regret. In the same way, observing both
price and demand does not necessarily give you the causality from one
to the other because of the unobservable factors at play.
If there is an analogy between the regret problem and the identifi-
cation problem of demand and supply, the natural question is “can
techniques developed to overcome the identification problem also be
used in this situation?” Two common techniques are the use of experi-
ments and instrumental variables.
In the world of demand curve estimation, a pricing experiment may
be used by a company to vary the price of a good and directly observe
the effect on demand. Under appropriate conditions (for example, ran-
domisation of where and how the prices are varied) the unobservable
factors can be assumed to vary only due to random noise, and hence
an unbiased estimate of the price elasticity can be found. However, as
we have seen, using an experiment does not solve the problem in the
regret world, as it is not simply of case of trying to eliminate sources of
bias. The sign of the effect itself is in question, with both options being
theoretically plausible, unlike demand elasticity which should, under
normal conditions, always be negative.
The instrumental variables approach has similar issues in its appli-
cation to regret. Typically, in demand estimation, you are looking for
instruments which would help explain the movement in price but not
a movement in demand (for example, weather patterns may dictate
costs in the supply chain but not affect the demand for a good). By
first calculating a “true price”, which subtracts the effects on price
of these variables, you can reduce the error in estimating the price
elasticity by utilising the true price in the demand equation instead.
This approach does not work in the regret case, however, because there
is no instrument which affects the anticipatory regret to one option
but not another. The mechanism through which anticipatory regret
affects actions cannot be controlled and isolated using the instrumental
variables approach.
2.3.3 Application of the assumptions
It is first worth noting that this is certainly not the first time that the
two sides of regret have been pointed out in a discussion of regret
theory. In their 1997 experiments, Zeelenberg and Beattie mention that
“...proposers [in the ultimatum game] can regret two things, offering too
little money when the offer is rejected, and offering too much when the
offer is accepted”[105, p68] and even attempt a discussion about which
may be the bigger factor on individual decisions in the ultimatum
game. They hypothesise that, typically, “...the regret about offering too
much money is generally less severe than regret about offering too little
money”[105, p68] but concede that receiving feedback on the minimal
acceptable offer39 “...can make regret about an offer that is too high
more severe because it points out exactly how much less the proposer
could have offered.”[105, p69] Also, as previously noted, Filiz-Ozbay
and Ozbay make extensive use of the two sides of regret in their work
on auctions, stating that “...if the bidders anticipate that they are going
39 the equivalent of learning t , the specific state of the world, in the example of both
continuous actions and continuous states presented earlier
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Figure 40: Expected Regret from acceptance
to feel winner regret, they will shade their bids. In contrast, if their
anticipation is loser regret, they will overbid”[24, p1407].
However, despite the acknowledged existence of the two sides of
regret in several papers, the application of this knowledge to drawing
conclusions from empirical and experimental results has been lacking.
It is to this application, on the existing literature, which we turn next.
Application to Zeelenberg and Beattie [1997]
As previously discussed, Zeelenberg and Beattie run a two stage ulti-
matum game, concluding that the lower proposals seen in stage two
from the group which experienced high regret in stage one [HRG]
compared to the group which experienced low regret in stage one, can
be interpreted as the experience of more regret causing an increase in
regret aversion of the participants in the HRG as “[t]his behaviour [of
making lower offers] represents regret aversion because lower offers
result in less regret if accepted.”[105, p72].
However, as explained earlier, the fact that there are two sources of
regret in such a decision making problem, means that it is not sufficient
to give an explanation about regret which focuses on just one source; in
this case the regret which results from making too high a proposal, if
the proposal is accepted. Given this specific result from the experiment,
there is another potential explanation which involves regret, for the
observed behaviour. Consider the graph in Figure 41.
Figure 41 shows the regret that an individual expects to face, con-
ditional on their proposal being accepted but as a function of the
minimum acceptable offer, for the range of proposals they can make
between 0 and 100 in the ultimatum game40. This expected regret is
zero, for a proposal of 0, because if the offer is accepted, there was no
superior bid that the proposer could have made which would have
increased their payoff. At the other end of the scale, if the proposal is
100 and is accepted, then the proposer will expect to feel regret if the
minimum acceptable offer was 0 or 1 or 2 or 3 all the way up to 98 or
99, all of which have a positive probability, knowing they could have
40 remembering that a proposal of 0 corresponds to keeping the entire amount of money for
yourself, and a proposal of 100 corresponds to giving all the money to the other player
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Figure 41: Expected Regret from rejection
lowered their offer and improved their payoff. Summing this regret
over all those probabilities means that the maximum expected regret
from the proposal being accepted will be at 100.
In addition, the curve is drawn to be strictly convex for two reasons.
Firstly, it fits with Loomes and Sugden’s standard assumption of regret
aversion, in that the maximum regret41 will be the proposer offering
100, this being accepted, but knowing the minimum acceptable offer
was 0, and hence realising they could have increased their payoff by
100 had they offered 0. This possible regret exists when the proposal
is 100, but not when the proposal is 99. When the proposal is 99, the
maximum regret will be the minimum acceptable offer being 0, and the
proposer realising that they could have increased their payoff by 99 had
they offered zero. Again, this regret exists when the proposal is 99, but
not 98. However, the regret from the 100 situation is disproportionately
larger than the regret from the 99 situation, under the assumption of
regret aversion. And hence adding the 100 situation to the curve (from
99) contributes more to expected regret than adding the 99 situation to
the curve (from 98). Hence the curve is strictly convex42. Additionally,
we need to assume strict convexity of regret in order to get an interior
regret-minimising solution to this problem, as it is claimed exists by
Zeelenberg and Beattie. This will be presented after introducing the
other form of regret, shown in Figure 41.
The second form of expected regret in the ultimatum game comes
from the possibility of the proposal being rejected. Once again, it is
zero at 100, because, if the proposal of 100 is rejected, then there is no
offer that the proposer could have made, since 100 was the maximum,
which would have resulted in an acceptance of the proposer’s offer, and
hence gain them positive payoff43. Additionally, if the proposal was
41 conditional on the offer being accepted
42 alternatively, ER(x+ 1) − ER(x) > ER(x) − ER(x− 1) under the assumption of
regret aversion, which gives the strict convexity
43 technically, in an ultimatum game where you can offer only whole numbers, such as
this experiment, this regret would also be zero at a proposal of 99, because having this
offer rejected, and hence learning that the minimum acceptable offer was 100, means the
only offer which was could have been accepted would have resulted in a zero payoff for
the proposer anyway. However, for all values less than 99, this regret would be strictly
positive.
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Figure 42: Expected Regret from acceptance and rejection combined
zero, and the offer was rejected, then all positive values for the proposal
could, depending on the minimum acceptable offer44, have potentially
been proposed and generated a positive payoff for the individual,
leading to the maximum expected regret from being rejected being at
a proposal of zero. Using exactly the same logic as in the “expected
regret from the proposal being accepted” situation, again the curve
is strictly convex. However, by acknowledging that the total expected
or anticipated regret, facing the proposer, is the sum of the expected
regret from the proposal being rejected and the expected regret from
the proposal being accepted, for every possible proposal we can draw
this sum to give the total anticipated regret. This is done in Figure 42.
What Figure 42 tells us is that, assuming both sources of regret are
strictly convex, then the total sum will also be strictly convex, and
we can find the point of minimum anticipated regret or, the regret-
minimising proposal, which will lie in the interior of the range of propos-
als. Given that Zeelenberg and Beattie predict that “...participants will
make regret minimizing decisions”[105, p65] in their experiment, then
we can assume that
1. Figure 42 is an accurate representation of how the two sources of
regret are assumed to act on the proposer in this experiment, and
2. The proposal which gives the minimum total anticipated regret
corresponds to the actual decision made by the proposer in the
experiment
As such, we can analyse the explanation given by Zeelenberg and Beat-
tie for the observed behaviour in the experiment45 using this graphical
framework. For those in the low regret group (LRG), let us assume
that the above figure corresponds to their decision making process, and
they are indeed acting as regret minimisers. In which case, their proposal
will be the value, p∗, which minimises the total anticipated regret (not
simply one form or another). This regret minimising position is shown
in Figure 43.
44 which, in this game, corresponds to the continuum of states of the world
45 that those proposers in the HRG submitted lower offers in the second stage because they
were more regret averse, and hence made a lower regret minimising offer, than those in
the LRG
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Figure 43: Regret minimising proposal p∗
Through the design of the experiment, the only difference between
the LRG and HRG is the amount of regret to which the respective
groups were exposed in stage one, so any significant difference observed
between the groups, with respect to their second stage proposals, can
be inferred to have been caused by the experience of regret. Indeed,
the HRG make significantly lower proposals than the LRG, which is
attributed to an increased sensitivity to regret in the state of the world
where the proposal is accepted. This idea is represented as an increase
in the convexity of the red curve in the graphical framework, as shown
in 44, or, intuitively, that large regrets now loom much larger than small
regrets for the HRG compared to the LRG. The result of this change
to the red curve then filters through to the blue curve, or the total
anticipated regret.
As explained by Zeelenberg and Beattie, the impact of this increased
sensitivity to the anticipated regret from a proposal being accepted is to
lower the regret minimising proposal from p∗to p ′ , shown graphically
in 46 by the new minimum point of the blue dashed line, which, itself,
is the total anticipated regret curve for those in the HRG.
So, this explanation does indeed appear to predict the observed
experimental result of a lower second round proposal for those in the
HRG (p ′, which had a mean of 26.34) compared to the LRG (p∗, which
had a mean of 34.69). The salient question, however, is whether this
is the only explanation for the observed experimental result. Is there
another reason why the regret minimising point for the HRG would
lie to the left of that for the LRG? Consider the graph in 46 where
the expected regret from the proposal being accepted is not different
between the HRG and LRG (i.e. the red curve remains unchanged), but
the expected regret from the proposal being rejected has been reduced
for the HRG.
In Figure 46, the dotted green curve (the “expected regret from the
proposal being rejected” curve for the HRG) lies below the solid green
curve (the “expected regret from the proposal being rejected” curve
for the LRG) which, when combined with the unchanged red curve,
gives rise to the total anticipated regret curve for the HRG (the dotted
blue curve) lying below the same curve for the LRG (the solid blue
curve). Intuitively, this can be thought of as the HRG now having a
Figure 44: Increased regret aversion should the proposal be accepted
Figure 45: New, lower regret minimising proposal p ′ caused by increased regret
aversion
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Figure 46: New, lower regret minimising proposal p ′ caused by reduced regret
aversion
lower sensitivity to potential regret, or lower regret aversion, than the
LRG, as, for every proposal, the anticipated regret is lower, with the
source of this lower regret aversion being the lower sensitivity to regret
from the proposal being rejected.
Notice, however, that the effect on p∗ is the same as it was in the
case where there was increased sensitivity to regret from the proposal
being accepted. Again, p ′ now lies to the left of p∗indicating that
the representative regret minimising decision maker from the HRG
will make a lower stage two proposal than the representative regret
minimising decision maker from the LRG, which is indeed what was
observed in the experiment run by Zeelenberg and Beattie.
As such, the explanation given above, that the experience of regret
actually causes the decision maker to have a lower regret aversion,
through less concern about regret in the state of the world that their of-
fer is rejected, predicts the same experimental result as was obtained by
Zeelenberg and Beattie. Hence, it cannot be rejected as a plausible expla-
nation for the observed behaviour, despite being, at the aggregate level,
exactly the opposite reasoning to the explanation given by Zeelenberg
and Beattie, simply on the basis of observed choice behaviour.
The outcome of this analysis is to show that, in an experiment such as
was run by Zeelenberg and Beattie, there will always be more than one
plausible explanation involving anticipated regret, and so it makes little
sense to pick one over the other without any corresponding empirical or
psychological justification. Just as Zeelenberg and Beattie’s explanation
is valid given the observed behaviour, so is the one in Figure 46. And
though it might be tempting to assume that the experience of regret
from having a “too high” offer accepted in stage one leads to increased
sensitivity to that same regret in stage two, so it is possible to assume
that because the decision maker did not experience the regret of having
a “too low” offer rejected in stage one, that they would be less sensitive
to that type of regret in stage two. Which of these two effects will
dominate the total anticipated regret aversion in stage two is, therefore,
unknown, and hence it is not possible to generalise from this observed
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Figure 47: Regret minimising contract offer p∗
behaviour that the experience of regret makes a decision maker either
more or less sensitive to total anticipated regret in a future decision.
Application to Creyer and Ross [1999]
As previously explained, there is a theoretical equivalence between
the two stage ultimatum game experiment run by Zeelenberg and
Beattie, and the two stage contract bidding experiment run by Creyer
and Ross. In the ultimatum game, a lower proposal yields a higher
payoff, but has a higher chance of being rejected outright, but in the
contract bidding game, a higher contract offer yields a higher payoff,
but has a higher chance of being rejected outright. As such, the same
analysis which was applied to Zeelenberg and Beattie can be applied
to Creyer and Ross, simply flipping the colour of the regret curves,
so that the expected regret from the proposal being accepted (the red
curve), is at a maximum with the lowest possible bid (which is $100k
in the second stage of this experiment), falling to a minimum with the
highest possible bid (which is $162.5k), and the expected regret from
the proposal being rejected (the green curve), is at a maximum with
the highest bid ($162.5k) and a minimum with the lowest bid ($100k).
As in the Zeelenberg and Beattie experiment, and for the same reasons
given the theoretical equivalence between the two experiments, both
regret curves are convex.
In Figure 47 p∗ represents the regret minimising contract offer of the
LRG in the second stage of the game. The experiment found that the
mean offer in the second stage, for those in the HRG, was lower than
the mean offer in the second stage of those in the LRG. This result met
with the initial prediction of Creyer and Ross, that those in the HRG
“...should be more likely to choose the option [in the second stage] which
maximises his or her chances of a positive outcome in a subsequent
decision, even if that option provides a lower pay-off.” [21, p386/7]
The interpretation of this prediction, from a regret aversion standpoint,
is that those in the HRG will be more conscious of the possibility of
having their offer rejected in the second stage, and so be likely to make a
safer, lower, offer. Graphically, therefore, this corresponds to an increase
in the convexity of the green curve, which gives the expected regret
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Figure 48: New, lower regret minimising contract offer p ′ caused by increased
regret aversion
from the contract offer being rejected. Again, by combining this new
green (dotted) curve with the unchanged red curve, we get the new,
blue (dotted) total anticipated regret curve for those in the HRG, shown
in Figure 48.
As shown in Figure 48, the regret minimising contract offer for those
in the HRG is lower, at p ′, that it is for the LRG, at p∗, which was the
behaviour observed in the experiment.
At first glance, this appears remarkably similar to the result from the
Zeelenberg and Beattie experiment, with one regret curve becoming
more convex, corresponding to an increased degree of regret aversion,
leading to a lower proposal, or contract offer, for those in the HRG
compared to those in the LRG. Here, however, unlike the Zeelenberg
and Beattie experiment, a lower offer is associated with lower risk
and lower payoff, and the source of regret which is increasing is the
anticipated regret from the offer being rejected, not the offer being
accepted. Indeed, if the same intuition from the Zeelenberg and Beattie
experiment was applied to Creyer and Ross’ experiment, then it would
predict an increase in the convexity of the red curve, and hence an
increase in the contract offers of the HRG compared to the LRG. It is fair
to say, therefore, that both the intuition and experimental results of the
two experiments are in direct contrast, despite the initial impression
that they are confirming the same theory that the experience of regret
leads to a subsequent increase in regret aversion.
As with the Zeelenberg and Beattie experiment, it is also possible to
explain the same experimental result by considering a reduced degree
of regret aversion from the other source of potential regret in the
experiment. This time, by assuming that the experience of regret in
stage one gives rise to a decreased sensitivity to the potential regret
from the offer being accepted in the second stage, possibly due to the
realisation that regret, as with other negative emotions, is not as bad
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Figure 49: New, lower regret minimising contract offer p ′ caused by reduced
regret aversion
in experience as it is in anticipation46, we can graphically decrease the
convexity of the red curve, and analyse the impact.
In Figure 49, as p ′ is lower than p∗, this explanation also predicts the
observed experimental result of the second stage contract offer being
lower for the HRG than for the LRG, and hence it is not possible to
discount either explanation on the basis of simply the observed differ-
ence in choice behaviour. Again, it is worth noting that one explanation
implies that the experience of regret has led to an increase in the total
regret aversion of the decision maker, and the other implies that the
experience of regret has led to a reduction in the total regret aversion,
yet both are explanations perfectly consistent with the result of the
experiment.
Application to Raeva and van Dijk [2009]
In contrast to the experiments of Zeelenberg and Beattie and Creyer
and Ross, the experiment of Raeva and van Dijk includes very spe-
cific statements of the mathematical assumptions from which their
experimental predictions are derived47. Specifically, for our purposes
in comparing this experiment to the others, we are interested in the
complete feedback trials, where there was a group who experienced
regret in stage one (the Regret Condition - RC) and a group who ex-
perienced no regret in stage one (the No Regret Condition - NRC). In
the second stage, both groups are asked to give a certainty equivalent
value for a gamble which is a 50% chance of €1000 and a 50% chance of
€100, with the hypothesis being that those in the RC will submit lower
certainty equivalent than those in the NRC. This prediction is explained
through the mathematics of the gamble and certainty equivalent. As
per equation 1 of Raeva and van Dijk, if the probability of getting €100
46 in keeping with the work of Gilbert et al. [26]
47 and, furthermore, their mathematical model is derived from Bell formulation of regret
theory as opposed to Loomes and Sugden which has typically been referred to so far
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from the gamble is p, and the certainty equivalent value is z, then the
individual will choose z such that
(1−p).v(1000) +p.v(100) +p.r(100− z) = v(z) + (1−p).r(z− 1000)
(2.1)
where v(.) is the utility attached to each outcome and r(x− y) is
an increasing regret function which gives the amount of regret experi-
enced from obtaining x, but knowing the alternative choice would have
resulted in y. Without the regret terms on either side of the equation,
you get the simple expression for setting the certainty equivalent value
of a gamble, whereby the utility of the certainty equivalent is equal
to the expected utility of the gamble. The third term on the left hand
side of the equation then adds in the regret suffered should the gamble
be taken, but it results in the low payoff, hence wishing the certainty
equivalent value was chosen instead (weighted by p, the probability
of the low payoff). The second term on the right hand side adds in
the regret suffered should the certainty equivalent be taken, but taking
the gamble would have resulted in the high payoff, hence wishing the
gamble was chosen instead (weighted by 1− p, the probability of the
high payoff).
The prediction of Raeva and van Dijk is that, for those in the NRC,
the above equation describes their choice problem in the second stage,
with p = 0.5 owing to the 50/50 nature of the gamble. For those in the
RC, however, the experience of regret, in stage one, from picking a door
which contained a €1 participation fee for the experiment, as opposed
to the alternative, revealed door, which, had it been chosen, would
have increased their participation fee to €10, results in an increase in the
subjective probability of losing the gamble in stage two. Mathematically,
this corresponds to an increase in the value of p faced by those in the
RC compared to those in the NRC. This has the effect of decreasing
the left hand side of equation 2.1, and increasing the right hand side
of equation 2.148. When the same certainty equivalent value from the
NRC49, therefore, is inserted into the equation for the RC, the impact
of the increase in p is to make the “money for certain” more appealing
than the gamble, and hence the value of z no longer represents certainty
equivalent. As such, in order to restore equality to the equation, a lower
value of z is needed, which explains the prediction of the experiment
that those in the RC will submit lower certainty equivalents than those
in the NRC.
This method of formulating a regret-based decision under uncertainty
problem is especially useful for analysing the two different forms of
regret. The equation above explicitly shows that there are two potential
regrets in this problem; of ending up with €100 from losing the gamble,
instead of €z for sure had they taken the certainty equivalent, and
of ending up with €z for sure, instead of the €1000 which would
have resulted had they taken the gamble. As previously explained,
these regrets act in opposite directions on the decision maker, with
considerations of the first making it less likely that the individual will
choose the gamble, and considerations of the second making it less
likely that the individual will take the money for certain.
48 remembering that the regret term will act negatively on the total utility of the individual
49 i.e. the value of z which equalised the equation for individuals in the NRC
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As noted previously, the approach of Zeelenberg and Beattie and
Creyer and Ross was to suppose that the experience of regret in stage
one, of such a decision making problem, would lead to a change in
the anticipated regret in stage two, specifically from a change in the
sensitivity to regret itself. In the mathematical language of this problem,
this corresponds to a change in either r(100− z) or r(z− 1000), and,
in essence, the point being made earlier was that you can explain a
deviation in observed experimental behaviour as much by an increase
of one as by a decrease in the other.
In contrast to that approach, the assumption of Raeva and van Dijk
is that the effect of experienced regret is not to change the regret
function itself, but to change the subjective probability, p, associated
with a similar kind of regret experienced in stage one. As such, this
assumption does lead to a change in the “expected regret” in stage two,
but does so by changing the “expected” part rather than the “regret”
part.
The benefit of making such an assumption is that in the mathematical
framework, presented by Raeva and van Dijk, an increase in the proba-
bility of one form of regret, in this case r(100− z), necessarily implies
a decrease in the probability of the other form of regret, r(z− 1000),
because the sum total of the subjective probabilities must add up to 1.
Intuitively, if you believe there is a higher chance of the gamble being
resolved not in your favour (p > 0.5), and hence a higher chance of
experiencing regret from not taking the money for certain, and having
the gamble giving you €100, then you necessarily also believe that
there is a lower chance of the gamble being resolved in your favour
(1− p < 0.5), and hence a lower chance of experiencing regret from
taking the money for certain, and seeing the gamble be resolved to give
you €1000 had you taken it.
By holding the regret function as stable, but assuming the subjective
probabilities will move in the above fashion, both sources of anticipated
regret experience a change in this model, and both changes act in the
same direction on the decision maker. In the case of an increase in p,
this makes the money for certain more attractive, and in the case of a
decrease in p, this makes the gamble more attractive. This runs contrary
to the frameworks used by Zeelenberg and Beattie and Creyer and Ross,
where a change in one source of anticipated regret had no impact on
the other source of anticipated regret.
As such, this method of predicting the observed experimental be-
haviour escapes some of the criticism, rooted in the Identification
Problem, which was applied to the previous two experiments. But this
only occurs by making a very strong assumption about the relationship
between the sources of anticipated regret. In the language of the Identifi-
cation Problem, you are no longer assuming independence between the
two variables of interest; in essence reducing the problem from having
two variables to only having one. The justification for this assumption
comes in a footnote of the paper which states
“We assume that the regret function r(.) is not affected
by experienced regret, in line with the findings of Ritov
[1996], outlined in Sec.2, that the main attribute of regret
influencing choice behaviour is the probability to regret.”
[73, Footnote 5]
The assumption has two distinct components. The first is that the regret
function is not affected by the experience of regret. The second is that
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the subjective probability changes in a specific direction as a result of
the experience of regret.The main question, therefore, becomes whether
or not making such a strong assumption can be justified on the basis of
the experimental design and other experimental literature.
Firstly, whilst the Ritov paper does indeed study the impact of prob-
ability on choice, in situations where anticipated regret is present, it
is not as simple as saying that the principle component of anticipated
regret in a decision is the probability. In contrast, Ritov [76] primarily
looks at the impact of probability on the effect of outcome feedback on
choice, and find that “...the experimental results... imply that the im-
pact of availability of outcome information on the decision maker’s
preferences varies with the probability of obtaining the better outcome”
[76, p236] which is different to saying that the primary channel through
which anticipated regret itself will vary is through the probability of
regret.
However, just because there is no clear support for the assumption,
this does not necessarily make it incorrect. But in absence of this
academic support, it is tough to believe that the regret function is
not at all affected by the experience of regret, especially as this is the
primary assumption of other work in this area. As the function is not
observable, however, it can’t be proved either way.
Given the experimental design, the bigger issue would seem to be
assuming a change in subjective probability of regret, as the gamble
in stage two of this experiment is absolutely explicitly a 50/50 gamble.
Whilst it is not quite a “heads or tails” type gamble, there can be little
doubt that the objective probability of each option is 0.5, and so it
seems to make little sense to suggest that an individual would believe
that such an explicit probability could be changed by the previous
experience of regret from a similar, but distinct, task. If we take the
implication of Raeva and van Dijk that the experience of regret makes
you “fear the worst again”, then their interpretation is that the prior
experience of regret changes the subjective probability of the worst
happening, rather than changing the “fear” associated with the similar
outcome.
It would appear to be a more plausible explanation for a situation of
true uncertainty, where the probabilities of each state of the world are
not explicitly given. Consider, for example, a individual who purchases
a laptop, without an extended warranty, without knowing the explicit
probability that the laptop will become defective within the term period
offered by the extended warranty. As it transpires, the laptop becomes
defective within the term period of the offered warranty, and so needs
to be replaced, with a new, but not identical to the previous, laptop.
Assuming the two laptops are sufficiently unrelated that the fact the
first laptop failed does not inform the individual about how likely the
second is to fail also (indeed, since time has passed, it is likely that
the second laptop is more technically capable than the first, and hence
less likely to break down), there is no method of Bayesian updating,
using information about the probability of defectiveness from the first
laptop, to inform the consumer of the new probability that the second
laptop will also become defective. However, the experience of regret
from the first laptop incident, where the extended warranty was not
purchased, and in retrospect, it would have been better to have done so,
makes the same possibility of regret, of purchasing the second laptop
without an extended warranty and having it fail, loom larger in the
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mind of the individual. Indeed, as the probability of the second laptop
failing is unknown, it could be reasonably assumed that the experience
of regret from the first laptop made the probability of failure of the
second laptop feel like it was more likely than it was in reality. As a
result, the fear of regret, from not purchasing the extended warranty
for the second laptop, and having it fail, looms larger than the fear of
regret from purchasing the extended warranty, and have the laptop
not fail during the period of cover, and so the consumer decides to
purchase the extended warranty with the second laptop50.
If however, we retain the set-up of the Raeva and van Dijk experi-
ment, with explicitly given probabilities, then there are certain pieces of
evidence which work against the critical assumption of the paper, that
the experience of regret makes the subjective probability of regretting
a similar, future decision more likely. For example, Tversky and Kah-
neman discuss a “Belief in the Law of Small Numbers”, “...that people
view a sample randomly drawn from a population as highly representa-
tive, that is, similar to the population in all essential characteristics.”[93,
p105] The application of this belief to both the above experiment, and
more generally, multiple-stage decision tasks where the states of the
world have known probabilities, is widely known as the Gambler’s
Fallacy, where “[s]ubjects act as if every segment of the random se-
quence must reflect the true proportion: if the sequence has strayed
from the population proportion, a corrective bias in the other direction
is expected.” [93, p106]. Note that the Gambler’s Fallacy does indeed
suggest that there can be changes in subjective probabilities as a result
of prior outcomes, as in the above experiment. Most commonly, this is
associated with the example that observing a run of heads increases
the probability of a subsequent tail, when flipping a coin in sequence.
The implication, however, of the assumption of Raeva and van Dijk
that the experience of regret from making a wrong decision increases
the subjective probability that you will experience regret from a similar
decision in the future, works in exactly the opposite direction to that of
the evidence of the Gambler’s Fallacy. If you were repeatedly betting on
tails, whilst flipping a coin in sequence, and constantly observing heads,
and hence experiencing regret from betting tails when you should have
bet heads, then Raeva and van Dijk suggest that this would increase the
subjective probability that, in the future, you would experience regret
from betting tails and observing a head, hence implying that a head
is more likely in the future. The Gambler’s Fallacy, on the other hand,
suggests that the previously observed run of heads would be “balanced
out” by observing a tails (and, hence, returning the small sample prob-
ability of the coin towards 0.5), hence implying that a future head is
less likely than a future tail51.
As such, whilst the assumption for the observed behaviour in the
experiment cannot be disputed on exactly the same theoretical grounds
50 and, indeed, the second laptop in that example is currently proving to be a very effective
and reliable tool for writing this thesis. Or at least significantly more reliable than the
first.
51 An effect which works in the opposite direction to The Gambler’s Fallacy is The Hot
Hand effect. It is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, however it is typically thought
of in terms of a belief in the continuation of winning gambling streaks (hence the term
hot hand), rather than losing streaks, or streaks of repeated regrets. As such, it is not
focussed on here. In any case, when discussing the validity of assumptions, it is more
important to evaluate the merits of evidence which runs contrary to the assumption (for
example, all swans are white), as just one piece of evidence can disprove an assumption (I
saw a black swan), but no amount of supportive evidence (I saw a white swan) can prove it
to be true.
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as the experiments of Zeelenberg and Beattie and Creyer and Ross, it
can be disputed on experimental grounds, as the evidence of the Gam-
bler’s Fallacy would suggest that the additional assumption made52
is inappropriate for this specific experimental set-up, given that the
probabilities used in stage two are both explicit and clearly 50/50. In
addition, it remains unclear why the effect of the experience of regret on
subsequent anticipated regret would act on the subjective probabilities
of future states of the world, and not on the regret function itself.
Application to Coricelli et al. [2005]
The approach of Coricelli et al. to the question of the impact of ex-
perienced regret on subsequent regret aversion, is notably different
from that of the previous three experiments through their use of both
neuroimaging techniques and the deviation from a simple two-stage
set-up to one of repeated decision making. The first part of their analy-
sis discusses whether anticipated regret itself can be shown to play a
role in the decision making of the individuals in the experiment, for, if
this is not shown to be true, then it will be impossible to estimate any
effect of experienced regret on subsequent regret aversion using this
experimental set-up. Using a panel logit model, the probability of an
individual i choosing gamble 1 (g1) in the experiment, as opposed to
gamble 2 (g2), at time t, is modelled as a function of the anticipated
regret, anticipated disappointment, and expected value of the gambles.
Formally
Pr (g1it) = F [dit, rit, eit]
where
d = (|y2 − x2|(1− q)) − (|y1 − x1|(1− p))
and is the difference in anticipated disappointment between the two
gambles (where xi and yi are the highest and lowest outcomes of
gamble gi, p is the probability of obtaining outcome x1and q is the
probability of obtaining outcome y2)
and
r = |y2 − x1|− |y1 − x2|
and is representative of the difference in anticipated regret between
the two gambles
and
e = EV(g1) − EV(g2)
and is the difference in expected value between the two gambles.
These 4 equations correspond to equations 1-4 in the work of Coricelli
et al..
Looking at the equation for anticipated disappointment, (|y2 − x2|(1− q))
corresponds to the probability of obtaining the lower outcome, multi-
52 necessary in order to escape the Identification type problem
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plied by the amount of money that was “lost” as a result of obtaining
the lower, instead of the higher, outcome. As such, it represents the
expected disappointment associated with gamble 253. Equivalently,
(|y1 − x1|(1− p)) is the expected disappointment associated with gam-
ble 1. As such, if the difference between them is positive, it implies
there was a higher expected disappointment in gamble 2 than gamble 1,
and, as such, a positive coefficient on d in the panel logit model implies
that the bigger the impact of anticipated disappointment on gamble 2,
compared to gamble 1, the more likely the decision maker is to choose
gamble 1 over gamble 2, in effect, choosing to avoiding the potential
for disappointment where possible.
The same idea is then also applied to anticipated regret, but two
things are immediately noticeable. Firstly, the two sources of regret
acting on the decision maker are obvious. On one hand, there is |y2−x1|,
which is the difference in payoff from choosing gamble 2, obtaining
the low payoff, and realising that you would have been better off from
choosing gamble 1 and getting the high payoff, and on the other hand
there is |y1−x2|, which is the difference in payoff from choosing gamble
1, obtaining the low payoff, and realising that you would have been
better off from choosing gamble 2 and getting the high payoff. The first,
however, has a positive effect on r, and the second has a negative effect,
effectively demonstrating the idea of competing effects of regret on
decision making.
The second noticeable point is the absence of probability weighting
attached to the measures of regret, as was the case when calculating
anticipated disappointment. Instead of representing anticipated regret
as the expected regret from choosing one gamble as opposed to the
other, the measure of regret given states what would be the ex-post
regret obtained, assuming that a particular gamble was selected and
that the selected gamble gave the lower payoff and that the other,
unselected gamble, would have yielded the higher payoff. As such,
it will misrepresent the effect of each source of regret on the decision
maker, as it necessarily assumes that the individual anticipates the
worst thing happening every time they select a gamble. It is admittedly
more complicated to calculate the true, expected regret, for each gamble,
however the cost of this assumption is clear from considering a small
sample of the problems faced by decision makers in the experiment.
For example, the expected regret of the decision problem in Figure 1
of the paper [19, p1256], has gamble 1 yielding +200 with probability
0.5 and -200 with probability 0.5, and gamble 2 yielding +50 with
probability 0.75 and -50 with probability 0.25. As such, the individual
will regret choosing gamble 1 only 50% of the time, as, in the other 50%
of the time, they achieve the best outcome (+200) in the entire problem.
In addition, that 50% is comprised of 75% of the time obtaining +50
from the unselected gamble (and, hence, in the language of the paper,
experiencing |-200 - 50| regret) and 25% of the time obtaining -50 from
the unselected gamble (and hence experiencing |-200 + 50| regret).
As such, the expected regret of gamble 1 is, more accurately, given by
r1 = 0.5(0.75|− 200− 50|+ 0.25|− 200+ 50|) = 112.5, as opposed to the
figure of r1 = 250, which is the number used in the regression analysis.
Equivalently, the true expected regret for gamble 2 is given by r2 =
53 in more classical representations of Disappointment Theory, such as Bell [7] and Loomes
and Sugden [59], there would be a “disappointment function” applied to the difference
in outcomes, so as not to impose linearity on the effect of disappointment, but this is
omitted for simplicity here.
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0.75(0.5|50− 200|) + 0.25(0.5|− 50− 200|) = 87.5, rather than the figure
of r2 = 250 used in the regression. The impact of this miscalculation
is that both gambles, from the perspective of simply considering the
worst thing that would happen in each situation, are assumed to act
equally in the mind of the individual, and hence have zero net effect
(r = r2− r1 = 250− 250 = 0) on the decision of the individual. In reality,
however, there is more expected regret from gamble 1 (112.5) than from
gamble 2 (87.5), and so there should be a net effect of anticipated
regret pushing the individual away from gamble 1, towards gamble 2,
included in the regression analysis of that decision.
Indeed, this approach can be applied to all 48 pairs of gambles
used in the experiment, as provided in Table 29 in Appendix A. By
calculating the true expected regret54 for each of the gambles, in each of
the 48 decision problems, and calculating the expected regret of gamble
2 minus the expected regret of gamble 1, we can obtain a true value of r,
here labelled as rt, and compare it to the false value of r, here labelled
rf, given by Coricelli et al..
There are several notable things immediately obvious from looking
at Table 29. Firstly, if we consider an “incorrect” value of r to be where
either
• rf > 0 and rt < 0
or
• rf 6 0 and rt > 0
then 15 out of 48 problems have an “incorrect” value for r in the
regression analysis conducted by Coricelli et al., simply on the basis of
having an incorrect sign, in essence saying that one gamble has more
expected regret than, or the same as, the other, when, in reality, this
is not the case. Of the remaining 33 problems, only 1 has rt = rf, in
essence saying that the value of r used in the regression analysis was
an accurate representation of the expected regret facing the individual
from both gambles only once. In the remaining 32 problems where this
was not the case, 16 overstated the difference between the two gambles
(so rf > rt), and hence suggested that concerns for anticipated regret
would make the individual choose gamble 1 more than was the case
in reality, and 16 understated the difference between the two gambles
(so rf < rt), and hence suggested that concerns for anticipated regret
would make the individual choose gamble 1 less than was the case in
reality. In total, for all 48 problems, the average margin of error55 was
105 units, which is over half a standard deviation of the values of rf
used in the regression analysis. Figure 50 plots both the true and false
values of r for all the problems, ordered by the value of rf used in the
regression analysis.
What is evident from Figure 50, therefore, is that there is considerable
variation between the true and false values for r, and it is impossible to
state, one way or the other, whether, if the true values of r were used in
the regression analysis, the same relationship between anticipated regret
and the decision of the individual would be found with significance. It
may be the case that the true values of anticipated regret lend further
54 assuming, as do Coricelli et al., that experienced regret is simply the mathematical
difference between the outcome that was obtained and the outcome which was selected
in the unchosen gamble, and is zero in cases where the outcome which was obtained
exceeds the outcome which was not (i.e. there is no rejoicing)
55 that is, the average of |rf− rt| for all 48 problems
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Figure 50: Visual representation of rt and rf
support to the relationship, or it could be that the true values statistically
eliminate the relationship, in which case the significance found in the
original regression would likely be caused by an omitted variable,
related to both the decision taken by the individual, and the simple
formulation of anticipated regret given by Coricelli et al..
In addition to this problem, as with the representation of anticipated
disappointment, there is no account taken of potential non-linearities in
the regret function arising from an assumption of regret aversion. Or, in
other words, the typical assumption of regret theory, that larger regrets
will loom disproportionately larger in the mind of the individuals than
small regrets, is ignored.
As a result of these two points, one of the principle claims on which
the experiment is based, that anticipated regret plays a significant
role in the decision making process of the individuals, is subject to
considerable doubt. The consequence of this doubt is that other results
in the experiment, such as “[t]he proportion of regret-avoiding choices
increased over time with the cumulative effect of the experience of
regret”[19, p1259], which follow from the assumption that anticipated
regret plays a significant role in the decision making process of the
individual, are also cast into doubt. Indeed, whilst Coricelli et al. show
that the proportion of regret-avoiding choices increases through the first,
second and last third of the experimental decisions, it is not stated how
the proportion of regret avoiding choices was calculated. Assuming it
was based on the same formula, r = |y2 − x1|− |y1 − x2|, which was
used in the regression analysis, with a regret-avoiding choice being
counted as “1” if gamble g1 was chosen when r > 0, or if g2 was
chosen when r < 0, and “0” otherwise, then the same criticism applies
as it did to the regression analysis; that the variable being created
may not be truly representative of “expected regret”, and hence the
supposed “regret-avoiding” choices may not be correct, instead being
representative of some other, related concept such as risk-aversion.
The second approach to modelling the effect of experienced regret
on subsequent choice is through the use of neuroimaging techniques.
Two analyses, using the neuroimaging data, were performed in relation
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to the impact of experienced regret on subsequent choice, to look for
brain activity which correlated with specific measures of experienced
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“...where CR is cumulative regret, t is trial, Aobtained is the average
realised payoff and Aunobtained is the average payoff of the unselected
gambles.”[19, p1261] This calculation is very much a rough approxima-
tion to the idea of cumulative regret, as, for example, it will necessarily
have less variation across individuals in the later trials compared to the
earlier trials, due to the time averaging, and also incorporates an idea of
“rejoicing”, as obtaining a payoff in excess of the unobtained payoff in a
given trial is associated with a reduction in cumulative regret for the
next trial. And though this variable is found to correlate with “...activity
in the medial left amygdala ... and medial OFC”[19, p1259] at the time
of choice, this is not sufficient to imply that the cumulative experience
of regret is having an impact on subsequent regret aversion. It may
simply be the case that this cumulative regret measure is representative
of the emotional state of the individual (i.e. whether they feel they are
doing “well” or “not well” in the task), and subsequently how risk
averse or seeking (distinct from regret averse or seeking) they wish to
be in the next trial.
Similarly, the second analysis performed using the neuroimaging
data uses “prior regret”, or the regret from the gamble in the last period,
in place of the cumulative regret used in the first analysis. Whilst it
is not stated how this measure is calculated (and, in reference to the
previous analysis, whether it includes rejoicing or not), it is found to
“...[enhance] responses in the right dorsolateral prefrontal (DLPFC),
right lateral OFC, and inferior parietal lobule”[19, p1259] between the
onset of the trial and the response of the participant. Once again, it is
not sufficient, from this analysis, to draw a conclusion about how the
experience of regret influences subsequent regret aversion, merely that
the experience of regret in a prior period appears to have some lasting
residual into the next period’s decision making process.
In order to use neuroimaging techniques to assess the impact of
experienced regret on subsequent regret aversion, we would first need
to identify the areas of the brain associated with anticipated regret at
the time of choice, or, in other words, the areas of the brain associated
with the anticipation of future negative emotions and the anticipation
of self-blame. Only once this has been achieved will it be possible to
use neuroimaging techniques to see what causes changes in patterns
of brain activity in these areas when decisions are made. As such, this
experimental set-up is a helpful first step in this process, but the results
drawn are insufficient to draw substantive conclusions about the impact
of experienced regret on subsequent regret aversion and subsequent
choice behaviour.
2.3.4 Conclusions to be drawn from criticisms of existing literature
Each of the four experimental papers, presented above, claim to offer
an insight into how the experience of regret influences subsequent
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decision making. They all demonstrate a statistically significant change
in individual decision making behaviour, resulting from an experience
of regret in a prior stage, yet the conclusions about how the experience
of regret causes the change in behaviour are subject to considerable
doubt once the regret-based processes, about how that causation might
actually work, are examined in higher detail. As such, it is fair to say
that all these experiments demonstrate something about the experience
of regret, but we can’t, at present, say what that is.
The most common conclusion drawn from this literature is that the
experience of regret causes an increase in regret aversion in subsequent
decision making. As demonstrated above, whilst that may possibly
be correct, it is not a conclusion that can be drawn from the current
experimental literature. Indeed, it is possible to interpret the data in a
different way, making assumptions consistent with regret theory, but
deriving the exact opposite conclusion, that the experience of regret
causes a decrease in regret aversion in subsequent decision making.
Indeed, whilst the first appears to be a more natural statement than
the second (it is easy, for instance, to imagine someone who has been
burned by a bad decision once being determined not to make the same
mistake twice), evidence from psychology, by Gilbert et al., “...suggest
that people are less susceptible to regret than they imagine, and that
decision makers who pay to avoid future regrets may be buying emo-
tional insurance that they do not actually need.”[26, p346] As such, the
experience of regret by an individual, and the subsequent realisation
that regret was, in fact, worse in anticipation than in experience, could
lead to a reduction in subsequent regret aversion, if the individual
does indeed realise that they are paying for emotional insurance that
they don’t need. So whilst the more familiar conclusion may prevail
and persist in the academic ether, there is enough doubt, and evidence
which runs contrary to the popular perception, that it is certainly worth
continuing investigations in the area to further explore the matter.
2.3.5 The next step
Having demonstrated that the existing literature is insufficient in pro-
viding a resolution to the problem of how experienced regret affects
subsequent regret aversion, it would be remiss to then not propose a
course of action which would lead us further down the path of discov-
ery in this field. The arguments presented above certainly hint at the
issues which lie at the heart of the problem in drawing conclusions
from the types of experiments which have been typically developed
and run in the past. As such, the next step is to create new experiments
which analyse those specific issues in isolation from the much broader
research questions. By learning more about the specifics, we can then
reform and remodel the original experiments, taking into account an
increased knowledge of the way regret works in the mind of individuals
when facing decision under uncertainty.
2.4 why does this matter?
A valid criticism of this work is to say that it is not particularly impor-
tant whether an individual is affected by Type A or Type B regret in
their decision making, as long as the point proved is that regret, in some
form, does affect decision making. In the classic demand and supply
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identification problem, the problem matters because firm (micro level)
and policy (macro level) decisions may be incorrect unless the source of
change is correctly identified, and the cost of incorrect decisions can be
high. As there appears to be no “real world” cost to misidentifying the
correct source of regret which influenced a decision, it is worth taking
some time to explain the reasoning for starting this discussion at all.
The point of this discussion is certainly not to argue whether one
type of regret should be considered more important than another. As
has been shown, Type A and B regret are arbitrarily defined for a
given decision problem. In some cases, the distinction between them
may matter, and in some cases it may not. It is up to a researcher to
decide whether, in the context of a specific decision problem, it is worth
making the distinction between two types of regret. It is certainly not
something which can be argued in abstract or absence of a context.
As the distinction between different types of regret has only been
previously touched on in a very limited number of instances, the im-
mediate implications and applications of this work are, therefore, also
limited. That is to say, aside from affecting the conclusions of a small
number of experiments, there isn’t much else to say at this point in
time. Taking this narrow view, the value of the work appears small.
However, academic research is a continually evolving process, and
the vast majority of work will rely on previous work as a starting point.
It is therefore important to highlight limitations of previous work, so
areas of weakness do not persist and pervade into new research. Failing
to do so acts as a disservice to future researchers who rely on the
robustness of findings in order to create their own theories and ideas.
Relating this point specifically to regret, in future research where the
distinction between different sources of regret does matter, it is very
important that assumptions about how an individual will respond to
them are based on solid evidence. This is so experiments are robustly
designed and empirical evidence is correctly analysed allowing new
research conclusions on the topic to be drawn.
If you consider, therefore, the benefit of this work to include what it
gives to future research, as well as present and past, its overall value
surely increases.
Having talked to several academic researchers in this area, the com-
mon wisdom is that the experience of regret increases subsequent regret
aversion. This seems plausible, and, as shown, a simplistic review of
the available experimental evidence would appear to support it. To
future researchers, however, there is a world of difference between an
answer which is plausible and an answer which is definitive. The value
of this work is to point out that, based on currently available evidence,
we are not anywhere close to being able to say the answer is definitive.
It is always more important to acknowledge what we don’t know, than
think we know more than we do.
2.5 summary
The existing experimental literature, which seeks to explain how the
experience of regret impacts subsequent regret aversion, and hence
subsequent choice, suffers from a fundamental problem which prevent
definitive conclusions from being drawn from the observed behaviour
in the laboratory.
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By explaining how all non-trivial decisions taken under uncertainty
involve at least two sources of regret, which will act in opposite di-
rections on the decision maker, any experimental study which looks
at how the experience of regret impacts subsequent regret aversion
must explain why, should a behavioural change in preference for one
option over another be observed, the cause of this change was as a
result of, for example, an increase in sensitivity towards one source of
regret as opposed to a decrease in sensitivity towards another. Indeed,
without such an explanation, any observed experimental result can be
explained equally correctly by an increase or decrease to the total degree
of regret aversion an individual may have. The most common conclu-
sion in the experimental literature, however, is that the experience of
regret leads to an increase in subsequent regret aversion, but, typically,
these experiments do not satisfy the above requirement of justifying
why they believe one source of regret will dominate the thinking of
the individual compared to another. Additionally, the neuroscientific
approach to measuring both anticipated regret and experienced regret is
not sufficiently advanced that it would be possible to observe more than
just behavioural changes and draw conclusions about the way in which
the experience of regret impacted the subsequent choice behaviour of
individuals, with respect to more than one source of regret, despite
initial evidence suggesting that such a link does exist.

3A S I M P L E E X P E R I M E N T S T U D Y I N G E X P E R I E N C E D
R E G R E T A N D C O N T E X T
3.1 introduction
The experience of regret is a negative emotion, inextricably linked to a
preceding action or decision, which, upon the resolution of uncertainty
under which the decision was taken, proved to be a worse choice than
could otherwise have been made. Importantly, regret can not exist as a
standalone emotion, such as, for example, being happy or nervous. I can
be “happy”, or “nervous”, without needing to be “happy because of...”
or “nervous of...” something specific. In contrast, we think of “being
regretful of...” something, rather than simply existing in a general state
of regretfulness.
This link between the emotion of regret, and the choice which caused
it, lends itself perfectly to being incorporated in economic decision
making frameworks, such as those by Loomes and Sugden [58] and
Bell [5], precisely because there is an explicit cause of the emotion (the
choice) which can be represented mathematically. Again, in contrast,
it is difficult to incorporate the effect of being happy or nervous into
an economic decision making framework because the conditions which
give rise to those emotions existing, and subsequently impacting deci-
sion making, are not well defined or understood. What may make one
person happy, may not cause another person to be happy to the same
extent, or even at all. In contrast, we can be confident in saying that
making a poor decision, when an alternative, which was considered,
would have resulted in a better outcome, will cause a degree of regret
in all people, and, importantly, the better the outcome which would
have resulted under the alternative action, the worse the regret.
As discussed elsewhere in this work, the experience of regret, linked
to a previous choice, can give rise to a change in future behaviour,
often represented as a change in the future aversion to regret as a result
of the experience. Various studies (Creyer and Ross [21], Zeelenberg
and Beattie [105], Raeva and van Dijk [73]) have attempted to explore
whether the experience of regret leads to a subsequent increase or
decrease in regret aversion in future decisions, typically where the
second stage of the experiment is a repetition of the first (or very
closely related), on the basis that a prior experience of regretting a
specific choice will have the most impact when the individual is faced
with that decision again. The limitations of this experimental approach
are explored in the previous chapter, but their approaches pose a further
question when considering both the effect of the experience of regret
on subsequent decision making and the link between a specific action
and the regret caused by it.
The issue at play comes from considering exactly what we mean
by the words “action” and “decision”, often used interchangeably, as
they relate to the association with the experience of regret. When we
are asked to make a choice, there are often different components and
contexts to the process of making that choice. Hence the question
becomes, which part, exactly, is the emotion of regret tied to? For
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instance, usually when we ask subjects in an experimental lab to make
a decision over two specific gambles, we will give the gambles titles
(Gamble A versus Gamble B), which may be located on specific parts
of the screen (Gamble A is on the left, Gamble B is on the right), and
they will have at least one specific characteristic which distinguishes
them from one another (Gamble A is “risky”, Gamble B is “safe”).
Suppose then, that Gamble A is chosen in this experiment, and, after
the resolution of uncertainty, Gamble B is found to have been a superior
choice. The person will then experience regret associated with their
choice. The question is, however, does the individual associate the
regret with the fact that the chosen gamble had a specific title (“I really
regret choosing that infernal Gamble A!”) or was located in a specific
part of the screen (“I really regret choosing the option which was on the
left”) or was representative of a broader preference over risk (“I really
regret choosing the risky option”)?
In terms of a one-shot choice, the specific nature of the association
between regret and the choice doesn’t particularly matter, because the
context and characteristics of the decision are inextricably bundled
together. The gamble which is on the left, before the decision is taken,
is the same gamble which was on the left, after the uncertainty is
resolved. However, the literature on the effect of experienced regret on
subsequent anticipatory regret, mentioned above, doesn’t ever explicitly
specify that these characteristics have to remain the same from one
decision problem to the next. Gamble A may be on the left in stage one
of the experiment, but be on the right in stage two. We would expect
there to be some effect of regret from stage one on stage two, but the
question is whether that regret is tied to the fact is was called “Gamble
A” or the fact it was on the left hand side of the screen. The answer to
this question will be crucial in deciding what was the causal effect of
the first stage regret on the choice at stage two.
It may be the case that simply the position of the various options
on the screen have no impact from one period to the next. Indeed,
it seems fairly likely that this characteristic of Gamble A is of minor
importance in the mind of the individual. It is not hard, however,
to find two distinct, changeable characteristics of the decision which
have a major impact on the decision making process. In these cases,
the tie between the regret and each of those characteristics will be of
significant importance when attempting to analyse the effect of the first
stage regret on the second stage decision.
The next section will examine the existing literature on some typi-
cal characteristics of decisions which are well known, and have been
extensively discussed and incorporated into the current thinking on
anticipatory regret. Following this discussion, we will propose an ex-
periment which is designed to isolate one particular characteristic, and,
by running the experiment, test whether the effect of experienced regret
in stage one on choice behaviour in a stage two, is tied to that charac-
teristic. The importance of this experiment lies in the consequence for
existing regret-based decision theories should the emotion be found to
tie to only specific characteristics of a decision, as such a level of detail
or contextual information, is not currently considered in the regret
literature.
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3.2 existing literature
The existing literature on anticipatory regret has never explicitly fo-
cussed on a comparison of the different characteristics of a decision,
and which the emotion of regret is most closely linked to, despite, as
explained above, this being an important consideration when designing
both theoretical models and experimental tests. What has occurred,
however, are a series of small literatures, each of which analyses how
regret can be influenced by a particular contextual characteristic of a
decision, based, in part, on intuition about how these characteristics
should or feel like they should play a role in the experience of regret. This
literature was especially prevalent during the 1990s; a period which
was between the earliest theoretical works of Bell [5] and Loomes and
Sugden [60] and then subsequent revisions of the regret-based the-
oretical literature in the first decade of the 21st century by Hayashi
[34], Zeelenberg and Pieters [106] and Hart and Mas-Colell [32]. The
experiments, which comprised the literature, were designed to point
out limitations of the existing theoretical understanding of the subject,
by suggesting factors of interest, in the decision making process, which
would have an effect on the influence of anticipatory regret, but were
not explicitly represented in any form of the theory. Coincidentally,
most of these factors can also be thought of as characteristics of the
decision, and help provide us with a starting point when trying to
identify which specific characteristics of the decision the experience of
regret may be associated with.
3.2.1 Action versus Inaction
One characteristic that can often be attributed to a particular decision
is whether it falls into the category of “action” or “inaction”. Action
is something we are readily familiar with, but it is also true that the
decision not to act is a choice which can be included in any decision
under uncertainty (including regret-based) framework, in that “not act-
ing” will have outcomes associated with each state of the world under
consideration. In the standard language of decision under uncertainty,
however, we do not give such context to the decision as either “action”
or “inaction”, simply representing it by its associated outcomes under
each state of the world.
Equivalently, the terms “action” and “inaction” can be referred to as
acts of “commission” and “omission”, respectively, and it was under
these terms that the effect of the context was explored by Spranca
et al. [86]. Based on a finding by Kahneman and Tversky [49], showing
that “...subjects felt more regret when bad outcomes result from action
than when they result from inaction” [86, p79], Spranca et al. define
the idea of an omission bias as being present “...when [subjects] judge
harmful commissions as worse than the corresponding omissions.” [86,
p79]. Their experiments find evidence for the existence of an omission
bias in decision making, but, importantly, only consider the idea of a
“worse” action from the point of a morality judgement and “...overall
goodness”[86, p91], and not a specific emotional response, such as
regret. Whilst this provides evidence that individuals consider the act
of commission worse than the act of omission when the consequences
are negative, it does not necessarily imply that the individual would
regret one more than the other.
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From this starting point Ritov and Baron [78] develop a series of
experiments which specifically ask about the experience of regret, as it
relates to both omissions and commissions. Their experiments involve
hypothetical scenarios and subjects being asked to rate “satisfaction
with the chosen decision” for both omissions and commissions, finding
that satisfaction “...was worse for acts [compared to omissions] with
full knowledge, when it was revealed that the outcome of the foregone
option was even better”[78, p126] implying that “... in some situations,
anticipated regret is greater for acts than omissions.” [78, p127] This
evidence that both the experience and anticipation of regret are linked
to the context of the decision, via the omission bias, is absent from
standard formulations of regret theory.
So long as the omission bias is consistent, however, the correction
needed in regret theory is a fairly simple one. It requires segregation of
options into omissions and commissions, and an understanding that
the role of anticipatory regret on decision making will be substantially
smaller for an omission than the corresponding commission. The fo-
cus of this work, however, is the feedback from experienced regret to
subsequent choice behaviour, and Zeelenberg et al. [110] analyse the
constancy of the omission bias1 from this perspective. By manipulating
feedback from a previous decision, in a hypothetical scenario2, partici-
pants in the experiment were asked to rate whether more regret would
arise from inaction or action, given a positive or negative prior outcome.
When the feedback was positive (or absent) the typical omission bias
was present. When the feedback was negative, however, the bias was
reversed, as the inaction was reported to lead to more regret than the
corresponding action. The authors attribute this change (from an “ac-
tion effect” to an “inaction effect”) to differing levels of responsibility in
each scenario3, demonstrating, once again, that the complex context of
a decision under uncertainty can have a significant effect on the role of
both experienced and anticipatory regret.
3.2.2 The Status Quo Bias
When we move from a one shot to repeated decision making scenario,
the omission bias is often demonstrated as a “status quo” bias. Typically,
the decision not to act will preserve the status quo, whereas the decision
to act will change it. Samuelson and Zeckhauser [82] outline a series
of scenarios, and run a sequence of experiments, which demonstrate
the status quo bias, with some of the decisions taken by participants
involving an element of uncertainty, and hence exposing them to po-
tential regret4. By presenting two different versions of each problem
(one where there is a pre-existing status-quo option and one where
that option is framed as a new decision like any other), they show a
higher proportion of “status-quo” choices being made in the majority
of situations, “...demonstrat[ing] the presence of [a] (statistically sig-
1 which they refer to as the “action effect”
2 in Zeelenberg et al. [110] Experiment 1, participants were told that two football teams
had either won (positive feedback) or lost (negative feedback) their previous match 4-0.
In the next match, both team lost 3-0, but one team had made no changes to the previous
match (inaction), whereas the other had made 3 changes (action).
3 the football coach who doesn’t change a team after a heavy defeat should feel more
responsible for the next defeat than the coach who at least tries to change the situation.
4 questions 2, 3 and 4 in Part One have the potential for what is termed in the paper as
“...decision regret” [82, p38], with the other questions either being taken under certainty,
or failing to show the resolution of the uncertainty from the gamble not taken.
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nificant) status quo bias across decision tasks and across alternatives
within decision tasks.”[82, p15]. Additionally, they present a two-stage
example where the status quo is endogenously determined by the
choice in the first stage5, and find a difference6 between the choice
of individuals in stage two, given they had previously had anchored
themselves to a particular option in stage one, compared to those who
faced the decision of stage two as the decision in stage one (i.e. had no
previous decision with which to anchor themselves). Samuelson and
Zeckhauser “...conclude that the sequential decision tasks show some
evidence of a status quo bias, most prominently in cases that involve
many alternatives.” [82, p26]
In this situation, there are many possible causes for a status-quo bias,
with Samuelson and Zeckhauser separating them into three main cate-
gories7 of which “[a]voidance of decision regret is ... one cause of status
quo bias.” [82, p38] These results, coupled with the action/inaction bias,
imply a different level of anticipatory regret associated with choosing
the status-quo again, compared to taking a new alternative, without
being able to isolate and separate the different possible causes from
one another.
Much of the literature on the status quo bias, however, discusses
the bias without reference to any feedback on the status quo option,
including the two stage example given by Samuelson and Zeckhauser.
Feedback, however, is a crucial determinant of the experience of regret,
in that good feedback confirms you made a good choice, and have no
reason to experience regret, and bad feedback indicates there was a
superior choice, and so it is reasonable to experience regret. Inman
and Zeelenberg [42] extend the work of Samuelson and Zeckhauser
by studying the status quo bias, conditional on the feedback which is
received as a result of the chosen option (which becomes the status quo
in stage two) in stage one. Their hypothesis is that should a “...strong
reason (e.g., a negative-experience episode) [lead] to the need to switch,
this should cause a reversal of the status quo effect ... [as] in the case
of negative feedback regarding the earlier outcome.”[42, p118] Thus
they “...predict that when negative information on the current course of
action is experienced but no avoidance action is undertaken, more regret
will be experienced if the subsequent outcome is also negative. In such
instances, changing the status quo should be preferred to maintaining
it.”[42, p118] By asking experimental subjects to rate the degree of
regret they would feel (on a ten point scale) in a number of hypothetical
scenarios, they demonstrate “...the status quo effect reverses in the
negative-prior-experience condition”[42, p120], implying that when
individuals have a justifiable reason for deviating from the status quo,
they anticipate less regret from doing so, and, indeed, anticipate feeling
more regret from sticking with the option which previously let them
down.
Both of the status quo experiments described above, however, rely on
subjective ratings of hypothetical scenarios for generating a measure of
5 Section 1.4 ; Sequential decisions [82, p22]
6 the difference was statistically significant, in the hypothesised direction given the as-
sumption of a status-quo bias, in 2 out of the 4 variations of the two-stage example. In the
other 2 variations, a confounding factor caused a significant result against the status-quo
bias in one, and the degree of significance was too small (p = 0.35) in the other.
7 “The effect may be seen as the consequence of (1) rational decision making in the presence
of transition costs and/or uncertainty; (2) cognitive misperceptions; and (3) psychological
commitment stemming from misperceived sunk costs, regret avoidance, or a drive for
consistency.” [82, p33]
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regret as it relates to the status quo bias. We would prefer an objective
behavioural measure of the link between the status quo bias and regret,
but, as Samuelson and Zeckhauser note, there are many confounding
explanations, aside from regret, which can give rise to a status quo
bias. In order to truly investigate the link between status quo choices
and regret, distinct from other possible confounding explanations, it is
necessary to move beyond inferring regret from behavioural decisions
to an explicit, objective measure of regret, which can be recorded when
an individual is asked to either choose, or deviate from, the status quo.
The recent developments in neuroscience, in identifying areas of the
brain associated with both the experience and anticipation of regret
(Camille et al. [16], Coricelli et al. [19], Chua et al. [17]), provide such
a platform for delving further into the relationship between the status
quo bias and regret. Nicolle et al. [66] conduct such a study by “...ex-
plor[ing] how asymmetric behavioural and brain responses for errors
after rejecting, or accepting, a status quo option may be associated with
a status quo bias on subsequent decisions.”[66, p3320] The study uses
a repeated perceptual judgement task, which had been shown, in a
prior study, to elicit a status quo bias towards accepting the previously
selected option, and tested hypotheses, generated from the existing neu-
roscience regret literature, “...that error-related brain responses would
be greater for erroneous status quo rejection than for erroneous status
quo acceptance”[66, p3322]. The first result they found connected the
difference between the acceptance of the status quo, leading to an error,
and the rejection of the status quo, leading to an error8 and the experi-
ence of regret at the time of outcome feedback, finding that “...activity
in the medial prefrontal cortex ... showed greater responsitivity to reject
[of the status quo] errors compared with accept [of the status quo]
errors” and “...left anterior insula activity was significantly greater for
reject status quo than to accept status quo errors.”[66, p3323] This evi-
dence is, in one sense, consistent with a difference in the experience of
regret, in that previous studies (Chua et al. [17]) have linked the anterior
insula to regretful experiences, but inconsistent in that the orbitofrontal
cortex (OFC) is most commonly associated with the experience of regret
(Camille et al. [16], Coricelli et al. [19]), and yet no evidence was found
for OFC differences at the time of outcome feedback. A fair conclusion
to draw is that, whilst neuroscience techniques have progressed the
understanding of experienced regret substantially, we are not yet in a
position to “measure”, using fMRI data, the experience of regret, and
hence draw concrete conclusions linking the experience to behavioural
choices.
3.2.3 Responsibility
A possible underlying reason for both the omission and status quo bias
is the associated responsibility that the individual would attach to the
decision they made, and hence the outcome which resulted. In the case
of the omission bias, the individual can rationalize the bad outcome,
assuming they choose not to act, by imagining9 that such a situation
would have occurred whether they were present, and chose not to act,
8 the status quo bias predicts that an individual will anticipate stronger regret as a result
of rejecting the status quo, and being wrong, compared to accepting the status quo, and
being wrong, leading to a preference for the status quo.
9 more commonly, in the language of regret, this type of imagining is known as counterfac-
tual thinking
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or not. Similarly in the case of the status quo bias, the individual can
imagine that the status quo is simply a reflection of previous ideas
about best practice, and hence choosing to follow the status quo is as
much a reflection of the decision of others as it is of the individual
themself. Both of these situations reflect a reduced responsibility of
the decision maker for the choice which was actually made, which the
decision maker can use to lower or mitigate their experienced regret
should a bad outcome result.
However, in the same way as the omission and status quo biases
can be thought of as characteristics of the decisions taken, we can also
consider the responsibility that the individual attributes to the choice
as merely another characteristic of the decision. In this framework,
it is highly likely that any decision making situation which either
contains “inaction” or “status quo” as one of the options will have a
variation in the degree of responsibility that the individual associates
to the choices on offer, making the combined effects on anticipated
regret difficult to separate. An easier starting point is to pose the
question “is responsibility for a decision a necessary condition for the
experience of regret?” That is, if we were to remove the characteristic
of responsibility10 from a situation, would it still be possible for an
individual to experience regret?
This question was initially addressed by a series of experiments
(Zeelenberg et al. [108], Ordóñez and Connolly [67]), which placed the
experiment participants in worded hypothetical scenarios and asked
them to subjectively rate the emotions that would be felt by the actors
in those scenarios. A typical scenario would have an actor experienc-
ing a bad outcome as a result of their own choice, which was to be
compared against the same scenario where the actor had the same
choice imposed upon them by an external agent, manipulating the
degree of responsibility the actor would feel for the outcome of the
scenario. Once the overall emotional ratings had been disaggregated
into separate components (regret, disappointment, happiness etc.), the
experiments found that the absence of responsibility severely reduced,
but did not totally eliminate11, the experience of regret for the actors in
those scenarios.
The validity of these results, however, can be questioned through the
typical economists’ critique, that by asking the experiment participants
to place themselves in the shoes of another person, and subjectively
rate hypothetical emotional outcomes, there is little incentive for the
experiment participant to either truthfully report their belief about
the emotional experience or exert the necessary effort to correctly
imagine what it would feel like to be placed in the hypothetical situation,
assuming it was possible at all. A superior approach would be to design
an experiment which constructs a decision making scenario in which
the participant must make choices for real, and hence experience first
hand the emotions associated with the outcomes of their choice. In
order to analyse the effect of responsibility, however, we would need
a control group where the participants must choose their own actions,
and a treatment group where the actions that they would have taken
anyway, are selected for them. In such an experiment, knowing which
actions the participants would have been chosen, without asking them
10 equivalently known in the literature as decision agency
11 which may be, in part, due to participants misunderstanding the implied theoretical
distinction between, for example, regret and disappointment
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to make a choice, is an incredibly difficult task, and hence there have
been no papers which use this exact approach. In addition, we are
still reliant on self-reported measures of experienced (and possibly
anticipatory) regret, which still fail the typical critique of the lack of an
incentive to truthfully report.
One recent paper, which seeks to overcome both these issues simulta-
neously, is that of Nicolle et al. [65] where two key ideas are combined
to provide a better understanding of the relationship between respon-
sibility and regret. Firstly, coupled with behavioural analysis, fMRI
techniques are used to assess whether patterns of brain activity, known
to correlate with the experience of regret (Camille et al. [16], Coricelli
et al. [19], Chua et al. [17]), are varied when the level of responsibility
an individual associates with a decision is manipulated. Secondly, this
variation in responsibility is achieved through a voting mechanism,
whereby the probability that the preferred action of an individual par-
ticipant is actually chosen can be lowered by having a majority voting
rule and increasing the number of people involved in the vote. For
example, when there is only one person in the vote, the individual is
wholly responsible for the decision, but when there is three people
in the vote, any one individual is, at most, 50% responsible12 for the
decision taken. Furthermore, by making participants choose gambles,
the outcomes of which are financially linked to the payment the in-
dividual would receive for the experiment13, there is an incentive for
participants to play according to their true preferences. The results of
this work found that “...regret-related neuronal activity in the amyg-
dala was enhanced by increased responsibility, suggesting a critical
role in “self-blame regret”” and also they “...did not find any brain
regions responding to what has been termed “outcome regret,” i.e.,
showing invariant responses to regret-related outcomes under all levels
of responsibility.” Nicolle et al. [65, p187] The finding of activity within
the amygdala increasing under increased responsibility corresponds
well to other experiments which have demonstrated a link between
the amygdala and experienced regret, suggesting this neuroscience
approach to regret studies, whilst somewhat currently untrustworthy
given the very small number of studies conducted in this fashion, may
prove increasingly fruitful as more commonly observed behavioural
responses to regret are investigated in this way.
3.2.4 Alternative explanations
An alternative explanation for the status-quo bias is that of loss aver-
sion (Thaler [91],Kahneman and Tversky [50]). Loss aversion reflects
the idea that people experience a greater disutility from a loss than
they experience utility from a gain of equal magnitude, and is a core
component of the value function found in Prospect Theory. Importantly,
a loss is considered relative to a reference point. In the situation where
there is a default or status-quo option, the reference point is fairly
clear. An action which may result in an outcome worse than that of
the status-quo can be considered as a potential loss relative to that
12 as the lowest majority in a three person society is two people, thereby attributing 50% of
the responsibility for the act which was chosen to each of the two people who voted for
it.
13 “Participants received 50p for each percentage they won of the maximum points they
could have won in their game” Nicolle et al. [65, p180]
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reference point. In this case, loss aversion drives choice to maintaining
the status-quo.
A related concept, of norm theory, is explored by Kahneman and
Miller [47], where “. . . (o)utcomes are perceived as worse when subjects
can easily imagine that a better outcome could have occurred.” (Ritov
and Baron [77, p50]). Where a clear position exists against which to
compare the alternative outcome (in the case of the status-quo or the
decision not to act), then magnifying the negative consequences of the
alternative has the behavioural effect of reducing the likelihood of the
alternative being chosen. Thus, the status-quo bias and the omission
bias will appear if the status quo or the decision not to act are easier to
imagine.
These explanations for the status-quo and omission bias run in par-
allel to the explanation of responsibility. For example, if you are in-
vestigating choice under risk through the lens of Prospect Theory, the
explanation of loss aversion makes most sense as loss aversion is a core
component of the value function used in Prospect Theory. In this thesis,
however, we are looking through the lens of Regret Theory, which
does not include loss aversion as a “standard” assumption relating
to the utility functions used. Hence, the explanation of loss aversion
cannot exist within the world of regret. In contrast, the explanation of
responsibility is more plausible in this world, as regret only arises from
the action of the agent (I can’t regret something someone else did), and
“taking responsibility for your action” is a psychologically sound idea.
Thus, whilst acknowledging the existence of other explanations for the
status-quo and omission biases, the focus in this world, and hence in
this work, is on responsibility.
3.2.5 Summary
The above research demonstrates that the specific characteristics of
any decision taken under uncertainty can have a strong impact on the
role that both anticipatory and experienced regret will have on that
decision. As regret is an emotion which relies on an association to a
choice to exist, it is reasonable that characteristics of the choice, beyond
simply the easily quantifiable “outcomes and associated probabilities”
described by traditional regret theories, will play a significant role.
The three characteristics described above, however, are not a complete
list of how mathematically equivalent options can be “framed” to
appear different to the individual, so we should continue to explore
other avenues which will have an impact on both the applicability, and
predictive capability, of theories which make use of regret. It is in this
spirit which we construct the following experiment.
3.3 when an action and a decision diverge
The broad theme of this work is moving studies of regret from static to
dynamic contexts, and so we can additionally study the above results
in terms of their applicability to repeated decision making scenarios as
well as one shot scenarios. The status quo bias is a commonly framed in
terms of repeated decisions, in that there should have existed a previous
decision for one option to be termed the “status quo”. A status quo
option, however, will be likely be stable over time, which presents
problems for experimental manipulation where an experimenter would
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like to manipulate the short-term dynamics of a situation in order to
observe changes in behaviour. Secondly, the inaction bias is only defined
in terms of a single decision, in that a decision not to act will yield less
regret than an equivalent decision to act. As such, there are unanswered
questions regarding the persistence of the inaction bias over time, and
whether the reduction of experienced regret from inaction, compared
to action, would result in a tendency to repeat, and not learn from,
mistakes and bad choices resulting from inaction. Lastly, the effect of
responsibility is hard to analyse dynamically, because a reduction in
responsibility is typically associated with having choices imposed upon
an individual, rather than requiring an individual to make a choice,
and, as such, there is little behavioural analysis to conduct or observe
when an individual is not being asked to make a choice.
As a result of this complexity in extending the existing literature to a
dynamic or repeated context, especially in the laboratory, we need to
start with much simpler, and much easier to define, characteristics of a
choice when seeking to move from a one shot to repeated or dynamic
context, in analysing how those specific characteristics interact with
the feedback from experienced to future anticipatory regret and future
choice.
3.3.1 The action
In economics, we often consider a choice as a comparison of costs and
benefits amongst options. These costs and benefits can be quantified
(according to some measure), and the comparison of the measures will,
typically, yield a “best” option amongst the group.
The process described above is, however, a purely theoretical exercise.
It is entirely possible to evaluate options without ever needing to make
a real choice. This is a hypothetical choice.
If we want to actually make a real choice in the real world there
needs to exist another component. This other component is the “action”
we would need to take to effect a choice.
This component arose in the previous discussion of the inaction bias,
where “inaction” was, in essence, doing absolutely nothing at all, and
an “action” is doing something, anything, physical to effect a different
choice.
Actions, defined as the physical process necessary in order to effect a
choice, can be thought of as incredibly wide ranging.
From a typical consumer perspective, some examples would be:
• Going to the shop to purchase a particular item or particular
brand
• Phoning a particular insurance company to purchase insurance
for a product
From an investment perspective, there are similar examples:
• Going on a website to buy or sell a particular number of shares
in a specific company
• Make an offer, through an estate agent, to buy a house
In the lab, we typically denote actions by selecting a specific option
on a computer screen, which will have a label; often a title or name, a
location on the computer screen, and perhaps even a colour.
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All of these examples above have a common theme running through
them. They consist of both a physical action and a label which repre-
sents the choice being made.
In the first example given, the decision to purchase a healthy snack
may have been considered as the best option amongst many in order
to meet the need of being hungry, but this is not a real world choice
until an action is taken (“going to the shop”) and a label is picked
representing the choice (“a single Dole banana”).
For the purposes of the discussion going forward, the term “action”
will encompass both the physical action taken, and the label of the
option representing the choice.
In short, economists would tend to think of “actions” as being unim-
portant in the context of decision making, in that they convey very little
information as to the quality of the decision being taken. For example,
if a lab experiment simply produced an output which stated “At time
period t, the option labelled x was chosen, as opposed to the option
labelled y, by clicking an icon on the left of the screen” then there
would be nothing to conclude from the data without understanding
the decision which choosing action x over action y represented.
However, aside from cases of inaction, every decision taken (including
decisions under uncertainty) can be thought of as having an associated
action necessary to effect the decision.
3.3.2 The decision
In contrast to the action, the “decision” can be thought of as the relative
comparison of economically important information between options
available to the individual. In the traditional microeconomic sense, the
decision made reflects the individual’s best response to the various
benefits and costs on offer. The decision taken by the individual conveys
to the observer a sense of what’s important and relevant to that indi-
vidual, and, as such, it is decisions, rather than actions, that economists
are typically most interested in, because it reveals how the individual
responds and reacts to incentives. For example, a laboratory output
which states “At time period t, the individual decided upon the risky
option, forgoing the safe option” gives us more useful information than
the equally correct output of “At time period t, the individual decided
upon action x, forgoing action y”, because it provides meaningful in-
formation as to how the individual responded to the incentives which
were placed in front of them.
Whilst it must be true that, in any decision problem, there is at
least one action associated with at least one of the two decisions14, an
economist would argue that, as the action alone carries no particular
economic information, it could be changed or replaced by another,
which effects the same decision, without any impact on the resulting
choice behaviour.
The natural extension to this argument is that there should be no
way to predict, ex ante, whether an individual will choose one particu-
lar action over another without also including, or controlling for, the
underlying economic decisions that the actions represent. For if there
14 in the simplest possible case, of an agent facing a decision between 2 options, it may
be the case that one decision can be implemented without the need for an action (i.e.
inaction will result in that decision being made by default), in order to differentiate the
two decisions, there must be an action associated with the other
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were such a method of prediction, it would imply than an individual
had an underlying preference for one action over the other, implying
that one action represented an increase in utility over the other, and
hence there was, in fact, economically relevant information contained
inside the action which would alter the decision taken at the margin.
The reason for the making this distinction between “action” and
“decision” was in relation to the characteristics of a choice which may
interact with the influence of anticipatory regret. Characteristics have
already been shown to be important with the status quo and inaction
biases. In the same way we can ask “does anticipatory regret work in the
same way for actions as for inactions?” we can ask “does anticipatory
regret work in the same way for actions as decisions?”
The reason for posing this question is that when we say an individual
will experience regret from the choice they made, it is not specified
whether the action, as distinct from the decision, will be associated
with the experience of regret. In a simple one shot decision situation,
the answer to this question does not matter at all, precisely because
the action taken by an individual is necessarily tied to the decision
it effected. It is impossible for me to decide to do something and
subsequently choose an action which effects a completely different
decision15. As such, it is impossible to determine whether anticipatory
or experienced regret is tied to either the action or the decision or both,
because, behaviourally, it will appear as the same thing.
The issue changes, however, when we move from a one shot situation
to a multi stage situation. In this world, the previous action and decision
can diverge, as “clicking on the blue icon on the left side of the screen”
may no longer represent the same decision in stage two as it did in stage
one. In this world, assuming that experienced regret has an impact on
subsequent decision making16, it now matters whether the previously
experienced regret was associated with the action or the decision in
terms of the impact of the regret on the stage two decision. It will have
an effect when only one of the previous decision or action turns up in
stage two, but it will matter most when both the decision and action,
from stage one, turn up in stage two, as opposing forces on the decision
maker. It is for this reason that the experimental configuration outlined
below will be used to analyse the problem at hand.
3.3.3 The influence of experienced regret
Experimental Literature
Experimental studies which have analysed the effect of experienced
regret on subsequent decisions taken under risk or uncertainty have
tended to assume one of two things.
Firstly, some (Zeelenberg and Beattie [105], Creyer and Ross [21])
assume the experience of regret will influence subsequent regret aver-
sion, which implies that the regret function, to be used in the second
decision making stage, is affected by previous regret, which changes
the relative attractiveness of options in the stage two decision. In the
absence of evidence to prove whether an observed change in preference
towards one option, say A, and away from another, say B, is caused
15 the assumption here is that we are ruling out “the trembling hand” often seen in
game theory, whereby an individual must take into account that they may make an
unintentional decision with very small probability
16 the literature of which was extensively analysed in the previous chapter
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by an increase in the anticipated regret associated with option B, or a
reduction in anticipated regret associated with option A17, these studies
have tended to assume that observed deviation away from any partic-
ular decision is evidence of an increase in regret aversion, due to the
“similarity” between the decision which was initially regretted and the
subsequent decision which the individual moved away from.18
Secondly, some (Raeva and van Dijk [73]) assume the experience
of regret will influence the subjective probabilities associated with
“similar” anticipated regrets in a subsequent decision. That is, having
experienced a regret once, I believe it is more likely that I will experience
a similar regret (as a result of taking a similar decision, and having
uncertainty work against me) again. Compared to the first approach,
this approach has the added benefit that if you believe the sum total
of all subjective probabilities must equal to one (i.e in a two option,
two state of the world model, an increase in the likelihood of one
regret necessarily implies an equivalent decrease in the other) then your
observed experimental result, of a shift in the relative preference for one
decisions over another, will necessarily either support the hypothesis
or refute it.
The problem with the two above approaches, however, is that, experi-
mentally, they produce behaviourally equivalent hypotheses. Given I
observe an increase in the relative preference for option A over option
B, I would be unable to determine whether it was due to a belief that
regret associated with option B was more severe (assumption one) or
more probable (assumption two). This problem is widely addressed in
Chapter 2.
On common themes
As the above studies are experimental, and not theoretical, in nature,
they do not make specific predictions about the impact of experienced
regret on subsequent choice in contexts other than those which are
very similar to the precise experimental design used in the papers. For
example, as the experiments do not make a distinction between the
actions and decisions taken, they do not provide insight into how the
experience of regret would differentially impact the various components
of choice in the second stage.
However, the three experiments mentioned above have certain “com-
mon themes” which underlie the authors’ implicit assumptions about
how the experience of regret will influence choice in a subsequent stage.
In each case, there is an underlying notion of similarity, in that the
experience of regret, from a particular choice in stage one, will only
affect subsequent choice as it pertains to “similar” choices in stage
two. In the case of a repeated decision, this is, in effect, saying that
the experience of regret, from choosing a particular option , provides
information only about that same option19, when it appears again in the
second stage. This intuition, however, does not tell us what will happen,
in the second stage, when there are elements of similarity associated
with more than one option. That is, if the action and decision from the
first stage diverge into separate options in the second stage.
17 as discussed in Chapter 2 of this work
18 it’s easy to imagine that an individual doesn’t want to repeat the same (or similar) mistake
twice, and so would wish to move away from the decision they initially made, though
this is only an assumption
19 in the form of either a change in the experience of regret associated with that option, or a
change in the subjective probability of experiencing that specific regret again
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Secondly, though all of the experiments use an idea of similarity,
they offer no explanation as to how, or why, that element of similarity
interacts with the changing decision in the second stage. By explicitly
assuming the experience of regret impacts the regret aversion, or sub-
jective probability, at stage two, they are saying that the experience of
regret impacts, in an easily quantifiable way (i.e. in a way that could
be modelled within existing regret-based theories) the second stage
decision, but not what that impact is conditional upon. Does a higher
degree of similarity between the previously regretted choice and a
possible option at stage two, for example, imply a larger change in
regret aversion or subjective probability? Or is there simply a constant
change if the decision maker deems the second stage to be similar, in
some way, to the first stage? Or will such an effect only exist if the
decision, and action, combined, is identical in stage two as it was when
it generated the experience of regret in stage one? Such questions are
left unanswered by these experimental works.
Theoretical Literature
The theoretical literature which looks at the role of regret in dynamic
contexts is generally confined to the field of learning, and adaptive
behaviour, where the experience of regret is providing feedback about
the underlying uncertain environment which the individual is making
decisions under. For example, “regret-matching” (Hart and Mas-Colell
[32]) uses regret as a tool for learning about the best-response in a
game theoretic setting, by adapting the probability of playing any
given strategy by the measure of experienced regret from playing such
strategies in the past. However, in our experimental environment, we
are simply looking at decision theory, rather than game theory, and
there is no information to be learnt, about the underlying environment,
from the past experience of regret, as the individual is provided with
complete information at every decision stage. As such, regret-matching
will not offer any predictions about behaviour in a complete information
environment.
The most recent theoretical work which uses anticipated regret in a
dynamic context is by Hayashi [35], focussing on dynamic consistency
of choices in the presence of anticipated regret. This work, however,
focusses on the “...opportunity dependence property of regret-based
choice” and “...maintain[s] the assumption that the decision maker
looks only at future, and does not care about what might have occurred
at unrealized events” [35, p402] thus specifically ignoring any feedback
effects from prior experienced regret on future choice. Consequen-
tially, this theory will too not offer any predictions on the difference
in behaviour as a result of the distinction between anticipated and
experienced regret.
Finally, the Theory of Regret Regulation by Zeelenberg and Pieters
[106] aims to be the most descriptive account of the different ways in
which regret affects decision making behaviour under uncertainty. It
builds on the literature spawned from the original formulations of re-
gret theory to suggest 10 propositions20 which describe the most crucial
aspects of regret for decision making, building from the premise that
“...consumers are regret averse and that, as a consequence, they try to
20 subsequently revised to 11 propositions in version 1.1 of the theory (Pieters and Zeelen-
berg [68])
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regulate their regrets” to form “...a single overarching model”[106, p3].
In terms of a prediction for the difference in effect between action and
decision regret on subsequent behaviour, Proposition 10 states “[r]egret
regulation strategies are decision-, alternative-, or feeling-focused and
implemented based on their accessibility and their instrumentality to
the current overarching goal.”[106, p4] This terminology is then ex-
panded upon later in the article, but no precise prediction is made
about the effect of experienced regret on subsequent decision making.
However, there is mention of what can be called ’the most common
assumption’ that “...[experienced] regret most clearly induces decision
reversals or undoing behaviors”, “[a] central element in the experience
of regret is the undo or reverse the decision that led to the regretted
consequences” and “...the prediction that regret promotes switching”
[106, p13]. Whilst these three statement do not make the same pre-
cise distinction between decision and action regret, at the very least
they do seem to indicate a desire for the individual to move away
from an action/decision which previously caused them to experience
regret. Applied to consumer purchases, this idea “...can motivate us
... to switch to another supplier of services or product the next time
around”[106, p13]. As such, it can be stated that an experiment which
shows a preference to switch away from a previously regretted decision
or action can be thought of as consistent with Regret Regulation Theory,
though not specifically predicted by it, but an experiment which shows
a preference to move towards a previously regretted decision or action
can be thought of as running contrary to Regret Regulation Theory.
Transfer of knowledge and similarity
One potential avenue to bridge the gap between the theoretical and
experimental literatures on the impact of experienced regret on subse-
quent regret aversion is the parallel literature (which sits across both
economics and psychology) on transfer of knowledge21. This literature
studies the mechanisms via which the lessons learned from a decision
made in one context are transferred into a future decision which is made
in a similar, but not identical, context.
This literature is immediately appealing, as the concept of “similarity”
is especially important, and there is both theoretical and experimental
evidence in support. Whereas the experimental literature on regret,
discussed earlier, struggles to define the components of a “similar”
decision, yet relies heavily on it to explain the experimental results,
the transfer of knowledge literature is able to precisely quantify how
similarity can explain the behaviour of individuals in subsequent choice
periods. For example, Zizzo finds “...just three variables ... are required
to jointly be able to predict 1/3 of the variance in similarity evaluations”
(p21) in the context of a range of game theory situations. In the context
of regret, if we were able to quantify how individuals consider regrets
to be “similar” to each other (whether they are evaluated according to
the similarity of the action, decision, or other dimensions), then we can
begin to make predictions which use the similarity as a proxy for the
salience of an anticipated regret in the decision problem.
However, a cautionary note is struck if we consider the more funda-
mental question of how knowledge is transferred, and not simply the
question of when knowledge is transferred. By asking the question of
21 wide ranging articles on the topic are contained in Zizzo [111]
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how knowledge is transferred, we are equivalently asking the questions:
what is being learnt through the experience of regret, how is this being
encoded into memory, and how it is then recalled to be used at a later
date? In the case of game theory, as discussed earlier with reference
to similarity, and also as in “regret-matching” (Hart and Mas-Colell
[32]), the underlying assumption is that you are using the experience
of playing the game to learn how to play the game better. Doing so, you
are able to overcome the limits of bounded rationality to improve your
utility, and the method by which this is accomplished is obviously of
great importance. In the language of de Jong and Ferguson-Hessler this
is “deep knowledge” which permits “...vertical transfer of knowledge”
[111, p6] to contexts outside of that in which the original learning took
place.
In the world of regret, however, it is certainly not clear what is being
learned, or how this learning can be used to improve your overall utility.
The first chapter of this work looked at what this world may look like
if the experience of regret is being used to learn more about the regret
function itself, or equivalently, an individual’s reaction to the emotional
consequences of utility gaps22, but it wasn’t clear that doing so worked
to the benefit of the individual23.
But in the case of simply studying whether the emotion of regret is
attached to an action or a decision, it is simply not clear whether this is
at all to do with the process of learning to ultimately improve utility.
It is much more related to the ideas of emotional residue from past
choices and increased sensitivity in the face of future choices, which
is a much more superficial notion than considering a deep transfer of
knowledge method of procedure. The question seems much more one
of reaction than reflection, and hence the extent to which the transfer of
knowledge literature can be of use in helping to understand the process
may well be limited, at least at this time.
3.3.4 Summary
No previous experimental or theoretical work, which studies how the
experience of regret will impact subsequent choice behaviour, has made
the distinction between a decision and an action, as defined earlier in
this work. As such, there is no previous work which makes an explicit
prediction about whether the experience of regret is tied to the decision
or the action taken, and consequently the effect of experienced regret
on subsequent choice when the decision and action, from a previously
regretted choice, diverge at a second stage. Several works make implicit
predictions and assumptions, which can be extended to a context when
the choice of an individual is split into the action and the decision,
suggesting an important role for “similarity” and a desire to “switch
away” from options which have previously caused the individual to
experience regret. The transfer of knowledge literature highlights the
importance of similarity in how learnings are taken from one context
and applied to another, but the absence of any obvious theories about
how the experience of regret is used to learn, over and above simply
the more reactive elements of the emotion, may limit how much this
literature can be used to help with the issues at hand.
22 “what I got” versus “what I could have had”
23 indeed, the process of learning about the regret function appeared to encourage them to
take more risks for fear of missing out on the big prize
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3.4 design of an experiment
The previous chapter of this work was dedicated to explaining the
difficulties associated with designing an experiment to test how the
experience of regret affects subsequent regret aversion. The above dis-
tinction between the regret associated with a decision, as opposed to
an action, does, however, provide a natural framework for designing
an experiment to investigate whether or not there is a link between
the regret associated with a previous action and the behaviour of an
individual when faced with that action again in a subsequent stage.
In order to answer such a question, we need to design an experiment
which compares the choice of an individual, under uncertainty, in the
presence of a previously regretted action, to the choice of an individual,
under uncertainty, without the presence of a previously regretted action.
Noting, however, the distinction between an action and a decision, it is
important to hold constant the decision being made by the individual,
whilst changing the action that the individual will see. In order to do
so, however, we will need to find a mechanism and context in which
it is possible to disaggregate the decision from the action, so that we
can present two different versions of the same decision, in the second
stage of the experiment; one in which the previously regretted action is
repeated, and one in which the previously regretted action is not.
3.4.1 An intuitive example
An example of an action, which can be thought of as distinct from a de-
cision, taken under uncertainty, is that of purchasing a brand. Consider,
for example, a multinational electronics corporation, which produces
a number of different electronic goods in a range of different markets.
It may be the case that, for one particular good, the brand carries a
relatively good reputation for quality and reliability, but, for a different
type of good, the brand is considered to be of relatively low quality and
reliability. In such a situation, the experience of regret, from choosing
one of the goods, and having it fail, provides no information about the
probability of failure about the other type of good24, or the utility that
will be gained from owning the other type of good. As such, in purely
the context of the decision as to whether or not to buy the other good,
there is no “Bayesian information” to be gained from the experience of
regret from the original good of the same brand. However, the action, in
this case, corresponds to the individual deciding to spend their money,
a second time, on the same brand which had previously caused them
to experience regret.
If there is such an effect, as a result of regretting the purchase of a
particular brand when faced with a decision whether or not to pur-
chase the brand again, it will impact most when the decision, that the
first purchase decision was based upon, is the reverse at the second
purchasing opportunity compared to the first. This is because the effect
of regret from the decision at the first stage will be acting in the opposite
direction, on the choice at the second stage, to the effect of regret from
the action at the first stage. This idea and effect can be illustrated with
an example
24 under the assumption that, because they are different goods, they are likely manufactured
in different factories, and designed and engineered by separate teams
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Consider the following situation: You are in an electron-
ics shop, and have to make a decision between a cheap
TV, made by a company you don’t recognise, and a more
expensive TV, which is made by LG.
The 2 TVs appear to have the same characteristics (same
size, picture resolution and a 12 month warranty), and pro-
duce a similar quality picture, but, fearing that the cheap
TV might be unreliable, you decide to purchase the LG TV.
As it happens, the LG TV breaks down shortly after the
12 month warranty expires, and you feel that you might
as well have purchased the cheap TV instead, and saved
yourself some money.
Shortly thereafter, you need to replace your mobile phone,
and have narrowed your choice down to a cheaper LG
mobile phone, and a more expensive Apple iPhone. Again,
both phones appear to have the same characteristics (same
size, picture resolution and a 12 month warranty), and are
similarly enjoyable to use and navigate.
You know that the iPhone is the more reliable brand in
mobile phones, and also know that the fact your LG TV
broke down doesn’t make it any more likely that your LG
mobile phone will do so too, but are faced with a tough
decision.
Previously, you had purchased an LG product, and ended
up wishing you had selected a different brand.
At the same time, however, you had purchased a more ex-
pensive, supposedly reliable product, and ended up wishing
you had taken the cheaper option.
Does the fact that you had a bad experience with the
LG TV make it less likely you will purchase the LG mobile
phone?
Does the fact that you had a bad experience purchasing
the more expensive, better brand TV make it less likely
you will purchase the more expensive, better brand mobile
phone?25
In this example, purchasing the LG brand a second time corresponds
to repeating a previously regretted action. Purchasing the Apple iPhone
at the second stage, however, corresponds to repeating a previously
regretted decision, in that the individual would be choosing to spend
additional money on a supposedly more reliable product, at the risk
that is may break down anyway and leave the individual wishing they
had taken the cheaper option. As such, in this example, the two types
of regret, from the first stage, are acting in opposite directions on the
individual at stage two26. The action regret is now linked to the LG
phone at stage two, whereas the decision regret is linked to the Apple
iPhone.
In order to isolate the effect of just action regret, however, we would
need to compare the answers to the above questions to an equivalent
second stage situation, where the individual must choose between
25 this hypothetical question was posed to the subjects in the experiment as part of the
post-experiment questionnaire, offering them the opportunity to give both answers and
comments
26 specifically without saying, however, whether the experience of regret from stage one
(both in terms of action and decision) makes the individual more or less likely to repeat
the previously regretted action or decision
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the iPhone and another less reliable, less expensive mobile phone,
equivalent to the LG phone in everything apart from its brand name,
thus keeping the decision identical across both scenarios, but changing
the action which the individual must effect in order to choose one of
the options.
Keeping the decision constant, however, is very tough to do with such
limited information. In such a hypothetical scenario, the probability
that the less reliable mobile phone breaks down, for example, is likely to
be conveyed by the brand name27 and the individual’s own experience
or awareness of the brand prior to the experiment. Thus, in order to
remove such subjective interpretation of the decision in the second
stage, we need to ensure that any and all information conveyed is
transparently objective, thereby ensuring direct control over the decision
which participants are taking in the second stage.
Negative Reciprocity
The broad definition of the term “action” leads to many other possible
explanations for what is observed as a change in choice at the second
stage seeming to result from a “bad outcome” in the first stage. With
specific relevance to brands, negative reciprocity would be a classic
example. In the presented example, it is easy to imagine the agent
feeling a sense of anger towards LG, as a company, and wanting to
“hurt” them in the second stage by not purchasing their mobile phone.
Though typically reciprocity, both positive and negative, is seen
between two people, in this case the “company” is a close substitute
for another person, and hence it is plausible to explain the behaviour
from a reciprocity perspective. As we move further away from a person
along the spectrum of “actions”, however, this explanation becomes
less plausible.
Suppose in the presented example, the products are not branded,
but simply sold in coloured boxes. The LG TV in stage one comes in
a “shiny blue box” and the LG phone in stage two also comes in a
“shiny blue box”, but there are many other products, made by different
companies, which come in a similar box. This breaks the link between
the company and the product inside the box, hence eliminates the
potential for reciprocity (as it may well be a different company selling
the phone in the shiny blue box in stage two).
In this situation, the “action” required is “select the product in the
shiny blue box” in both stages. Hence, if regret is associated with that
action from stage one, it has the opportunity to influence choice at
stage two. If there was a change in choice, attributing the change to
reciprocity is less plausible. Indeed, generic labelling of this kind is
what is used in the experiment in the remainder of the chapter.
An aternative formulation of the same idea can be found in the world
of gambling, and, specifically, poker. The nice thing about poker is that
we typically have four different labels for cards of equivalent value; for
example, the four of hearts, spades, clubs and diamonds. Imagining a
poker situation where you make a bet, for example that your pair of
sevens (say, diamonds and hearts) is good enough to win the hand, you
are making a decision to bet on the strength of the value which those
cards represent (a pair of sevens is a mid-range pair), but also taking an
27 thus implying that the brand name conveys some useful information to the individual,
and hence breaking the purely “action” versus “decision” distinction made earlier
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action to bet on exactly the cards labelled the “seven of diamonds and
hearts”. Suppose you make this bet and lose. Now suppose that one
of two things may happen. By chance, you receive the exact same pair
as you did previously (seven of diamonds and hearts) or you receive
the other pair of sevens (spades and clubs), and you are again required
to bet on the strength of your cards. In a purely economic sense, they
are of equivalent value, and hence the same choice should be made.
Even in a traditional regret aversion sense, there is no reason to imagine
that the anticipated regret from betting (and losing) on one pair would
be any different to the other. However, the past experience of regret,
tied specifically to the two red cards, may cause a different choice to
be made in the comparison to the two black cards. Are you willing to
give the red cards a second chance? Or do you believe that those cards
only bring you bad luck? Again, if the emotion of regret is only tied
to the previous decision (betting on the strength of a mid-range pair
and losing), then it makes no difference. But if it is tied to the action
(betting on the seven of hearts and diamonds and losing) then it may
make a difference.
3.4.2 An objective mechanism
The simplest way to achieve direct control over the decisions, under
uncertainty, faced by subjects in the experiment is to design the deci-
sions to be as simple as possible. The less information that is provided
to the subjects, the less room there is for subjective interpretation of
the problem at hand28. Similarly, if we wish to isolate and study the
effects of regret, both experienced and anticipated, we must limit the
number of different sources of regret in the experiment so that any
effects can be precisely identified. These two criteria indicate that the
best possible experimental design is a simple gambling task, where
monetary outcomes and associated probabilities are explicitly defined,
where a subject only has two possible options at every decision making
stage. As such, let us define
• Gamble R - a p chance of winning £r and a 1 − p chance of
winning £0
• Gamble S - a 1−p chance of winning £s and a p chance of winning
£0
In addition, in order for the decision to be non-obvious, let us define
Gamble R as the “risky” gamble, and Gamble S as the “safe” gamble, so
that 0 < p < 0.5 and r > s. As such, given a choice between Gamble R
and Gamble S, under an expected utility framework, all information that
a participant needs to know in order to make a decision is objectively
defined.
However, if we assume that a decision maker is also concerned
with anticipated regret, in addition to the pure expected utility, as
suggested by Loomes and Sugden [58] and Bell [5], then the decision
28 This would be considered the traditional view of experimental economics. There exists
a wider literature on experimenter demand effects (Zizzo [112]) which looks at how
the construct of the experiment itself acts as a cue for a specific type of behaviour by
the subjects. Whilst presenting a bland, neutral frame (Gamble A, Gamble B) works to
reduce these effects in this specific experiment, this should not be taken as true for all
experiments. Indeed, context may sometimes be required to counteract the wider effects
of the experimental design.
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maker also needs to know the probability that they will experience
regret, conditional on each of the two options that they can take. If,
for example, each gamble is resolved by a separate and independent
mechanism (e.g. two separate random number generators), but the
subject only observes the resolution of uncertainty for the gamble which
they select, then the typical assumption made in the regret literature
is that the individual cannot possibly experience regret, given they
do not observe whether the non-chosen gamble would have resolved
in their favour or not29, and hence anticipated regret would not play
a factor in such a decision. If, however, the individual observes the
resolution of uncertainty for the unchosen gamble, as given by the
second random number generator, then the probability of experiencing
regret, conditional on having chosen a gamble which lead to a payoff of
£0, is simply given by the unconditional probability that the unchosen
gamble would have lead to a positive payoff had it been chosen30.
However, the effect of anticipated regret will be maximised when
the outcome of the two gambles are dependent on each other; that
is they are simultaneously resolved by just one mechanism (say, one
random number generator) and, hence, the conditional probability of
experiencing regret given the gamble you chose resulted in a payoff
of £0, is equal to 1. As this experiment is designed to identify the
possible effects of experienced regret on subsequent decision making,
it is sensible to choose a design which maximises the potential for both
the experience and anticipation of regret, and hence having the gambles
resolved by just one mechanism will be implemented throughout.
3.4.3 Type A and Type B Regret
In Chapter 2, the idea of Type A and Type B regret was explained by
considering the two following possibilities when making a decision to
set aspirations or predict one’s own ability
A) “I am worried that I might set my predictions or as-
pirations too high, end up not meeting them, and regret
setting an unattainable goal”
B) “I am worried that I might set my predictions or as-
pirations too low, end up exceeding them, and regret not
having more belief in my own ability”
In this experiment, however, the subjects will not be asked to bet on
their own ability, or set aspirations, but rather, in the context of Gamble
R and Gamble S presented above, will be asked to make a choice
between a relatively “risky” and relatively “safe” option. As such, in
order to continue to use the Type A and B regret terminology31, they
need to be redefined in the context of risk seeking and risk aversion.
29 it is occasionally argued that, in such a situation where an individual selects a gamble
which does not resolve in their favour but observes nothing else, they may construct a
“counterfactual”, and experience regret from imagining what might have happened had
they chosen differently, as opposed to experiencing regret from observing what would
have happened had they chosen differently. However, it is typical that in experiments
designed to analyse the effect of anticipated regret, this possibility is ignored.
30 as an example, if the subject had chosen Gamble R, and lost, receiving a payoff of £0, the
probability of experiencing regret would be 1−p, the probability that Gamble S would
have paid £s had it been chosen.
31 remembering, that the definition of Type A and Type B regret was never intended to be
fixed, but rather to highlight the fact that there is always at least two sources of regret,
and the context of the decision specifies to what they correspond intuitively
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The above definitions can be thought of in terms of how “conservative”
the individual wishes to behave, in terms of their aspirations, with, for
example, Type B regret equating to the individual worrying about being
too conservative, and regretting not being more speculative. Under that
premise, it makes sense, in the context of simple monetary gambling
behaviour, to redefine Type A regret as
A) “I am worried that I may act in a risky fashion, which
does not pay off, and regret not choosing a safer option”
and similarly, Type B regret as
B) “I am worried that I may act in a safe fashion, which
does not pay off, and regret not choosing a riskier option”
In these terms, choosing the above Gamble R, the relatively risky option,
exposes the individual to Type A regret, where as choosing Gamble S,
the relatively safe option, exposes the individual to Type B regret.
3.4.4 Generating regret
By asking the subjects to choose between Gamble R and Gamble S in
stage one, under the premise that both gambles are resolved simultane-
ously by a single mechanism, we will create four different groups of
individuals after the end of stage one. These are
1. Subjects who chose Gamble R, and won, experiencing no regret.
2. Subjects who chose Gamble S, and won, experiencing no regret.
3. Subjects who chose Gamble R, and lost, experiencing Type A
regret.
4. Subjects who chose Gamble S, and lost, experiencing Type B
regret.
Thus, for the purposes of investigating the effect of experienced regret
on subsequent decision making, we would, at first glance, like as many
people as possible to fall into groups 3 and 4. This can be achieved in a
number of different ways. The most obvious is to rig the experiment so
that everyone loses, and hence either falls into group 3 or 4 depending
on whether they chose Gamble R or S. Such deception, however, is typi-
cally frowned upon by economists when designing experiments, on the
basis that repeated use of misinformation primes experimental subjects
to come to expect information to be false, which means that, again,
we lose direct control over the information which subjects are using
to make decisions. In addition, this experiment uses multiple sessions
over a two day period, and it would quickly become apparent, should
subjects communicate outside the lab, that the presented probabilities
for the gambles do not accurately reflect the true probabilities of any
individual subject winning either of the two gambles, which will affect
the behaviour of future subjects, who have not already participated,
should this information be passed on. As such, deception is not an
option for this experiment.
An alternative strategy is to make Gamble R, the risky gamble, simul-
taneously very attractive and very unlikely to win. This can be achieved
by specifying the value of p to be very low and the value of £r to be
very high (relative to the value of £s). In such a situation, the expected
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proportion of those who fall into group 3 would be close to 1− p, and,
as such, we could easily restrict study to the effect of Type A regret
on subsequent decision making. In theory, this seems like a sensible
move32. Intuitively, however, there is a problem with presenting Gamble
R as the “obvious” choice. In keeping with the literature linking the
feeling of responsibility to the experience of regret, it is easy to imagine
that “[p]eople expect a narrow margin of loss—or a ‘‘near miss’’—to
exacerbate self-blame, and thus they expect that margin to exacerbate
regret as well”(Gilbert et al. [26, p346]) and, consequently, therefore, a
large margin of loss, where a subject never had any intention of picking
a “non-obvious” gamble, will reduce self-blame and responsibility, and
thus reduce both the anticipation and experience of regret. As such,
in an experiment which needs to generate the experience of regret in
order to study its effects, there is a trade off between increasing the
proportion of people who experience at least some regret and increasing
the magnitude of regret for anyone who does happen to experience it33.
The choice made in this experiment is to maximise the number of
marginal subjects, who are close to indifference between Gamble R and
Gamble S, in order to generate the maximum possible anticipation and
experience of regret, given a fixed budget constraint from which to
fund the experiment. As such, we need to find values of £r, £s and p
for which the modal subject is just indifferent between the two gambles.
A hypothetical gambling questionnaire34, and a small scale pilot of the
experiment, found these values to be as follows
• Gamble R - a 30% chance of winning £14 and a 70% chance of
winning £0
• Gamble S - a 70% chance of winning £6 and a 30% chance of
winning £0
3.4.5 Resolving the gambles
Under the above definitions of Gamble R and Gamble S, a credible
randomisation mechanism is needed to resolve both gambles accord-
ing to the stated probabilities of 70% and 30%. A transparently fair
randomisation mechanism35 is that of rolling a die, but, in the case of
generating probabilities corresponding to 70% and 30%, at minimum, a
ten-sided die would be necessary. Fortunately, such a ten-sided die was
owned by my supervisor, Dr Daniel Sgroi, and, therefore, this was used
as the randomisation mechanism. This transformed the two gambles to
be
• If you choose Gamble R, you will win £14 if the die lands on 7, 8
or 9, and £0 otherwise
32 even considering the potential financial costs of paying a small proportion of subjects a
very large amount of money should they win Gamble R
33 this trade off is also evident when considering that increasing the value of both £r and
£s increases the magnitude of the consequences of making a wrong decision, and hence
the experience of regret from making such a wrong decision, but, given a fixed budget
from which to fund the experiment, also reduces the sample size which would be used
in any hypothesis tests.
34 completed by 29 students who attend a second year microeconomics course at The
University of Warwick
35 an example of a non-transparent randomisation mechanism is a computer random
number generator, which, presented to subjects without the underlying code, could easily
be, or at least believed to be, rigged to produce numbers which favour the experimenter
at the expense of the subject
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• If you choose Gamble S, you will win £6 if the die lands on 0, 1,
2, 3, 4, 5 or 6, and £0 otherwise
In order to ensure the privacy and anonymity of subjects in the experi-
ment, however, it was not possible to physically roll a die in front of
them to resolve the gamble. Similarly, to prevent the subjects from ex-
periencing emotions such as envy, as a result of observing the reactions
of other participants in a given session of the experiment, it was also
not possible to physically roll a die at the front of the laboratory, and
have all subjects observe the result. As such, a second best solution
was developed of providing the subjects with a pre-recorded video, of
the ten-sided die being rolled, and allowing them to view this video
in privacy on their own individual computer terminals after they had
made their decision36. Whilst it may not be perfectly possible to con-
vince the subjects that their viewing of the video was not conditional
on the choice of gambles that they had made37, and hence that they
were not being deceived in any way, the privacy benefits of this method
outweighed concerns about the believability of the outcome of the un-
certainty. Additionally, because of the simplicity of the webpages used
to run the experiment, it was not possible to select a random video
for every subject in the experiment. However, it was possible to select
a random video for every session of the experiment, as the code used
to display the video was simple to change between sessions, and, as a
result, every subject in a given session viewed the same roll of the die
and, hence, the same resolution of the uncertainty. To ensure this was
truly random, and hence ensuring that the probabilities stated in the
experiment were correct, a large number of die rolls were pre-recorded,
and a third party randomly allocated videos to sessions, prior to the
choices of any subjects.
3.4.6 The second stage
As mentioned in the above section, the two primary groups of subjects
we are interested in are those who experience Type A regret from stage
one (group 3) and those who experience Type B regret from stage one
(group 4). In order to investigate the effects of both types of regret on
subsequent behaviour, and additionally study the difference between
regret linked to action and regret linked to decision, we need to design
a second stage of the experiment where the subject is asked to make
another gambling decision, but fashioned in such a way that we can
compare the behaviour of subjects who face subtly different choices.
Ideally, we would like a second stage which allows us to vary the
action, whilst holding the decision constant, and also vary the decision,
whilst holding the action constant. However, without having an explicit
measure of regret, or a method for isolating the anticipated regret com-
ponent of an subject’s decision, it would be foolish to draw conclusions
from an experiment which varied the second stage decision (such as the
probabilities of winning a particular amount of money) and attribute
the observed changes in behaviour simply due to the effect of the prior
experience of regret. However, in contrast, a second stage which holds
the decision constant, but varies the actions need to implement the
36 an example of such a video, and how it was presented to subjects, is available at
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/slovelady/v1
37 though the simplicity of the webpages used, which all the students are very familiar with,
should suggest that it was not
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subject’s decision, by definition has no obvious economic reason for
producing a difference in behaviour. Hence, we would be much more
confident drawing conclusions related to non-economic reasons, such
as regret, from a second stage where the decision is held constant, but
the actions are varied, and so it is this approach which shall be used.
Additionally, as discussed in the intuitive example, a second stage
where the previously regretted choice is separated into the constituent
components of the action and the decision, and these components are
assigned to different options of the stage two gamble, is the most interest-
ing case under which to analyse the effects of action and decision regret
separately. Assuming it is more likely that the effect of decision regret
(“I regret choosing the safe option”) will impact more on the regret
associated with the most “similar” decision in stage two, and the effect
of action regret (“I regret selecting Gamble R”) will do likewise for the
most “similar” action in stage two, it forces the subjects to consider
the possible emotional consequences associated with both options in
stage two, rather than simply weighing the emotional consequence of
choosing the exact same option again. Furthermore, if it was possible
to analyse the individual preference for the two stage two options sepa-
rately (rather than simply getting a measure of the relative preference,
given by which option was ultimately selected), we would be able to
disentangle the relative magnitude of the impact of decision and action
regret. As such, the second stage of the experiment will deliberately
split up the decision and action of the previously regretted option from
stage one.
Considering the subjects who will end up in group 3 after stage
one, they experienced Type A regret from making a relatively risky
decision, by choosing Gamble R as their action. As such, in stage two,
where Gamble R occurs, it should now be considered the relatively
safe option. Considering the subjects who will end up in group 4 after
stage one, they experienced Type B regret from making a relatively safe
decision, by choosing Gamble S as their action. As such, in stage two,
where Gamble S occurs, it should now be considered the relatively risky
option. However, as Gamble R was originally “quite risky” to begin
with, and Gamble S was originally “quite safe”, this design of stage
two necessitates in the introduction of two more gambles.
• Gamble VR (very risky) - a 10% chance of winning £50 and a 90%
chance of winning £0. You will win £50 if the (ten-sided) die lands
on the number 0
• Gamble VS38 (very safe) - a 100% chance of winning £4. You will
win £4 if the (ten-sided) die lands on any number between 0 and
9 (inclusive)
Using these two new gambles, those in group 3 will be presented, in
stage two, with a choice between Gamble R (now relatively safe) and
Gamble VR39, and those in group 4 will be presented, in stage two, with
a choice between Gamble S (now relatively risky) and Gamble VS40.
38 the names of all the gambles have been changed here from what was actually presented
to the subjects in the experiment. In the experiment, arbitrary letters of the alphabet were
chosen for the names, so not as to prime the subjects with any specific information as to
how they should be interpreted or how the subjects should act. They have been presented
as such here to aid understanding of how “risky” each gamble is.
39 the webpage which subjects saw to resolve this choice is viewable at http://go.warwick.
ac.uk/slovelady/v2at1
40 the webpage which subjects saw to resolve this choice is viewable at http://go.warwick.
ac.uk/slovelady/v2bt1
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However, both of these situations involve a previously regretted action,
as well as a previously regretted decision. As such, in order to isolate
the effects of just action regret on subsequent choice, we need to also
have a control stage two of the experiment, where those in group 3 face
exactly the same decision, but do not see the action (or, equivalently,
label) of Gamble R repeated, and those in group 4 face exactly the same
decision, but do not see the action (or, equivalently, label) of Gamble S
repeated. As such, we need four new gambles, which are decisionally
and economically equivalent to R, S, VR and VS, but are not “presented”
in exactly the same way, in order to disassociate the action component
of regret. This can be done by defining four new gambles as follows
• Gamble Rc - a 30% chance of winning £14 and a 70% chance of
winning £0
• Gamble Sc - a 70% chance of winning £6 and a 30% chance of
winning £0
• Gamble VRc - a 10% chance of winning £50 and a 90% chance of
winning £0
• Gamble VSc - a 100% chance of winning £4
These gambles are mathematically equivalent to those presented ear-
lier, simply calling them something different41, but this might not be
sufficient to break the action association, for example, between Gamble
R and Gamble Rc. Hence, let us introduce a subtly different way of
resolving the risk according to the given probabilities. Instead of rolling
one ten-sided die, to generate a number between 0 and 9, let us roll
two ten-sided dice to generate a number between 00 and 99. As such,
the above gambles are resolved according to
• Gamble Rc - You will win £14 if the two dice generate any number
between 00 and 29
• Gamble Sc - You will win £6 if the two dice generate any number
between 30 and 99
• Gamble VRc - You will win £50 if the two dice generate any
number between 90 and 99
• Gamble VRc - You will win £4 if the two dice generate any number
between 00 and 99
Thus, from a decision perspective, a choice between Gamble R and
Gamble VR is identical to a choice between Gamble Rc and Gamble
VRc42. Similarly, a choice between Gamble S and Gamble VS is identical
to a choice between Gamble Sc and Gamble VSc43. From an action per-
spective, however, in both cases, the former choice involves a repeated
action, of choosing the same letter resolved by the same method as in
stage one, whereas the latter choice does not have the repetition.
Thus, we have created a control, where the action is not repeated, and
treatment, where the action is repeated, version of stage two for each of
41 again, to aid understanding, the names of the gambles are presented differently here to
what subjects saw in the experiment, but the principle of the argument remains
42 the webpage which subjects saw to resolve this choice is viewable at http://go.warwick.
ac.uk/slovelady/v2ac1
43 the webpage which subjects saw to resolve this choice is viewable at http://go.warwick.
ac.uk/slovelady/v2bc1
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the subjects in groups 3 and 4, and we are interested in the difference
in observed behaviour between control and treatment, for both those in
group 3 and those in group 4. From an experimental design perspective,
therefore, there should be a random allocation of subjects in group 3 to
either the treatment or control version of stage two, and likewise for
those in group 4. For simplicity, we shall call the versions of stage two
for subjects in group 3 either “stage two-A treatment” or “stage two-A
control”44 and the versions of stage two for subjects in group 4 either
“stage two-B treatment” or “stage two-B control”.
For those who did not experience regret
As previously stated, the simplicity of the web-pages used to design and
run the experiment did not permit us to filter subjects to different stage
two web-pages depending on stage one choice, only on the outcome
of stage one uncertainty, which, due to the use of random videos for
each session, was known to the experimenter, but not the subjects, prior
to the beginning of each experimental session. Thus, for example, in a
session where the winning number from stage one was 6, this meant
that those who chose Gamble R would experience Type A regret, but
those who chose Gamble S would experience no regret, and win £6.
All of these people, however, must then be directed to either “stage
two-A treatment” or “stage two-A control”. As such, it was necessary
to specify, in advance of the session, whether the session was a control
session, in which case everyone was filtered to “stage two-A control”
or a treatment session, in which case everyone was filtered to “stage
two-A treatment”.
As a result those who chose Gamble S, and experienced no regret,
saw the same second stage (either treatment or control) as those who
chose Gamble R and experienced Type A regret. Thus we have stage two
data from subjects who won in stage one (either by choosing Gamble R
or S), and received some payoff, as well as from those who experienced
regret.
3.4.7 Flow chart
Putting all of the above information together, therefore, leads us to be
able to draw the flow chart in Figure 51, which specifies the various
paths down which any given experimental subject may fall, given their
choices, the outcome of uncertainty, and the decisions which they will
be asked to take along the way.
3.4.8 Controlling for risk seeking and other individual specific factors
The aim of randomly allocating experimental subjects to either the treat-
ment or control group is that there should be no correlation between
individual, unobservable characteristics and the probability that a given
subject is allocated to either the treatment or control group. However,
as the method for generating the treatment and control groups is not
purely random45, but, as discussed above, is conditional on the session
44 indicating that those subject will have experienced Type A regret at stage one
45 i.e. the probability, both before the subject allocates themselves to an experimental session,
and when they enter the lab for their session, of being in the treatment group, is not
exactly equal to 0.5.
Figure 51: Experiment Flow Chart
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which they attend, and the allocation of the subjects to the sessions is
by their own selection (though without their knowledge which sessions
are control and which are treatment), we would like a method which
allows us to control for more obvious characteristics which will have a
causal effect on their choices, and might end up as correlated with their
allocation to either a treatment or control session46.
Most of these characteristics, such as gender, age, personality and
mathematical ability, can be assumed to be constant throughout the
experiment, and so can be asked or measured in a questionnaire which
is administered after the main body of the experiment is finished. Some
of these characteristics, however, can be reasonably assumed to be
affected by the decisions made, and outcome of uncertainty in the
main body of the experiment, and so will need to be measured before
the experiment is conducted. Specifically, we would like a measure
of inherent risk seeking for each of the subjects, which is correctly
incentivised to generate truthful revelation from the subjects.
Holt and Laury procedure
A standard method of generating a measure of risk seeking / risk
aversion is that proposed by Holt and Laury [38]. The method proposes
that subjects face a series of 10 gambling scenarios, where, in each
scenario, there are two possible gambles as options. The gambles are
similar to those described for this experiment, in that there are only
two possible outcomes for each gamble. In each of the scenarios the
amounts of money that each gamble offers stays constant, with one
of the gambles offering “extreme” payoffs (both high and low) and
the other offering “intermediate” payoffs. As the scenarios progress,
the probabilities associated with each of the states of the world is
varied, in such a way that the expected value (EV) of the gamble with
extreme payoffs increases, thus making it more attractive compared to
the gamble with intermediate payoffs. As such, given the increasing EV
of the “extreme” gamble, compared to the “intermediate” gamble, a
risk seeking individual is more likely to choose the extreme gamble in
more of the scenarios than would a risk averse individual. Additionally,
the gambles are created in such a way that an individual choosing
according to expected utility would have a unique switching point,
in that they would prefer the safe gambles in all scenarios before the
switching point, and would prefer the risky gamble in all scenarios
after the switching point.
The version of the procedure used in this experiment is modified
from the original to take advantage of the standard experimental show-
up fee offered to subjects. Subjects are offered £5 for showing up to
the experiment, but have the opportunity to exchange this show-up
fee for a lottery ticket, which pays £10 with some probability p and £1
46 as an example of how this could happen, there were 14 sessions of the experiment
run over the two days in the original run of experimental sessions. On the first day
(Tuesday) there were 4 control sessions and 3 treatment sessions, but on the second day
(Wednesday) there were 3 control sessions and 4 treatment sessions. At the University of
Warwick, however, there are sports run on a Wednesday afternoon at the same time as the
experimental sessions. Under the hypothesis that men are more likely to play sport than
women, and hence are more likely to sign up to Tuesday sessions than Wednesday, this
could result in relatively more men being allocated to Tuesday sessions than Wednesday,
which would result in more men in control sessions than women. If men are assumed to
be more risk seeking than women, this could induce a correlation between risk taking at
stage two and the allocation of control and treatment groups, caused by a factor which
has nothing to do with regret.
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Show-up fee Gamble
scenario amount probabilty high p low 1− p
1 £5 1 £10 0.1 £1 0.9
2 £5 1 £10 0.2 £1 0.8
3 £5 1 £10 0.3 £1 0.7
4 £5 1 £10 0.4 £1 0.6
5 £5 1 £10 0.5 £1 0.5
6 £5 1 £10 0.6 £1 0.4
7 £5 1 £10 0.7 £1 0.3
8 £5 1 £10 0.8 £1 0.2
9 £5 1 £10 0.9 £1 0.1
10 £5 1 £10 1 £1 0
Table 6: Holt and Laury scenarios
with some probability 1− p. To synchronise this idea with the Holt and
Laury procedure, 10 scenarios are presented, with a different value of
p in each scenario, with the subjects being informed that one scenario
will be randomly selected, with their choice between the show-up fee
and the lottery ticket in that scenario determining their payoff. The
scenarios presented to the subjects were as shown in Table 6.
In each of the ten scenarios, the subjects had to pick whether they
wished to keep their £5 show-up fee, or exchange it for the lottery ticket
with payoff and probabilities as specified. However, in order not to
generate the anticipation or experience of regret as a result of the Holt
and Laury procedure, rather than the main body of the experiment
itself, all subjects were informed that
Once you have made all 10 choices, at the end of the
session, one of these scenarios will be randomly picked, and
your decision in that scenario will determine your payment
for this section of the session.
Please note, for this section only, you will not learn which
scenario was picked, or be told whether you won or lost
based on any lottery tickets you may have selected. You
will simply have the correct amount included in your total
payment for the session.
Informing subjects that they would not see the resolution of uncer-
tainty, as it pertained to both the scenario selected and the outcome
of any lottery tickets they may have selected, prevents the rest of the
experiment from being impacted by the use of the Holt and Laury
procedure. Additionally, by running the Holt and Laury procedure
before the main experiment, it generates a measure of risk seeking /
risk aversion unaffected by the experience of winning, losing, regret or
disappointment, and so should give a true reflection of the underlying
risk characteristics of the subjects.
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3.5 hypotheses
Given the experimental design, there is a significant amount of infor-
mation to be gained from analysing the results. The regret literature
suggests some natural hypothesis tests in keeping with the style of
existing research in the area.
3.5.1 Hypothesis 1A
The prior experience of Type A regret makes subjects more sensitive to Type A
regret, increasing the future anticipated regret from relatively risky decisions,
and hence more likely to choose Rc over VRc at point 12 compared to Rc over
VRc at point 6.
3.5.2 Hypothesis 1B
The prior experience of Type B regret makes subjects more sensitive to Type B
regret, increasing the future anticipated regret from relatively safe decisions,
and hence more likely to choose Sc over VSc at point 8 compared to Sc over
VSc at point 10.
3.5.3 On 1A and 1B
Such hypotheses are typical in the regret literature, and appear con-
vincing because they appear to give a specific prediction about the
behaviour of individuals in the experiment. In this case, they say we
should compare “people who did regret a decision” to “people who
didn’t regret a decision” when faced with a similar decision to make
in the future. In this experiment, however, “people who did regret”
are equivalent to “losers” of the stage one gamble and “people who
didn’t regret” are equivalent to “winners” of the stage one gamble. This
creates a confounding “wealth effect”, as those who did not regret in
Hypothesis 1A have just won £6 from choosing Gamble S (correctly)47,
and those who did not regret in Hypothesis 1B have just won £14
from choosing Gamble R (correctly)48. Thus, it would be misleading to
attribute any observed change in behaviour to an experienced regret
effect when a wealth effect would be arguably much more significant49.
In order to control for such wealth effects we would need to create
two additional groups of subjects who did not “win” in stage one, but
47 For completeness, in the experiment, the observed proportion of subjects choosing Rc at
point 12 was 39.2% and the observed proportion of subjects choosing Rc at point 6 was
58.9%. Under a chi-squared test for for equality of proportions (chi2(1) = 5.1768 p = 0.023)
we would reject the null hypothesis, but draw the opposite conclusion to Hypothesis 1A,
in that more subjects chose the relatively safe option at point 6 compared to point 12.
This may be indicative of “target” wealth effects rather than traditional wealth effects.
48 For completeness, in the experiment, the observed proportion of subjects choosing Sc at
point 8 was 11.5% and the observed proportion of subjects choosing Sc at point 10 was
9.1%. A chi-squared test for for equality of proportions is not appropriate in this instance
as several cells have below 5 subjects.
49 The sums of money available to win in the experiment are neither particularly small nor
particularly significant, and are comparable, from an hourly rate perspective, to other
experiments run through the DR@W Laboratory. Thus, whilst it’s certainly possible to
argue that traditional wealth effects would play a role in the decision making process,
it may be more sensible to consider a “target” wealth effect as the source of potential
wealth confounds. That is to say, as the experiment appears to offer comparable payouts
to other similar experiments that the subjects may have participated in, they may have a
good sense of what is considered “success” and “failure”, and take decisions to ensure
they “succeed” at the expense of large upside.
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instead faced a choice between Gamble Rc and Gamble VRc (in one
group) and Gamble Sc and Gamble VSc (in the other) as a simple one
stage gamble, and then compare the percentage of people who chose Rc
(Sc) over VRc (VSc) in the one shot gamble to the percentage of people
who did equivalently having experienced regret from a similar decision
in a previous stage. Formally, this suggests two new hypotheses
3.5.4 Hypothesis 1C
The prior experience of Type A regret makes subjects more sensitive to Type A
regret, increasing the future anticipated regret from relatively risky decisions,
and hence more likely to choose Rc over VRc at point 12 compared to Rc over
VRc when faced with the choice between Rc and VRc as a one shot decision.
3.5.5 Hypothesis 1D
The prior experience of Type B regret makes subjects more sensitive to Type B
regret, increasing the future anticipated regret from relatively safe decisions,
and hence more likely to choose Sc over VSc at point 8 compared to Sc over
VSc when faced with the choice between Sc and VSc as a one shot decision.
3.5.6 On 1C and 1D
As mentioned in the previous chapter, however, note that the above
hypotheses are not the only hypotheses, including the effect of experi-
enced regret on subsequent regret aversion, which will predict the same
observed pattern of behaviour. Consider the following two hypotheses
3.5.7 Hypothesis 1E
The prior experience of Type A regret makes subjects less sensitive to Type B
regret, reducing the future anticipated regret from relatively safe decisions, and
hence more likely to choose Rc over VRc at point 12 compared to Rc over VRc
when faced with the choice between Rc and VRc as a one shot decision.50
3.5.8 Hypothesis 1F
The prior experience of Type B regret makes subjects less sensitive to Type A
regret, reducing the future anticipated regret from relatively risky decisions,
and hence more likely to choose Sc over VSc at point 8 compared to Sc over
VSc when faced with the choice between Sc and VSc as a one shot decision.
This type of effect was considered during the design of the experiment, and specifically
the hypotheses that are to be tested are made across control and treatment groups with
similar wealth levels.
50 equivalently, this hypothesis could be considered as “the experience of Type A regret
makes subjects less regret averse overall, and as subject are more concerned with Type B
regret than Type A in stage two, they are more likely to choose Rc over VRc at point 12
compared to Rc over VRc when faced with the choice between Rc and VRc as a one-shot
decision.” This style of the hypothesis is more in keeping with the research conducted in
Chapter 2, and is behaviourally equivalent.
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3.5.9 Hypothesis Equivalence
The equivalence of behavioural predictions made by 1C and 1E, and
similarly 1D and 1F, implies that this experimental set-up is not suitable
for investigating whether the experience of regret leads to a subsequent
decrease or increase in regret aversion, of any type. As such, we must
go beyond the typical and traditional hypotheses tests when analysing
the results of this experiment. Instead of working from a position of
attempting to vary the experience of regret, and hold the second stage
decision constant, we should go down a path of varying the second
stage of the experiment, in a fashion which traditional theories say
will not be affected by the experience or anticipation of regret, and
see the impact of this change on behaviour for different levels of prior
experienced regret.
3.5.10 Atypical Hypotheses
As previously discussed, conventional theories of how experienced
regret influences subsequent decisions focus on changing some quantifi-
able aspect of the decision, without explaining the mechanism through
which this experience of regret operates. Specifically, they fail to specify
how the recurrence of actions, as opposed to decisions, will influence
this mechanism. This experiment allows us to test whether the action is
indeed relevant in the transmission mechanism of experienced regret
to subsequent decision making. By specifying a control group, which
will be faced with a similar decision in stage two as they did in stage
one, but will not see the exact same actions as were presented in stage
one, and comparing the decisions taken to a treatment group, who face
exactly the same stage one and stage two decisions as the control group,
but see a recurrence of one action from stage one, we can test whether
the experience of regret is transmitted to subsequent choice behaviour
through a link to actions. Specifically,
3.5.11 Hypothesis 2A
The experience of regret from a particular action, and emotional link to a
subsequent recurrence of that action, will influence the decision made by
subjects at point 7, when a previously regretted action reoccurs, compared to
the equivalent decision taken at point 8, when the previously regretted action
does not reoccur. Thus, the proportion of subjects choosing the relatively safe
option, VS, at point 7 will be different to the proportion of subjects choosing
the relatively safe option, VSc, at point 8.
3.5.12 Hypothesis 2B
The experience of regret from a particular action, and emotional link to a
subsequent recurrence of that action, will influence the decision made by
subjects at point 11, when a previously regretted action reoccurs, compared to
the equivalent decision taken at point 12, when the previously regretted action
does not reoccur. Thus, the proportion of subjects choosing the relatively safe
option, R, at point 11 will be different to the proportion of subjects choosing
the relatively safe option, Rc, at point 12.
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3.5.13 Control Hypotheses
Hypotheses 2A and 2B predict the existence of a reason (experienced
regret linked to an action) for a change in the proportion of subjects who
will choose a (relatively) safe gamble over a (relatively) risky gamble
between the control and treatment groups. However, there are plenty
of other reasons that one could imagine will have a non-negligible
effect on different choice behaviour between the control and treatment
groups. For example, in the control group at point 12, the relatively safe
option will win if the two dice generate the number 00. However, in the
treatment group at point 11, the relatively risky option will win if the
one die generates the number 0. Hence, should subjects, on average,
have an aversion to making a decision which is reliant on observing
the number zero to win, either in the form of 00 or 0, then this would
imply subjects being more likely to choose the (relatively) risky option
at point 12, yet subjects being more likely to choose the (relatively)
safe option at point 11, despite these decisions being mathematically
equivalent. Such a preference would generate a positive result when
testing Hypothesis 2B, with no need for an explanation involving the
experience of regret from a particular action at a prior stage. This effect
is defined as the “inherent action aversion”.
Two other common explanations for biases in repeated gambling
behaviour are the “Gambler’s Fallacy” and “Hot Hand” effects. The
Gambler’s Fallacy, “...expecting outcomes in random sequences to
exhibit systematic reversals” (Rabin and Vayanos [72, p730]), could
be applied in this experiment if experimental participants “...believe
mechanical randomizers ... exhibit sequential tendencies” (Keren and
Lewis [55, p75]), and believe that the die used to resolve the gambles in
stage two is the same die as used to resolve the gambles in stage one51.
In which case, having observed the die land on a number between 0 and
6 in stage one, those participants at point 11 may believe that a number
between 7 and 9 has a greater than 30% probability of occurring at
stage two, compared to those subjects at point 12, who have the gamble
resolved by two die instead of one, and hence are unaffected by the
fallacy. This theory would predict that subjects are more likely to choose
Gamble R at point 11 compared to Gamble Rc at point 12. As with the
above aversion to the number zero, this belief would cause a positive
result to a test of Hypothesis 2B, without any need for a an experienced
regret explanation.
The Hot Hand effect, defined as “...as a belief in the continuation of
streaks” [72, p733], applied in this context as a belief that a “winner”
will keep on winning, and a “loser” will keep on losing, would predict
that “losers”, who experienced regret in stage one, would behave more
conservatively52 than those who won. This theory, however, does not
predict a difference in behaviour between control and treatment groups,
conditional on “losing” at stage one, as is evident in Hypotheses 2A
and 2B.
As such, we have two possible confounding effects, of the Gambler’s
Fallacy and the “inherent action aversion”, which would give the same
hypotheses tests as Hypothesis 2A and 2B. However, both of the alter-
native explanations also make predictions about behaviour of subjects
51 this is true, but not specified to the participants in advance of making their decision.
52 under the assumption that the larger payoff constitutes “winning” more than the smaller
payoff
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when they haven’t experienced regret from stage one. Specifically, the
Gambler’s Fallacy predicts that, for example, if those subjects at point
11 have a stronger preference for R than subjects at point 12 have for
Rc, then subjects at point 5 would have an equally strong preference
for R when compared to the preference of subjects at point 6 have for
Rc. That is to say, the effect of the Gambler’s Fallacy is not conditional
on the choice of the subject on stage one, merely conditional on the
observed roll of the die, which is the same (a number between 0 and 6)
for all subjects at points 5, 6, 11 and 12.
In a similar vein, there is no reason why any inherent action aversion
would be conditional upon the choice, and hence the emotional experi-
ence, of the subject at stage one, and hence such an explanation would
predict the same difference in behaviour between control and treatment
groups for both those who experienced regret, and those who did not
experience regret.
In contrast, the hypothesis that the experience of regret from a par-
ticular action creates an emotional link to a subsequent recurrence of
that action, implies that there would only be a difference in behaviour
between the control and treatment group under the experience of re-
gret, and not when there is no experience of regret from the first stage.
Hence, we can differentiate between “regret-based” hypotheses and
“non-regret-based” hypotheses, by the following control hypotheses.
3.5.14 Hypothesis 3A
In the absence of the experience of regret from stage one, there is no inherent
preference, or bias resulting from the observation of the resolution of uncer-
tainty at stage one, which causes subjects to choose differently between the
control and treatment groups at stage two. Hence, the proportion of subjects
choosing the relatively safe option, VS, at point 9, will be no different to the
proportion of subjects choosing the relatively safe option, VSc, at point 10.
3.5.15 Hypothesis 3B
In the absence of the experience of regret from stage one, there is no inherent
preference, or bias resulting from the observation of the resolution of uncer-
tainty at stage one, which causes subjects to choose differently between the
control and treatment groups at stage two. Hence, the proportion of subjects
choosing the relatively safe option, R, at point 5, will be no different to the
proportion of subjects choosing the relatively safe option, Rc, at point 6.
3.5.16 Expectation for the results of the hypotheses
Based on standard regret theories, the most predictable result would be
a failure of Hypotheses 2A and 2B, and a success of Hypotheses 3A and
3B, thereby implying that simply framing the decision problem in terms
of a repeated, previously regretted action, has no effect on the choice
made in stage two. However, should Hypotheses 2A and 2B succeed,
and Hypotheses 3A and 3B fail, there would be reason to believe that
the experience and association of regret to a particular action is not
the primary cause of a difference in observed behaviour between the
control and treatment groups. Should all four hypotheses fail, we would
need to revisit the proposed emotional attachment theories altogether.
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However, should all four hypotheses succeed, it would imply that
there is an emotional link between the experience of regret and the
subsequent recurrence of the action which caused the regret, causing a
change in behaviour when that action is part of a subsequent decision,
thus implying it is not sufficient to model the effect of the experience
of regret on subsequent choice without reference to the context and
action, in addition to the decision, which was taken in the first stage.
3.6 experimental confounds
The design of this experiment necessarily introduces a potential con-
found when discussing hypotheses and interpreting the results. As we
are looking at a two stage experimental design, as per the decision tree
in 51, whilst we may get a random sample of the student population
at stage one of the experiment, we will certainly not get a random
sample of the population in each of boxes 1, 2, 3 and 4 for the start of
stage two. The left side of the decision tree at stage two is entered by
those participants who chose S at stage one, which is the relatively safe
option. The right hand side is entered by those participants who chose
R at stage one, which is the relatively risky option. Therefore, in simple
terms, we would expect the left hand side of the tree to be comprised of
more risk averse participants, and the right hand side to be comprised
of more risk seeking participants53.
The effect of this confound is two-fold. First, any hypotheses which
rely on comparisons between groups across the “left – right” tree divide
(i.e. anything from triangle 5 through 8 against anything from triangle
9 through 12) are subject to the argument that the difference in risk
aversion in the samples is a possible cause for the experimental result.
Second, any hypotheses which rely on comparisons between groups
exclusively within their branch of the tree (either left or right) may
generate a result which is only applicable to either risk averse (left) or
risk seeking (right) people.
The first of these effects is more significant and important than the
second.
Thinking about the second, applicability is always a concern in exper-
imental economics; usually discussed from the point of external validity
or “parallelism” of an entire experiment. To the extent that there is
a theoretical reason to believe that the results are only applicable to
one “type” of person, the experiment can easily be repeated on a new
sample of people who may be more risk averse / seeking than this
sample, and this hypothesis can be tested.
The first effect must be more carefully navigated, as there is always
reason to believe risk aversion may drive decisions made under risk.
However, in contrast to the typical hypotheses tested in regret exper-
iments (as discussed with respect to hypotheses 1A through 1F), the
hypotheses being tested in this experiment (2A through 3B) are only
made within a branch of the tree (either left or right). This should
alleviate the concerns of the possible confound with respect to any of
these individual hypotheses.
53 This expectation is confirmed by analysing the results of the Holt and Laury procedure
separately for those who chose R at stage one to those who chose S. Amongst those who
chose R the mean number of safe choices made was 5.5, whereas amongst those who
chose S, the average was 6.3. This is a significant difference at the 1% level, according to
a two sample t-test.
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3.7 the experiment
The experiment was run at The University of Warwick, over the 29th
and 30th November 2011 and the 2nd December 201454, in the DR@W
(Decision Research at Warwick) Laboratory in the Department of Eco-
nomics. Over the three days, there were 21 hour-long sessions run.
Participants were recruited from the DR@W Participants Database,
consisting of around 1400 students and staff from the University of War-
wick, with the majority of participants being in their first and second
year of undergraduate study. All participants who had registered for
invitations to laboratory experiments were invited to sign up, with first
priority being offered to those who had never missed an experimental
session which they had signed up for. In total, there were 420 spaces
available to which interested participants could assign themselves55,
and 376 participants indicated a willingness to participate in the ex-
periment, leaving spaces in some of the sessions, which happened
for the later run sessions on the 29th and 30th November 2011. The
invitation email which was sent to all participants in the database is
included in Appendix B. Of the 376 participants who signed up to
participate, 344 showed up over the three days. Summary statistics of
the 344 participants are also given in Appendix B.
Of the 21 sessions, 11 were designated as “control sessions” and 10
were designated as “treatment sessions”. As the experiment was run
in a simple web-browser, the path through the experiment (i.e. the
sequence of webpages which every participant would see) was only
possible to specify on a per-session basis, and not on a per-participant
basis. Thus, in order to generate true randomisation between treatment
and control groups, we were reliant on participants randomly allocating
themselves across the treatment and control sessions.
A very detailed experimental procedure is given in Appendix B, but
is summarised as follows. On entering the laboratory, each participant
randomly chose a slip of paper which specified a unique participant
ID number, which would be used to identify their responses across the
experiment. This ensured anonymity of subject responses, as the ID
number was not known to the experimenter. Once in the laboratory,
and seated at a random computer terminal, all participants were read
a set of instructions, as presented in Appendix B.3.6. They then pro-
gressed throughout the experiment without further instruction from
the experimenter. The experiment took approximately 45 minutes to
complete.
Once all subjects in a given session had completed the experiment,
they were read, and paid according to, a set of payment instructions, as
given in Appendix B.3.7. Their payment was calculated as the sum of
the result of their choice and the resolution of the gambles from stages
one and two, and the result of the Holt and Laury[38] procedure56. The
54 additional sessions were requested to be run upon submission of the original thesis,
hence the extended delay between the first and second set
55 a maximum of 20 in each of the 21 sessions
56 to recap, of the 10 scenarios presented using the modified Holt and Laury procedure,
one was randomly selected by a random number generator. If the participant chose to
keep their £5 show-up fee for this scenario, this was added to their payment. If they
chose to gamble in this scenario, the outcome of the gamble was resolved according to
the given probabilities, using a second random number generator. If the participant won
the gamble, £10 was added to their payment. If they lost the gamble, £1 was added to
their payment
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(1) (2)
c1 Safe Choice? c1 Safe Choice?
Age 0.000549 0.000803
(0.946) (0.921)
Male (d) -0.0671 -0.0591
(0.204) (0.267)
A-level maths (d) -0.0398 -0.0303
(0.569) (0.670)
Time of session (24hr) -0.00404 -0.00265
(0.766) (0.846)
2014 session (d) 0.0475 0.0513
(0.377) (0.343)
EV Correct (d) -0.0139 -0.0210
(0.799) (0.703)
HL Safe Choices 0.0523∗∗∗
(0.000)
Observations 344 344
Pseudo R2 0.009 0.039
Marginal effects; p-values in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 7: Probit model showing determinants of stage one choice. Shown are the
marginal effects of each independent variable, evaluated at the mean.
mean participant payment was £12.45 for a 45 minute session, which
equates to an average hourly pay rate of £16.60.
3.8 results
3.8.1 Stage one
For every subject, stage one offered the choice between Gamble R and
Gamble S, with Gamble R considered relatively risky and Gamble
S considered relatively safe. As such, we can characterise the choice
simply by stating whether they preferred the safe choice (Gamble S) or
not. As this variable is a dummy variable, an appropriate regression
model to use is a cross-sectional probit model, where the dependent
variable takes the value of 1 if the subject chose the safe option in stage
one, and 0 otherwise. A range of individual specific characteristics,
measured by responses to the post experiment questionnaire, are tested
for their predictive power on the stage one choice, and the results of
this analysis, using the probit model, are given in column 1 in Table 7.
Two of the characteristics relate to the subjects inherent mathemat-
ical ability, as measured by their previous study (A-Level Maths) and
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gamble r gamble s
Number 18 189
As a % of subjects who suffered
no stage one regret
8.70 91.30
As a % of total subjects 5.23 54.94
Table 8: Choices of subjects who won in stage one
whether or not they could correctly calculate a simple expected value
(EV Correct). 2014 session is a dummy variable indicating that the subject
participated in the repeat sessions in 2014 as opposed to the original
sessions in 2011. No characteristics were found to be significant at the
5% level.
Column 2 in Table 7 takes the probit model fitted in column 1, and
adds an additional explanatory variable, of the number of safe choices
(choosing the fixed show-up fee over the lottery ticket) made by the
subject, out of 10 scenarios, from the incentivised response to the
Holt and Laury procedure57. As would be expected, risk aversion, as
displayed by the response to the Holt and Laury procedure is a highly
significant predictor of risk aversion in the stage one gamble, with no
other variables significant at the 5% level in this version of the model.
In total, 116 (33.72%) of the subjects chose Gamble R (relatively
risky) in stage one, and 228 (66.28%) chose Gamble S (relatively safe),
indicating a preference, on average, for the safe gamble. However, from
the percentages, it is clear that there was no “obvious” choice, which
would have reduced the likelihood of the result of stage one generating
experienced regret.
Due to the randomisation of the selection of videos of the ten-sided
die being rolled, the probability that, in any given session, Gamble S
won was 0.7, and hence the probability that Gamble R won was 0.3.
However, the small sample (only 21 sessions) meant that, in reality, 18
of the 21 sessions (85.71%) resulted in Gamble S winning, and only 3 of
the 21 sessions (14.29%) had Gamble R winning. This translated, due
to the small variance in the number of subjects per session, into 287 of
344 (83.43%) of subjects experiencing a roll of the die where Gamble
S was the ex-post optimal choice, and 57 of 218 (16.57%) of subjects
experiencing a roll of the die where Gamble R was the ex-post optimal
choice.
The result of both the choices of the subjects, and the resolution of
uncertainty, in stage one, as displayed Tables 8 and 9, shows that 137
(39.82%) of subjects experienced some form of regret from stage one,
with 98 experiencing Type A58 regret, and 39 experiencing Type B59
regret. In the language of the Figure 51, this implies that of the 344
57 a higher number for this variable indicates a higher degree of risk aversion, though
a response of exactly 10 indicates a subject who did not understand the question, as
the final scenario offers the subjects a 100% chance of winning £10, if they choose the
“risky” lottery ticket. 5 subjects displayed this failure to understand, and hence are
excluded from subsequent regression and statistical analysis, along with 3 other subjects
who self-reported that they did not understand certain aspects of the Holt and Laury
procedure
58 choosing gamble R, and regretting not being more conservative
59 choosing Gamble S and regretting not being more speculative
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gamble r gamble s
Number 98 39
As a % of subjects who suffered
stage one regret
71.53 28.47
As a % of total subjects 28.49 11.33
Table 9: Choices of subjects who lost in stage one
experienced regret at stage one
saw stage 2a saw stage 2b
Control Treatment Control Treatment
# of subjects 52 46 26 13
Group # on Figure 51 12 11 8 7
Table 10: How many participants fell into each stage two group? For those
who did experience regret at stage one
subjects who started the experiment, 18 end up in group 1, 189 end up
in group 2, 98 end up in group 3 and 39 end up in group 4.
3.8.2 Result of the randomisation
As previously stated, each session was designated either a control or
treatment session, and all the subjects in a given session saw the same
sequence of gambles. Additionally, as Figure 51 indicates, those who
fell into groups 1 and 4 after stage one saw stage 2B as the second
stage, and those who fell into groups 2 and 3 after stage one saw stage
2A as the second stage. Given Tables 8 and 9, indicating the number
of subjects who experienced each type of regret and also those who
experienced no regret, we can now define the numbers of subjects
who fell into each of the stage two groups given this process. This
information is displayed in Tables 10 and 11.
As there were only 3 sessions where the safe choice from stage one
was the losing choice, Tables 10 and 11 show this corresponds into a
low number of subjects falling into groups 7, 8, 9 and 10. As some of
our hypotheses rely on comparisons between these groups, there is
likely to be a problem of achieving statistical significance due to the
no regret at stage one
saw stage 2a saw stage 2b
Control Treatment Control Treatment
# of subjects 96 93 11 7
Group # on Figure 51 6 5 10 9
Table 11: How many participants fell into each stage two group? For those who
did not experience regret at stage one
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low numbers. An issue also arises as the randomisation was done on a
session, not subject level, meaning 2 sessions were control and only 1
was treatment. We will return to this issue later, but will, for now, focus
on sessions where the safe choice in stage one was the winning choice.
For those subjects who ended up in groups “5 and 6” & “11 and 12”,
however, the randomisation procedure appears to have had the desired
effect, with close to 50% of the subjects from the previous buckets
falling into each group. It is possible, however, that the randomisation
accidentally selected subjects with specific characteristics, which could
be correlated with their decision making at stage two. To check this, we
can run a probit regression, with the variable indicating whether the
subject attended a treatment session or not, as the dependent variable,
and all of our measurable subject-specific characteristics as independent
variables. The results of this, for subjects in sessions where the safe
choice in stage one was the winning choice, are given in Table 12.
Column 1 of Table 12 shows a highly significant positive correlation
between having an A-Level maths, or equivalent, qualification, and the
probability that you attended a treatment session. Notice that this is
even controlling for whether or not you can calculate a simple expected
value. This significance remains when we introduce additional regres-
sors in the second reported regression, in the form of the results of the
Big 5 personality test60. Given there may be an accidental relationship
between mathematical ability and whether or not you were in the con-
trol or treatment, it is worth keeping this relationship in mind when
calculating the effect of the treatment on choice behaviour at stage two.
3.8.3 Stage two
Lack of subjects in groups 7, 8, 9 and 10 and experimental design
As outlined above, there is a noticeable shortage of subjects who fell
into groups 7, 8, 9 and 10. A typical rule of thumb used in economics
experiments is that 30 subjects per cell is required as a sensible start-
ing point for analysis61, so falling below this threshold is obviously
concerning.
As always with experiments, the limiting factor is resources. With
only 7 subjects falling into group 9, the simple conclusion is that is
would take an experiment approximately four times as long and four
times as expensive to generate sufficient data to produce the necessary
sample sizes in all cells. As the experimental sessions run to date cost a
total of £4283 to pay participants, one which costs four times as much
is beyond the reach of all but the most well-funded research groups.
However, this may be an overestimate as the experimental design
choice of “session specific die rolls” rather than “subject specific die
rolls” implies the variance around the expectation of how many subjects
should fall into each group is higher. Thus, to estimate the true expected
funding the experiment requires in order to have at least 30 subjects
60 the Big 5 personality test, used in this experiment, is a 44 question personality survey,
where subjects must answer to what degree they associate with specific types of behaviour
(for example, “I am someone who is inventive”) on a 5 point Likert scale. It is commonly
used in psychology and produces a measure of personality in five key areas: extraversion,
agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism and openness. (See John et al. [43] and
John et al. [44])
61 though, as List et al. [57] point out, this rule “...has little basis in terms of power unless
the researcher believes that he wants to detect an approximately 0.70 standard deviation
change in the outcome variable” (p449)
(1) (2)
Treatment? Treatment?




Male (d) -0.108 -0.116
(0.082) (0.079)
A-level maths (d) 0.230∗∗ 0.227∗∗
(0.003) (0.004)













Pseudo R2 0.031 0.037
Marginal effects; p-values in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 12: Probit model showing subject-specific characteristics as correlates
with the allocation to a treatment or control session. Shown are the
marginal effects of each independent variable, evaluated at the mean.
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Figure 52: Experiment Group Probability Chart
fall into each group, we should consider the design where individuals
receive subject specific rolls of the dice, and combine the observed
decision frequencies with the true win / loss probabilities.
As can be seen from Figure 52, only 5% of subjects would be expected
to fall into groups 9 and 10 based on the observed decision probabilities
at stage 1 and the expected probabilities given by subject-specific die
rolls. Therefore, to get a minimum of 30 subjects in each group, you
would need a pool of 600 subjects to enter the lab. Given the observed
average per participant payment of £12.45, this would imply a payment
fund of approximately £750062. As such a large payment fund was not
available, it was simply not possible to generate a new, or extend the
current, experimental design to meet these objectives.
One potential solution to this problem is the use of deception. By
manipulating the true probabilities of the stage one gambles to be
closer to 50/50 (rather than the 70/30 indicated to participants), you
are able to move more subjects towards groups 9 and 10 at the expense
of additional subjects in cells 5 and 6. Indeed, if the stage one gambles
are simply resolved as a function of what was chosen in stage one, then
62 Additional funding would also be necessary to build a custom experimental website
where subject specific outcomes (as opposed to session specific) can be tracked, as the
University of Warwick Sitebuilder system does not currently permit this. Cost estimates
of taking this approach ranged between £1000 and £3000.
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control treatment
Gamble Rc Gamble VRc Gamble R Gamble VR
% of subjects 52.03 47.97 68.35 31.65
Table 13: Stage two choice by treatment for groups 5, 6, 11 and 12
you can perfectly ensure that exactly 1/8 of the subjects fall into each
of the final groups.
This approach is problematic, however, for two reasons. Firstly, this
experiment was run by an economist in an economics department
laboratory, and the status-quo is that “...[economists] almost never use
deception” (Roth [79]) for fear of polluting the well for other researchers
who will rely on a subject’s belief that the information they have been
given is true. This viewpoint is enforced by the rules of the DR@W lab
which no not permit studies that use deception. The second reason it is
problematic is one of practicalities. Even if deception were permitted,
the cost of resources and effort required, in order to successfully rig the
experiment so that it is both simultaneously perfectly deceptive and
perfectly believable to the subjects who participate, may actually be
higher than just doing the experiment without any deception at all.
Primary analysis on groups 5, 6, 11 and 12
As such, we will restrict most of our analysis to those cells where a
good quantity of data was available given the present experimental
design. Specifically, we will look at those subjects who faced stage 2A,
as a result of Gamble S being the winning gamble from stage one, and
hence were in groups “5 and 6” & “11 and 12” in stage two.
As described in the design of the experiment, the gambles in stage
two were chosen so as to be close to indifference for a large number of
the subjects, with the aim that the experience (or lack thereof) of regret
from stage one would be sufficient to induce a significantly observable
difference in behaviour at stage two. As such, we need neither Gamble
R (or Gamble Rc in the control group) nor Gamble VR (or Gamble VRc
in the control group) to be clearly preferable for the average subject,
in order to generate some variance in behaviour at the second stage.
Table 13 shows the proportion of subjects who chose each gamble in
stage two, as a fraction of the total number who faced a choice which
involved that gamble (i.e. conditional on whether they were in the
treatment or control group).
Looking at the control group, the percentage of subjects choosing the
relative safe (Gamble Rc) and relatively risky (Gamble VRc) options
is approximately equal63, suggesting the gambles can be considered
very close to indifference for the average subject. This indicates we have
developed a suitable second stage environment in which to study the
impact of experienced regret from the first stage.
Noticeably, however, the proportion of subjects who chose the math-
ematically equivalent gambles (Gamble R and Gamble VR) in the
treatment group is different64 from the control group, suggesting that
63 a chi-square test for equality of proportions does not reject the null of no difference
64 using the sample proportions from the control group, the observed frequencies in the
treatment group differ from expectation with a chi-squared value of 14.831, hence this
result is significant the 1% level
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control treatment
Gamble Sc Gamble VSc Gamble S Gamble VS
% of subjects 10.81 89.19 20.00 80.00
Table 14: Stage two choice by treatment for groups 7, 8, 9 and 10
% of subjects choosing safe
option
control treatment
who experienced regret at stage one 39.21 58.94
who experienced no regret at stage one 59.09 71.91
Table 15: Percentage of subjects who chose the relatively safe option at stage
two, conditional on being in groups 5, 6, 11 or 12
the treatment, of having the same action from stage one repeat in stage
two, had some effect on choice behaviour. It is not possible to say, sim-
ply from this level of data, however, whether the hypotheses outlined
earlier are true or false, in that the cause for this change in behaviour
was the experience of regret at stage one.
Secondary analysis on groups 7, 8, 9 and 10
For completeness, we also present the same descriptive statistics for
those students who fell into groups “7 and 8” & “9 and 10” in Table 14.
These results show a clear preference for the very safe gambles65.
3.8.4 Testing the hypotheses
Breaking the data up further66 allows us to observe the choice behaviour
at stage two, dependent not just on whether the subject was in the
control or treatment group, but dependent on whether or not the subject
experienced regret resulting from their choice at stage one. Table 15
indicates the percentage of subjects who chose the relatively safe option
(Gamble R or Gamble Rc), broken down by both treatment/control and
also the experience of regret at stage one.
This data allows us to run preliminary tests on the experimental
hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2A
The limited number of subjects who fell into groups 7 and 8 (13 and 26
respectively) prevents us from interpreting meaningful results from a
test of Hypothesis 2A, but the data is presented for completeness. It is
tested in the simplest fashion as
H0 : proportion of subjects choosing VS at point 7 =
proportion of subjects choosing VSc at point 8
65 An equivalent set of chi-squared tests are not possible in this case as several of the
observed and expected frequencies fall below 5
66 specifically for those subjects in groups 5, 6, 11 and 12, and excluding those 8 subjects
who were unable to understand the Holt and Laury procedure
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# who chose relatively risky option 3 3
# who chose relatively safe option 23 10
% who chose relatively safe option 88.5% 76.9%
χ2 test for equality of proportions: χ2(1) = 0.8864 p = 0.346
Table 16: χ2 test of Hypothesis 2A
treatment control
# who chose relatively risky
option
18 31
# who chose relatively safe
option
26 20
% who chose relatively safe
option
59.1% 39.2%
χ2test for equality of proportions: χ2(1) = 3.7361 p = 0.053
Table 17: χ2 test of Hypothesis 2B
H1 : proportion of subjects choosing VS at point 7 6=
proportion of subjects choosing VSc at point 8
using a chi-squared test for equality of proportions. This is reported in
16.
Hypothesis 2B
Hypothesis 2B, as stated on page 149, posits that “...the proportion of
subjects choosing the relatively safe option, R, at point 11 will be different to
the proportion of subjects choosing the relatively safe option, Rc, at point 12.”
This can be tested in the simplest fashion as
H0 : proportion of subjects choosing R at point 11 =
proportion of subjects choosing Rc at point 12
H1 : proportion of subjects choosing R at point 11 6=
proportion of subjects choosing Rc at point 12
using a chi-squared test for equality of proportions. This is reported in
17.
Table 17 shows that the although the difference in proportion of
subjects choosing R at point 11, compared to Rc at point 12, is approxi-
mately 20 percentage points, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis
H0 in favour of the alternative hypothesis H1 at the 5% level (p = 0.053),
though clearly this is very close to the threshold. Thus, in the strictest
sense, this represents a failure of Hypothesis 2B. However, dividing
the sample into those who participated in the original sessions (in
2011) and those who participated in the later sessions (in 2014), as per
Table 18, shows that there was a difference across the sessions, with the
sample from the original sessions choosing in support of Hypothesis
2B, and those from the later sessions against Hypothesis 2B.
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treatment control
% who chose relatively safe
option in original sessions
58.1% 30.0%
% who chose relatively safe
option in later sessions
61.5% 52.4%
χ2test for original sessions: χ2(1) = 4.8673 p = 0.027
χ2test for later sessions: χ2(1) = 0.2731 p = 0.601
Table 18: χ2 test of Hypothesis 2B by session
treatment control
# who chose relatively risky option 1 1
# who chose relatively safe option 6 10
% who chose relatively safe option 85.7% 90.9%
Table 19: data for Hypothesis 3A
Hypothesis 3A
As with Hypothesis 2A the limited number of subjects who fell into
groups 9 and 10 (7 and 11 respectively) prevents us from interpret-
ing meaningful results from a test of Hypothesis 3A, but the data is
presented for completeness. It is tested in the simplest fashion as
H0 : proportion of subjects choosing VS at point 9 =
proportion of subjects choosing VSc at point 10
H1 : proportion of subjects choosing VS at point 9 6=
proportion of subjects choosing VSc at point 10
however the low count of participants in the cells makes a chi-squared
test for for equality of proportions not possible. This data is reported in
Table 19.
Hypothesis 3B
Hypothesis 3B, as stated on page 151, posits that “...the proportion of
subjects choosing the relatively safe option, R, at point 5, will be no different
to the proportion of subjects choosing the relatively safe option, Rc, at point 6.”
This can be tested in the simplest fashion as
H0 : proportion of subjects choosing R at point 5 = pro-
portion of subjects choosing Rc at point 6
H1 : proportion of subjects choosing R at point 5 6= pro-
portion of subjects choosing Rc at point 6
using a chi-squared test for for equality of proportions. This is reported
in Table 20.
Table 20 shows that the difference in proportion of subjects choosing
R at point 5, compared to Rc at point 6, is approximately 13 percentage
points, but we are unable to reject the null hypothesis in favour of
the alternative, at the 5% level (p = 0.065). The result, that we fail to
reject the null hypothesis, supports Hypothesis 3B. However, it should
be noted that, as with Hypothesis 2B, we are particularly close to the
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treatment control
# who chose relatively risky option 25 39
# who chose relatively safe option 64 56
% who chose relatively safe option 71.95% 58.9%
χ2 test for for equality of proportions: χ2(1) = 3.4038 p = 0.065
Table 20: χ2 test of Hypothesis 3B
hypothesis pass / fail
2A lack of data
2B FAIL (just)
3A lack of data
3B PASS (just)
Table 21: Summary of hypothesis tests
threshold for finding a significant difference in the preference for the
relatively safe option between the control and treatment groups.
3.8.5 Summary of the results
As presented in Table 21 and discussed in 3.5.16, a failure of Hypothesis
2B, but a success of Hypothesis 3B represents the conclusion that
simply framing the decision problem in terms of a repeated, previously
regretted action, has no effect on the choice made in stage two. However,
as both hypotheses were close to the boundary between success and
failure, it is worth considering a broader interpretation of the results
that looks at a wide range of reasons why we may have seen the
results unfold as they ultimately did. In any case, the combination
of both an unclear conclusion, and the lack of data to test certain
hypotheses, suggests more work should be conducted in this area to
better understand the problem at hand.
3.9 analysis of the results
In this section we will explore four possible explanations for the ob-




4. Small changes in context are simply not important for most people
3.9.1 Insufficient sensitivity
As will be discussed extensively in 3.10, the experimental set-up used
is certainly not ideal for generating a meaningful experience of regret,
and then measuring small changes to future regret aversion, split out
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into action and decision components. In brief, a lab set-up where
relatively small sums of money are at play, and true responsibility for
choices is hard to generate, is far from ideal conditions. However, as the
significance test on Hypothesis 2B was particularly close to the usual
threshold, one plausible conclusion is that there really is a meaningful
result to be found here67, but simply our experiment was not sensitive
enough to detect it. Alternatively this can be thought of as saying
despite our best efforts to control the experiment in the lab, there was
simply too much noise from other sources to mask the effect of the
treatment on those who experienced regret.
As what we are looking to identify is the additional effect of the
treatment68 on those who experienced regret, compared to those who
didn’t, we can try an alternative formulation of the hypotheses which
attempts to control for the other sources of variation between the control
and treatment groups, not related to the experience regret69. In theory,
this makes our effect of interest easier to identify. Doing this requires
a “difference-in-difference” model, which can be formulated70, using
interactive dummies, as follows:
P(safe choice in stage two)i = c+α1Ti+α2Ri+α3TiRi+ εi (3.1)
where Ti is a dummy indicating that subject i was in a treatment ses-
sion, and Ri is a dummy indicating that subject i experienced regret in
stage one. Under this formulation α3 represents the additional effect of
the treatment on those who experienced regret at stage one, compared
to those who didn’t. That is to say, the effect of seeing a previously
regretted action, over and above any other effects of the treatment on
the control group71.
Estimating and interpreting this formulation is easiest using a logit
model where the dependent variable is measured in the odds metric
rather than in the probability metric (Buis [14]). Under this model, the
constant term is interpreted as “baseline” odds, where all the dummies
are set to zero. That is to say, the odds of a subject, in the control
condition who did not experience regret in stage one, choosing the
relatively safe option compared to the relatively risky option in stage
two. The coefficient α1 then becomes the multiplicative effect of being
in the treatment condition compared to the control condition. Our
coefficient of interest α3 then tells us by how much the effect of the
treatment differs between those who experienced regret in stage one
and those who did not, and hence we are looking at the significance of
this coefficient as a test of our primary hypothesis. The results of this
67 where the result is that a link between regret and the action which caused the experience
of regret, will impact choice behaviour when the action reappears in a future decision.
This implies that the context and circumstance which the initial decision was taken under
plays a more meaningful role in the experience of regret than traditional regret-based
theories, which often use a modified version of a non-expected utility framework, have
accounted for.
68 of a subject seeing in stage two, an action that they previously saw in stage one
69 potentially an inherent action aversion
70 reference to the “safe choice” in stage two more precisely refers to the relatively safe choice
in stage two
71 as discussed in the design of the experiment, we had assumed the effects of the treatment
on the control group would be zero







Was regret experienced in stage one? 0.449∗
(0.024)
Multiplicative treatment regret dummy 1.256
(0.664)
Observations 279
Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 22: Logit model showing the determinants of choice at stage two for those
in groups 5, 6, 11 and 12. Shown are the multiplicative effects of each
independent variable on the odds ratio.
regression72, for those subjects who fell in groups 5, 6, 11 and 1273, are
presented in Table 22.
Table 22 shows a significant effect of the experience of regret in stage
one on the odds of choosing the safe option in stage two for those
who were in the control group. As the effect size is less than 1, this is
interpreted as the experience of regret reducing the odds of choosing
the safe option in stage two. As experiencing regret in stage one is
equivalent to “losing” in stage one, this is consistent with a “target
earnings” strategy, whereby those subjects who lost in stage one need
to behave in a more risky fashion in stage two in order to achieve their
earnings goal for the session.
Also significant at the 10% level is the effect of the treatment on
the odds of choosing the safe option in stage two, for those who did
not experience regret in stage one. This is a more peculiar result, as
the treatment was designed to have no effect on those in the control
group. The effect size is greater than 1, indicating those who were in
the treatment group were more likely to chose the safe option in stage
two compared to the control group, conditional on being a “winner” in
the first stage.
The most plausible causal explanation is that, for those in the treat-
ment group, though they picked (and won) by choosing Gamble S
in the first stage, they equivalently saw Gamble R lose in stage one.
This result then suggests that they were more likely to choose Gamble
R (over Gamble VR) in stage two, compared to the mathematically
equivalent Gamble Rc (over Gamble VRc) in the control group. This
can be interpreted as evidence in support of the Gambler’s Fallacy, or
72 The dependent variable “SCS2” stands for “Was the relatively safe choice made in stage
two?”
73 again, we are looking at just these groups due to the lack of subjects in groups 7, 8, 9 and
10, and also controlling for the possibility that Type A regret may work in different ways
to Type B regret
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the “law of small numbers”, in that there was an expectation of Gamble
R being more likely to win in the second stage because they saw it lose
in the first stage. This belief in the “law of small numbers” would, in
this experiment, imply that subjects who observed a roll of the single
die, between 0 and 6 in stage one, would predict a greater than 30%
chance of observing a roll between 7 and 9 in stage two74.
As such, the Gambler’s Fallacy does indeed explain the significance
and direction of α2. Those who experienced regret in stage one, and fell
into the treatment group, were more likely to select Gamble R, which
resolves in their favour if a number between 7 and 9 is rolled (which,
due to the Gambler’s Fallacy, they now believe is more probable) com-
pared to had they fallen into the control group, where the uncertainty
in stage two is resolved by the combination of two dice, of which the
subjects had observed no previous rolls.
However, our primary hypothesis, that the α3 coefficient would be
significant, is shown to be false, as the p-value is equal to 0.664. Thus,
even when controlling for the effect of target earning wealth effects and
the law of small numbers, we do not see an effect of action regret, as
distinct from decision regret, on the choice made in stage two. We will
explore potential reasons for this in the subsequent sections.
3.9.2 Experimental confounds
As indicated earlier, there were certain characteristics of the subjects
which appeared to be correlated with both the allocation to the treat-
ment and control groups, and the choices made in stage one. These
were the past mathematical background of the subjects, and also the
underlying risk preference as given by the Holt and Laury procedure.
These correlations could possibly be driving the results shown in 3.9.1
(specifically the significance of α1 and α2, and hence potentially the
insignificance of α3) rather than any underlying theoretical reasons.
As such, we would want to control for these characteristics of the sub-
jects and repeat the analysis shown in Table 22. This can be achieved by
including the potential confounding variables as additional regressors
in Equation 3.1. The results of this are shown in Table 23.
As shown in Table 23, very little changes in terms of the significance
of α1, α2 and α3 through the addition of the extra regressors. As such
we can be confident that experimental confounds are not the cause of
the results discussed in 3.9.1.
3.9.3 Population changes
As discussed at the time of presenting the results of Hypothesis 2B ( on
page 162), there appears to be very different behaviour at play when
looking at the hypothesis simply for those subjects who participated
in the original run of sessions (in 2011) and those who participated
in the later run of sessions (in 2014). Hence a possible cause for the
experimental results is that we are simply looking at two fundamen-
tally different populations, and hence it is not possible to aggregate
74 this can either be thought of as “I observed a number 3 in stage one, therefore every other
number, aside from 3, is slightly more likely in stage two” which would imply a greater
than 30% chance of observing a number between 7 and 9, or “I observed the numbers 7,
8 and 9 not be rolled in stage one, therefore they are more likely to be rolled in stage two”
which has the same effect
(1) (2) (3)
SCS2 SCS2 SCS2?
baseline 0.722 1.427 0.716
(0.505) (0.281) (0.546)
Treatment? 1.784 1.781 1.782
(0.067) (0.068) (0.069)
Was regret experienced in stage one? 0.466∗ 0.449∗ 0.466∗
(0.032) (0.024) (0.032)
Multiplicative treatment regret dummy 1.336 1.255 1.335
(0.584) (0.665) (0.585)
HL Safe Choices 1.119 1.119
(0.120) (0.120)
A-level maths 1.008 1.012
(0.980) (0.972)
Observations 279 279 279
Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 23: Logit model with additional regressors showing the determinants of
choice at stage two for those in groups 5, 6, 11 and 12. Shown are the
multiplicative effects of each independent variable on the odds ratio.
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2011 2014 testing the difference
Self reported happiness 1 0 3
(% of subjects in session) 2 1 6
3 10 15
4 33 33
5 37 35 Grouping into “sad”, “neither” and “happy”
6 13 6 χ2test of independence
7 5 2 χ2(2) = 9.11 p = 0.01
Mean age 20.52 21.84 t-test of mean diff t = 3.48 p = 0.00
% male subjects 47.24 41.27 χ2test of equality of % χ2(1) = 1.15 p = 0.29
Table 24: Descriptive statistics from the original (2011) and later (2014) sessions
the results across all three sessions. Evidence of this comes from the
summary statistics of the participants in the original sessions compared
to those in the later sessions. These are presented75 in 24.
Table 24 indicates that we are potentially considering two funda-
mentally different populations of subjects, due to the time difference
between running the original and later sessions. As the subjects were
drawn from a student population at the University of Warwick, the
change in happiness may possibly be attributed to the higher level
of tuition fees now levied on undergraduate students and the above-
inflation rises in graduate fees between the two time periods. This has
the potential to affect the way subjects respond to the experience of
negative emotions and their associated risk attitudes.
In order to test whether the delay in running additional sessions is
responsible for the results found, we can split the sample into those in
the original and those in the later sessions, and re-run the regression in
Table 22. These results are shown in Table 25.
As the results show, there appear to be significant differences in the
coefficients (both in terms of magnitude and significance) between the
original and later sessions. In the original sessions, the target wealth
effect appears significant, but in the later sessions, the treatment effect
appears significant. To test this, we can include interactive dummies
(between each of the factor dummies and the session indicator), and
test the significance of the additional terms. The results are shown in
Table 26.
None of the interactive dummies appear significant even at the 10%
level, though this may be a sample size issue, as the inclusion of
additional regressors makes it more difficult to find such a result.
Consequently, we conclude there may be population issues at play,
though the sample size makes it difficult to identify at a sufficiently
significant level.
3.9.4 Small changes in context are simply not important for most people
As the above sections demonstrate, there is no clear evidence for the
effect of “action regret” as distinct from “decision regret” on subsequent
75 A score of 1 in self-reported happiness corresponds to “completely unhappy” whereas 7
is “completely happy”, with the midpoint of 4 being “neither happy nor sad”







Was regret experienced in stage one? 0.259∗∗ 0.978
(0.005) (0.968)
Multiplicative treatment regret dummy 2.308 0.545
(0.213) (0.493)
Observations 175 104
Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 25: Logit model showing the determinants of choice at stage two for those
in groups 5, 6, 11 and 12, split according to the sessions. Shown are
the multiplicative effects of each independent variable on the odds
ratio.
choice behaviour. There is always the possibility that there really is
an effect, but it is too small to notice, even with the above pieces of
analyses designed to tease out the answer.
An implicit assumption in the above argument is that the effect is
very small for everybody, hence making the average effect in the popu-
lation too small to detect given the experimental design. An alternative
hypothesis is that the average effect may well be small for the popula-
tion, but there is a small sub-section of the population for whom the
effect is large, with the remainder of the population being completely
unaffected. Without any intuition as to who this sub-section of the
population may be, we are left looking at too broad a group in order to
try and identify the effect.
One obvious starting point is to sub-divide the population according
to gender. The results of running Equation 3.1 separately for males and
females is shown in Table 27
In Table 27 we see the results appear very different for males and
females. Females have a much stronger baseline preference for the
safe option in stage two, and are especially responsive to the target
wealth effects (α2 = 0.234 p = 0.005), whereas males appear more
subject to the Gambler’s Fallacy (α1 = 2.380 p = 0.064). For females,
the effect of action regret is now strong in size, but still not significant
at a sufficient level (α3 = 2.810 p = 0.165). These results are indicative,
however, of differing sensitivities between males and females to the
effects identified in the experiment. From the perspective of identifying
significant regret effects, it would appear to make more sense to focus







Was regret experienced in stage one? 0.298∗∗
(0.007)









Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 26: Logit model showing the determinants of choice at stage two for
those in groups 5, 6, 11 and 12, including interactive session dummies.








Was regret experienced in stage one? 0.234∗∗ 0.857
(0.005) (0.758)
Multiplicative treatment regret dummy 2.810 0.588
(0.165) (0.483)
Observations 152 127
Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 27: Logit model showing the determinants of choice at stage two for those
in groups 5, 6, 11 and 12, split by gender. Shown are the multiplicative
effects of each independent variable on the odds ratio.
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Was regret experienced in stage one? 0.762 0.285∗
(0.565) (0.043)
Multiplicative treatment regret dummy 0.290 3.291
(0.110) (0.168)
Observations 139 140
Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 28: Logit model showing the determinants of choice at stage two for
those in groups 5, 6, 11 and 12, split by happiness. Shown are the
multiplicative effects of each independent variable on the odds ratio.
Similarly, in Table 28 we divide the population up into those who
report76 as “not happy”77 and those who report as being “happy”7879,
under the hypothesis that regret may have differing effects depending
on the present emotional state of the subject.
The standout result in Table 28 is the coefficient on the Treatment
variable for those who self report as “not happy” (α1 = 7.153 p = 0.001).
This can be interpreted as an especially strong belief in the Gambler’s
Fallacy for those who aren’t happy, yet won in the first stage. The
strength of the result is surprising, but perhaps those who have seen
bad things happen recently interpret the win in the first stage as a sign
that their luck is about to change. Further research investigating the
link between the Gambler’s Fallacy and self-reported happiness would
be recommended as there is none which currently exists in this area.
From a regret standpoint, the more interesting result of Table 28 is
that the coefficients on the “regret x treatment” interactive dummy
variables, α3, appear to be reflected around 1 depending on whether
you are “happy” or “not happy”. If you are “not happy”, then α3 =
0.290 (p = 0.110), saying that the effect of the treatment on those who
experienced regret compared to those who didn’t is to lower their odds
of choosing the relatively safe option by 3 times. If you are “happy”,
then α3 = 3.290 (p = 0.168), saying that the effect of the treatment
on those who experienced regret compared to those who didn’t is to
76 The report is taken after the decisions have been taken and videos viewed, but before the
result of the Holt and Laury procedure and payment is known. This creates a potential
issue with the direction of causality, but due to there being a relatively small number
of participants who won in stage two, you can limit the analysis to only those subjects
who received the same payoff as a result of their choices in stages one and two, and,
qualitatively, the results still hold.
77 this consists of those reporting as “Completely Sad”, “Very Sad”, “Fairly Sad” or “Neither
Happy nor Sad”
78 this consists of those reporting as “Fairly Happy”, “Very Happy” or “Completely Happy”
79 the division is, conveniently, an almost exactly 50/50 split
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raise their odds of choosing the relatively safe option by 3 times. The
significance levels are clearly an issue, but the size of the coefficients
goes some way to explaining the failure to find the effect earlier, as it
appears to be working in different ways on different sub-sections of the
population. In the case of those who are “not happy”, they effect is that
they are less willing to choose the safe option, which was the option
which they regretted choosing in the first stage. In the case of those
who are “happy”, the effect is that they are more willing to choose the
safe option, despite it being the option they regretted choosing in the
first stage. Intuitively, this direction seems right as happy people may
be more willing to “forgive and forget” than those who are not happy,
but further research would be required in this area to establish the true
reasons and the statistical significance.
Clearly, by sub-dividing the samples into smaller and smaller groups,
we run the risk of finding these results simply due to the outlier actions
of a few specific experimental subjects. In the case of the coefficient on
the Treatment variable for those who self-report as “not happy”, the
magnitude of the coefficient (α1 = 7.153) is immediately suspicious,
as it seems somewhat implausible that playing around with die and
labels (without actually changing the probabilities or payoffs of the
underlying gambles) can cause a group to be 7 times more likely to do
anything, let alone change their gambling decisions80. That being said,
the purpose of research is to simultaneously build on what has gone
before and suggest avenues for future work, so repeating these results
with similar subjects but in a new environment would be a good first
step.
3.10 why you wouldn’t design an experiment like this if
you had the choice
When designing a gambling based experiment, there are a few different
designs which can be used to convey the idea of “decision under
uncertainty”. In this experiment, we take the approach of “decision
under risk” where the probabilities associated with each state of the
world are explicitly stated, in both the form of a percentage and the
numbers on the face of a ten sided die81 which are linked to each
state of the world. This gives a high level of control over the important
information which participants can use to make a decision, and places
them in a position of having no prior information, unbeknown to
the experimenter, which could help them make a decision one way
or another. The use of a randomised treatment and control group
permits the use of indirect control over other factors which could
potentially affect an individual’s decision making (such as, for example,
their inherent preference for risk), but, where possible, the use of
direct control is preferable for identifying the causality present in the
experiment.
By contrast, several of the initial designs of this experiment used
decisions under uncertainty at both the first and second stage, where
explicit probabilities for each state of the world were not specified,
but a “subjective probability estimate” could be inferred from a set
of information provided to the participants. The first design of the
80 though there are 73 subjects included in this specific comparison, so it’s not an incredibly
small subject pool
81 or two ten-sided dice in the control group at stage two
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experiment had individuals making “buy or sell” decisions on an
amount of stock, where the past history of the stock was provided in
the form of the graph, and a set of information surrounding the wider
conditions of the economy and industry was available for the subject to
consult. The second design of the experiment had the subjects watching
videos of several horse races, and being asked to make a bet on a horse
having been provided with their odds and a form guide.
3.10.1 Hard to generate regret from dice
The benefit of using a “decision under uncertainty” design as opposed
to a “decision under risk” design is that, because the probability es-
timates of the stock increasing or decreasing in price, or equivalently
the horse winning or losing the race, are derived by the participants
themselves from a set of information, the participants feel a sense of
responsibility for not simply their own decisions (whether to buy or
sell the stock, or which horse to bet on), but also for their own sub-
jective probability estimates upon which their decisions are based. As
demonstrated earlier, the existing literature shows a strong relationship
between responsibility and experienced regret, and, hence, in a an
experiment which is designed to look how the experience of regret in-
fluences subsequent choice, you would prefer that effect to be as strong
as possible, and hence design an experiment where the individual
feels highly responsible for the outcome of their decisions at stage one.
Intuitively, in order to generate the largest possible experience of regret,
you would want the subject to believe that there is something they
could have either known or done which would have revealed to them
the true outcome of the uncertainty, prior to their decision, and hence
informed them of the correct decision to take. This is especially true
when the decision under uncertainty involves an outcome which has
already been resolved (such as the stock price of a firm from a previous
time period, or the video of a horse race which has already been run), but
is unknown to the subject in the experiment. In this case, there is an
impression that all uncertainty has been resolved82, and it is merely
a question of whether the subject can work out which is the “correct
answer” in terms of the decision to take.
The flip side of this argument is that is an experiment which uses a
mechanical randomisation device, such as a die, has an explicit element
of randomness built in. That is, there is no information which the
participant could have known, or have been expected to know, which
would have resulted in a “better” understanding of which face of the
die was likely to come up. As such, ex-post, the subject has an ability
to rationalise their decision, and absolve themself of responsibility, by
realising that there is nothing they could have done or known, ex-ante,
which would have given them a reason to take a different decision,
and potentially improve their payoff. This reduction in responsibility is
likely to cause a reduction in the amount of regret experienced, and,
equivalently, a reduction in the amount of regret anticipated, from
either a stage one or stage two decision. As such, any results which
are present in the data, linking the experience of regret to subsequent
choice behaviour, will be harder to spot.
82 that is, one state of the world will occur with probability p = 1, and all others have a
zero probability of occurring.
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However, from the perspective of the subject in the experiment, it
is important for them to believe that the whole process is fair and
transparent, in order that they give due care and consideration to the
decisions which they are being asked to take. In this regards, the use
of dice to resolve the gambles is a more transparently fair process (in
that the outcome is beyond the control of the experimenter as well as
the subject) than the use of either stocks or horses, which could have
been chosen precisely because they offered the promise of high reward,
but ultimately failed to deliver. To this end, the need for a believable
experiment outweighs the need for a particularly emotional experiment,
and the benefits of direct control, in having the same explicitly stated
probabilities for both control and treatment groups, outweigh the ben-
efits of having non-stated, subjective, malleable probabilities under
uncertainty, and hence justify the decision to use dice as the method
through which to resolve the gambles in this experiment.
3.10.2 Discrete choice
The experimental procedure outlined relies on, at both stage one and
stage two, the subjects making a choice between only two options,
giving the main experimental variable of interest as the proportion of
subjects who chose the relatively safe option at stage two, a binary
outcome, in that either the subject chose the relatively safe option or
they did not. Once this choice is made, the gambles are played out in
front of the participants, and they are paid according to the outcome of
their choice and the outcome of the gamble, so the subjects are correctly
incentivised to reveal their true preferences when making the choice.
However, what the outcome of the stage two choice does not reveal
is how strongly the subject preferred one gamble over the other. In the
language of limited dependent variables, there is an underlying latent
variable of the difference in utility between the relatively safe and
relatively risky gambles, and the outcome of the binary choice simply
reveals whether the latent variable is positive or negative, and not the
absolute magnitude. In an ideal experimental design, we would find
a way to tease out the magnitude, by asking the subject to reveal, in
essence, how strongly they feel about their decision. The benefit of this
approach is that we would be able to measure, for example, whether
the impact of the experience of regret from stage one is only significant
for subjects that were making very marginal decisions83, and, for those
individuals who were affected, to what degree of magnitude did it
affect their stage two decision.
Stating a “selling price”
One possible approach to generating a continuous measure of gambling
preference for, as an example, the stage two decision, is to ask the
individual to state the minimum price at which they would be willing
to “sell” one of the two gambles on offer for the other. That is, for
example, those subjects who are at point 11 would be “endowed” with
Gamble R, and be asked to state the minimum price at which they
83 it can be argued that an individual would feel less regret about not taking a decision they
never had any intention of taking compared to if they were very close to choosing the
ex-post superior option in the first place. That is, the individual would find it easier to
imagine a counterfactual where they chose the ex-post superior option, and realised a
better payoff, the closer they were to taking that option.
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would be willing to swap Gamble R for Gamble VR. The price would
be stated in the following fashion:
Presently you have chosen Gamble R, which offers you a 30%
chance of winning £14 and a 70% chance of winning £0. Gamble
VR, in contrast, offers you a 10% chance of winning an amount
of money £x, and a 90% chance of winning £0. Please state the
minimum possible value of x for which you would be willing to
exchange Gamble R for Gamble VR.
There would then need to be a market mechanism which determined
whether Gamble R is indeed exchanged for Gamble VR at that price,
thus allowing for a “selected” and an “unselected” gamble in the mould
of the original experiment. Both selected and unselected gambles would
then be resolved by the die mechanism, permitting the experience of
regret to occur from both exchanging Gamble R for VR when R was
ex-post superior and also not exchanging Gamble R for VR when VR
was ex-post superior.
In order for such an experiment to produce meaningful results, how-
ever, the “market mechanism”, which determines whether or not the
gambles are exchanged at the price stated, must provide subjects with
an incentive to truthfully reveal the minimum price at which they would
be willing to sell Gamble R, in order that the answer can be assumed
to be a marginally small amount above the true point of indifference
between the two gambles. That is, the subjects in the experiment must
have a dominant strategy to reveal their true preferences.
A mechanism that is commonly used in experiments to achieve such
a measure is the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism (BDM) (Becker
et al. [3]). Applying the mechanism to this experiment and this example,
the market value of x would be randomly drawn by the experimenter
(call this value x*), and, if x* exceeds the value of x stated by the subject,
they would exchange Gamble R for Gamble VR, where Gamble R is
now defined as a 10% chance of winning £x* and a 90% chance of
winning £0. Should the value of x* fall below the value of x stated by
the subject, they would retain Gamble R as their chosen gamble, but
still see the outcome of the roll of the die which defines both their
payoff as a result of retaining Gamble R, and the payoff they would
had received, under the now completely defined Gamble VR, had they
chosen a value of x in excess of x*.
This mechanism is, on an intuitive level, “...simple and presumed to
induce truth-telling. Individuals have the incentive, it is believed, to
report their true maximum willingness-to-pay”(Horowitz [39, p7]), or,
as in both this example and the original BDM paper, an incentive to
reveal their minimum selling prices. As such, it seems like an excellent
candidate mechanism through which to elicit a continuous variable in
the second stage of the experiment.
Problems with the BDM mechanism
There is a large theoretical and experimental literature, however, on the
failings of the BDM mechanism to deliver the incentive compatibility
which is often claimed. The criticisms can be broadly categorised, for
these purposes, into theoretical failings, practical failings, and regret-
specific failings.
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Theoretical failings
The logistics of the BDM mechanism do not make explicit reference
to the type of good being sold or bought by the experimental subject;
only the method through which they must submit their bid. Indeed
the BDM mechanism has been applied to a very wide range of goods,
for example, famously by Kahneman et al. [51] where it is used to
effect the sale of mugs. One type of good, however, has been shown
to place some restrictions on the applicability on the use of the BDM
mechanism. Karni and Safra [54] examine the BDM mechanism when
dealing with the sale of lotteries84, and prove that “...the elicitation of
certainty equivalents of all lotteries, using the experimental method of
Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak, is possible if and only if the preference
relation is representable by an expected utility functional” [54, p676].
It is the double implication of this result which is of relevance here,
as, for the whole of this experiment, we are assuming the subjects are
including anticipated regret in their decision making process, which,
in the guise, for example, of Loomes and Sugden [58], is an explicitly
non-EUT. As such, the BDM procedure, applied to subjects behaving
with specifically non-EUT preferences, will not yield truthful revelation
of certainty equivalents or selling prices. In a similar work, Horowitz
[39] shows that even for non-random goods, the BDM is not incentive
compatible for non-standard preferences (including regret and disap-
pointment aversion), as the reported “certainty value” or selling price
“...is not independent of the distribution of prices”[39, p10] which may
be specified and draw from, at random, by the experimenter.
Practical failings
The last paragraph of Horowitz’ work correctly states “[r]esearchers
will also want to know whether any of these effects is large enough to
matter in real world applications of the BDM”. A study by Vlaev et al.
[97] asked subjects to state the maximum amount of an endowment
they would be willing to spend to avoid a small electric shock, using a
standard BDM mechanism to decide whether this value was sufficient
to “buy” the participant out of the electric shock85. However, there
were two possible conditions that subjects could have been assigned to.
In the first condition, they received an endowment of 40p, and hence
the BDM mechanism generated a random number between 0 and 40p.
In the second condition, they were given an endowment of 80p, and
hence the BDM mechanism generated a random number between 0
and 80p. In accordance with Horowitz’ claim, the selling price was
not independent of the distribution of prices, with a highly significant
difference between the “demand for relief of pain” for those in the 80p
endowment group compared to those in the 40p endowment group, as
evidenced by Figure 53.
Likewise, an earlier experiment of Bohm et al. [11] holds the endow-
ment constant and elicits the minimum selling price of a non-risky
object (“...a card entitling the bearer to a given quantity of petrol”[11,
p1080]), under three different upper bounds of the price range from
84 specifically, lotteries which have “...a finite number of prizes, i.e., a
lottery(x1, p1; ... ; xn, pn) where pi is the probability of xi,
∑n
i=1 pi = 1,
and for all i, xi 6 xi+1”[54, p677] of which all the gambles in this experiment are of the
form.
85 in addition, subjects were explicitly told why, given this mechanism, it was in their best
interest to reveal their true value
Figure 53: Figure 3b from Vlaev et al. [97] showing “[d]emand curves for pain
relief derived from the trials following experienced (consumed) pain
of a long duration (i.e., 15 shocks)” [97, p314]. For each endowment,
there were two separate “blocks” of activity. One block consisted of
trials where the subject experienced either a high or medium shock,
and the other consisted of trials where the subject experienced either
a medium or low shock, hence the graph reports two different
demand curves, for relief of the medium pain, given the particular
block of trials that the subjects were in.
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which the BDM mechanism draws a market price. Despite being ex-
plicitly told what the market value of the petrol was (with the card re-
deemable at a petrol station next to the university where the experiment
took place), the mean reported selling price was significantly higher
for the group whose upper bound on the BDM mechanism was higher
than the market price, compared to the group whose upper bound was
slightly lower than the market price. A third group stated selling prices
where the upper bound was not explicitly defined, but was stated to be
“...what we think is the maximum price any real buyer would be willing
to pay for this card”[11, p1082], and were found to report selling prices
not statistically significantly different from the low upper bound group,
but significantly below the high upper bound group. The conclusion,
that the high upper bound “...seem[ed] to make subjects overstate their
selling reservation prices”[11, p1084], again gives reason to doubt the
practical suitability of the BDM mechanism for incentivising subjects to
reveal their true preferences, given the upper bound must be invented
and stated, in some form, by the experimenter, in any given experiment
wishing to use the BDM mechanism.
Regret-based failings
In addition to both the theoretical and practical problems in using
the BDM mechanism to incentivise subjects to truthfully reveal their
preferences, there are some further issues relating exclusively to the
design of this experiment and the effect that we are trying to investigate.
By studying the effects of experienced regret on subsequent choice
(potentially relating to the effect on subsequent regret aversion), as
previously mentioned, we are reliant on the experiment to both produce
experienced regret, and be conducive to thoughts of anticipated regret.
Introducing the BDM mechanism into the equation makes this more
difficult for several reasons.
Firstly, in contrast to the second stage of the experiment where
there is only binary choice, any decision submitted through a BDM
mechanism in terms of a minimum selling price of, for example, Gamble
R in the second stage, does not immediately rule out the possibility
of one particular type of regret. In the binary choice experiment, an
individual choosing Gamble R over Gamble VR immediately rules out
the possibility of experiencing Type A Regret86, and so it is simple for
them to calculate the possibility of experiencing Type B Regret87. In
contrast, assuming any selling price stated by the subject has a strictly
positive probability of being selected by the BDM mechanism, then any
price submitted exposes the subject to both types of regret, conditional
on the BDM mechanism deciding whether they keep Gamble R or
exchange for Gamble VR. As such, when an individual is calculating
their potential anticipatory regret from any bid submitted, they must
additionally consider the probability distribution of the mechanism, as
well as the probability that the eventually selected gamble will lead
to the experience of regret. By making anticipatory regret harder to
correctly calculate, there is an increased risk of subjects making errors
in such a calculation, and hence their decision not accurately reflecting
their true aversion to regret.
86 as, having chosen the relatively safe option at stage two, they could not experience regret
from feeling they were overconfident and wishing they had acted more conservatively
87 which is the probability of Gamble R winning, conditional on the fact that Gamble VR
didn’t win
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This “compound lottery” effect of the BDM mechanism not only
makes the true effect of regret on the preference of the individual much
more difficult to calculate, but also presents an additional opportunity
for the decision maker to absolve themselves of any responsibility for
the outcome of their second stage decision. Precisely because the price
submitted in stage two does not prevent either Gamble R or Gamble
VR from being chosen for the individual88 by the BDM mechanism,
the experience of regret can always be attributed to the combination of
the resolution of the BDM mechanism (which selected which gamble
the individual would ultimately own), and the roll of the dice which
informed the individual whether or not they would have been better off
had the BDM mechanism selected the other gamble for them instead.
By having two separate points at which mechanical randomisation
takes place, the ease with which the subject can rationalise the event is
increased, and the lower the effect of regret will be, as we have already
seen that regret is positively linked to the degree of responsibility that
the subject feels for the outcome.
3.10.3 Summary of the design
The present design of the experiment is neither ideal for generating the
experience of regret in stage one, nor ideal for measuring the degree to
which the subjects were affected by the experience of regret at stage two,
as shown above. However, the practicalities of running the experiment
in this way give the greatest possibility of obtaining a “clean” result.
That is to say, a result from which an observer would be able to clearly
see the difference between treatment and control, what information
was presented to subjects and what, specifically, could be inferred from
it. Additionally, given the simplicity of the experiment, should any
experimenter wish to repeat the experiment, it would be very easy to
do so.
The above discussion is not given simply as a justification for why
this particular experimental design was chosen, but rather to highlight
the wide variety of complexities in designing such an experiment at all.
Building an experiment to investigate a subtle and nuanced aspect of a
difficult to observe emotion requires careful thought and consideration,
but the interaction between the emotion, the two-stage design and the
measurement means you end up choosing the “least worst” design
rather than any sense of an “optimal” design.
There is certainly a theoretical argument for using a BDM mechanism
to elicit preferences, but the practical limitations give us reason to doubt
its suitability in this case. Coupled with the additional requirement
for the participants in the experiment to understand both what the
mechanism is, and how it works (i.e. the need for lotteries in order to
resolve different lotteries), for it to be of use, the design chosen here is
one which opts for simplicity rather than complexity.
3.11 conclusions
The experiment was designed to look specifically of the effect of regret
tied to an action on subsequent choice behaviour in a gambling context.
88 in contrast to “by the individual” in the binary choice version
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The above results suggest that the effect of the treatment89 on those who
experienced regret (compared to those who didn’t) may well vary sig-
nificantly according to different sub-sections of the population. Whilst
the effect could be negligible for some (males) it may be important for
others (females). The direction of the effect may even vary according
to current emotional state (happy or not). Hence a failure to find an
overall strong statistically significant result is potentially due to to the
samples chosen being too broad, and further work should be focussed
on targeting those sub-sections of the population where an emotional
link to an action, or label, is likely to play an important role in their
future decision making.
Additionally, the experiment showed some evidence for the effect of
the Gambler’s Fallacy in this context, and also target wealth effects.
3.11.1 On future experimental work
One avenue for further work may be to step outside the lab and look to
field or natural experiments to conduct similar hypothesis testing. As
homogeneity of groups may be important to detect a result, and actions
can be interpreted in the context of labels or brands, a large firm with
a loyal customer base, including many repeat customers, could be a
suitable environment.
The idea of “re-branding” is often used when large numbers of
customers may have had a bad experience with a product or brand
(potentially causing the experience of regret), but it would be interest-
ing to explore if the true effect of re-branding on repeat purchase is
different90 for different sub-sections of the population.
One other environment which could prove fertile for future research
is the world of online poker. In this environment, participants are
frequently exposed to the possibility of experienced regret, and also
make many frequent similar, but not identical, decisions. An experiment
which looks at whether the experience of regret in a prior stage acts
significantly on participants, especially when they are faced with a
similar decision in the future, could make the distinction between action
regret and decision regret by looking for instances where the same card
(e.g. seven of hearts) that had caused the initial regret reappears in
the subsequent decision stage. This could be compared against those
decisions which were functionally the same91, but involved a different
card (e.g. eight of spades), much in the same way that our experiment
changed the label on the gambles, and how many die were being rolled,
in the second stage.
Lastly, the experiment was, ideally, supposed to generate subjects
who had experienced both Type A and Type B regret from stage one,
and analyse the effect of the ’previously regretted action’ treatment
separately for both groups. However, as the resolution of uncertainty
from the gambles generated very few subjects who chose Gamble S and
lost, there were too few subjects to generate meaningful analysis for
those subjects who experienced Type B regret. As such, for future work,
it would be worthwhile testing whether results can be found for Type
B regret, as we have essentially done for Type A, and consequently
89 where the treatment is showing an “action” which may have caused regret in the previous
stage, but keeping the probabilities and payoffs the same between treatment and control
90 and, indeed, worth the cost
91 in the language of Texas hold-em poker, for example, this could be “calling with middle
pair” on the river
182 a simple experiment studying experienced regret and context
investigate what happens when the previously regretted action becomes
the relatively risky option in stage two, as opposed to the relatively safe
option.
3.11.2 On future theoretical work
At present, no regret-based theory takes into account the context of the
choice being made in such a way that distinguishes the decision being
made from the action needed to effect that decision. Thus, this work
adds to the literature on effects such as the omission and status-quo
biases, which are, in effect, specific representations of how the action
can be considered as distinct from the decision. With the omission bias,
sometimes you may not need to do anything to effect your choice, and
with the status-quo bias, you may need to act in a fashion which is
considered abnormal or atypical in order to effect your choice. There-
fore, in order to develop regret-based theories of decision making going
forward, some account of the context or “framing” of the problem,
and what each action, as distinct from the decision, represents to the
individual decision makers, is needed.
The type of development which this work suggests, because of the
two stage design of the experiment, is one where the context of the
actions which are on offer are given by past experience the decision
maker has with those actions. That is to say, the decision maker draws
on information they learnt from previous encounters with the action,
when deciding what would be the consequences which result should
they choose to take the action again. In this experiment, because of the
similarity between Gamble R in stage two and Gamble R in stage one
(compared to the lower degree of similarity between Gamble Rc in stage
two and Gamble R in stage one) the subject may be able to transfer
some knowledge between the stages, and this information should be
factored into the decision making process the second time around.
Therefore, an important determinant of the effect to which regret will
impact upon choice is the degree of similarity which exists between a
current option and a recallable situation which provides the decision
maker with information about the affective consequences of taking a
particular option again. As the individual finds it difficult to predict
their own emotions, they are searching for information which will make
that prediction more accurate, and find it easiest to do so when a high
degree of similarity enables them to recall such information.
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Problem Number x1 p y1 1−p x2 q y2 1−q rf rt
1 200 0.8 50 0.2 200 0.2 50 0.8 0 90
2 200 0.2 50 0.8 200 0.5 50 0.5 0 -45
3 200 0.5 -50 0.5 50 0.5 -50 0.5 150 75
4 50 0.8 -50 0.2 200 0.2 -200 0.8 0 150
5 50 0.2 -50 0.8 200 0.5 50 0.5 -250 -155
6 200 0.5 -200 0.5 200 0.8 50 0.2 -250 -170
7 50 0.8 -200 0.2 200 0.5 -50 0.5 -300 -75
8 200 0.5 50 0.5 50 0.5 -50 0.5 250 125
9 50 0.8 -200 0.2 200 0.8 -200 0.2 -150 -120
10 50 0.2 -50 0.8 -50 0.5 -200 0.5 250 95
11 50 0.5 -50 0.5 50 0.5 -200 0.5 150 75
12 50 0.2 -200 0.8 50 0.2 -50 0.8 -150 -120
13 200 0.5 -200 0.5 50 0.5 -200 0.5 150 75
14 50 0.2 -200 0.8 50 0.8 -200 0.2 0 -150
15 200 0.8 -200 0.2 50 0.2 -200 0.8 150 270
16 50 0.5 -200 0.5 50 0.8 -200 0.2 0 -75
17 200 0.5 -200 0.5 50 0.8 -50 0.2 0 -30
18 200 0.8 -50 0.2 200 0.5 50 0.5 -100 25
19 -50 0.2 -200 0.8 200 0.2 -200 0.8 -250 -50
20 -50 0.2 -200 0.8 200 0.5 -200 0.5 -250 -170
21 200 0.8 50 0.2 200 0.5 -50 0.5 100 95
22 200 0.2 -200 0.8 50 0.2 -50 0.8 0 -90
23 200 0.8 -50 0.2 50 0.8 -50 0.2 150 120
24 -50 0.8 -200 0.2 200 0.2 -200 0.8 -250 40
25 -50 0.5 -200 0.5 200 0.8 -200 0.2 -250 -245
26 -50 0.8 -200 0.2 200 0.8 -50 0.2 -400 -230
27 -50 0.2 -200 0.8 50 0.8 -200 0.2 -100 -170
28 -50 0.8 -200 0.2 -50 0.5 -200 0.5 0 45
29 50 0.5 -50 0.5 50 0.2 -200 0.8 150 150
30 200 0.8 -200 0.2 -50 0.2 -200 0.8 250 290
31 200 0.5 -50 0.5 -50 0.5 -200 0.5 400 200
32 -50 0.8 -200 0.2 200 0.2 -50 0.8 -400 -80
33 200 0.2 -50 0.8 200 0.8 50 0.2 -100 -170
34 200 0.8 -50 0.2 50 0.8 -50 0.2 150 120
35 50 0.2 -50 0.8 200 0.5 50 0.5 -250 -155
36 200 0.5 50 0.5 50 0.2 -50 0.8 250 155
37 200 0.5 50 0.5 200 0.8 -50 0.2 100 -25
38 50 0.8 -50 0.2 200 0.8 -50 0.2 -150 -120
39 50 0.5 -50 0.5 50 0.5 -200 0.5 150 75
40 200 0.8 50 0.2 200 0.5 -50 0.5 100 95
41 200 0.5 -50 0.5 50 0.8 -200 0.2 300 75
42 50 0.5 -200 0.5 200 0.5 -200 0.5 -150 -75
43 50 0.8 -200 0.2 200 0.8 -200 0.2 -150 -120
44 200 0.5 -200 0.5 -50 0.2 -200 0.8 250 170
45 200 0.2 -200 0.8 -50 0.8 -200 0.2 250 -40
46 200 0.8 -200 0.2 200 0.5 -50 0.5 -150 45
47 200 0.5 -50 0.5 200 0.8 -200 0.2 150 -45
48 200 0.5 -200 0.5 200 0.2 -200 0.8 0 120
Table 29: False Regret and True Regret for all 48 problems used in Coricelli et al.
[19]
186
BA P P E N D I X F O R C H A P T E R 3
b.1 invitation email
Hello #fname# #lname#!
We would like to invite you to participate in a new DR@W
Laboratory research project called "Decision Sessions". For
participating in an hour long session, you will be able to
guarantee yourself a show-up fee of £5, with the chance to
win further amounts of money depending on your decisions
in the session.
The research sessions will take place in the DR@W Lab,
S2.82 in Social Sciences, and are scheduled for the following
times:
#sessionlist#
If you want to participate, you can register by clicking on
the following link:
#link#
(If you cannot click on the link, copy it to the clipboard
by selecting it, right click, and choosing "Copy", and then
paste it into the address line in your web browser by right
clicking there and choosing "Paste".)
Once you have registered for a session, further informa-
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b.2 summary statistics
29 nov 30 nov 2 dec combined
Number of Participants 122 96 126 344
Male (%) 46.72 47.92 41.27 45.06
Female (%) 53.28 52.08 58.73 54.94
Average age 20.65 20.36 21.84 21.01
1st Year Undergrad (%) 22.13 30.21 25.40 25.58
2nd Year Undergrad (%) 28.69 31.25 23.02 27.33
3rd Year Undergrad (%) 31.15 27.08 22.22 26.74
4th Year Undergrad (%) 3.28 1.04 4.76 3.20
Graduate (%) 13.93 9.38 17.46 13.95
Other (%) 0.82 1.04 7.14 3.20
A-Level Maths? (%) 81.97 85.42 78.57 81.69
Economics Dept (%) 31.97 33.33 19.05 27.62
Business School (%) 16.39 11.46 19.84 16.28
Statistics Dept (%) 11.48 8.33 8.73 9.59
Maths Dept (%) 8.20 8.33 4.76 6.98
Engineering Dept (%) 4.92 3.12 11.90 6.98
Psychology Dept (%) 5.74 3.13 7.94 5.81
Other (%)1 21.31 32.29 27.78 26.74
Table 30: Summary statistics for all participants in experiment
b.3 experimental methodology
b.3.1 Participants
Participants were invited to the experiment through an email sent to the
University of Warwick’s DR@W (Decision Research at Warwick) partic-
ipant database, which contained over 1500 active profiles, comprised
primarily of Undergraduate students at the University of Warwick (well
distributed across year and course of study). Sign-up was completed
on a first come, first served basis, through self-allocation to one of 21
available sessions, with the first round of sessions being on the 29th
and 30th November 2011 and the second round of sessions being on
the 2nd December 2014.
b.3.2 Materials
The experiment was designed to run entirely in a web browser, with a
hard copy of the Information Sheet and Consent Form provided to each
participant. The experiment was built in the University of Warwick
Sitebuilder environment, which allows for simple data capture and
1 no other department had more than 6% of the sample
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navigation, though not more sophisticated mechanisms (such as subject
specific randomisation). In addition to the main experiment (design
detailed below) subjects also completed an incentivised Holt and Laury
procedure to measure risk attitudes (prior to the main experiment),
answered a DOSPERT (Domain-Specific Risk-Taking) questionnaire,
completed a Big 5 Personality profile, and answered basic questions
relating to their individual personal and academic characteristics (all
after the main experiment). These were all hosted within the Sitebuilder
environment. Gambles in the Holt and Laury procedure were resolved
using a random number generator in excel (subject specific), though
the outcomes of the gambles were not disclosed to the participants. The
result was simply added to their total payment. The procedure was run
prior to the main experiment so that the measure of risk attitude would
be unaffected by the main experiment. The results were not disclosed
so there would be no emotional carry-over from the Holt and Laury
procedure into the main experiment. Gambles in the main experiment
were resolved through rolling either 1 or 2 ten-sided die. Due to the
limitations of the Sitebuilder environment, gambles were only session
specific, not subject specific. For each gamble within each session, the
dice were rolled in advance of the session, with the rolling of the dice
videotaped, with audio, and then played back to the subjects once they
had made their decision. This was to ensure the complete privacy of
the participants throughout the experimental session.
b.3.3 Design
The project aimed to investigate the effect of experienced regret on
subsequent anticipatory regret and hence subsequent choice behaviour.
Specifically, the experiment looked to investigate whether the emotion
of experienced regret is associated to the “action” as distinct from the
“decision” taken, and hence has an impact on subsequent choice when
the previous decision/action is disaggregated into component parts in
a similar situation. This was investigated through a simple two option,
two stage gambling task, where participants must choose between a
relatively safe and relatively risky option in each stage. The key design
occurs in stage 2 of the experiment. If a participant was allocated to
the “treatment” condition, then stage 2 would contain an action that
they had previously seen in stage 1 (i.e. if they picked “S”, it would
imply they had a x% chance of winning £y, resolved by rolling 1 die,
and this was something they had previously seen in stage 1). If they
were in the “control” condition, they would be faced with the same
“decision” as those in the treatment condition (in terms of probabilities
and payoffs), but the “actions” would be labelled differently (i.e. they
would need to select “Sc”, which is resolved by rolling 2 die, to make
the same decision that choosing action “S” represented in the treatment
condition). The primary outcome is the difference in frequency with
which “S” and “Sc” were chosen in the treatment and control groups,
in those instances where a participant had chosen S in stage 1, and S
had turned out to be the wrong choice. Participants also answered a
questionnaire which obtained measures of individual characteristics.
The time taken to complete the experiment from start to finish was
around 45 minutes. The stages of the entire experiment were run in the
following order:
1. Holt and Laury procedure
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2. Stage 1 choice
3. Stage 2 choice
4. Participant information questionnaire
5. DOSPERT procedure
6. Big 5 procedure
Based on the design of the experiment, and choice behaviour observed
in similar experiment, the mean payment was expected to be £11.40. The
observed mean payment was £12.45, decomposed as a mean payment
of £6.15 for the Holt and Laury task (5p more than expected), and £6.30
for the main experimental tasks (£1 more than expected).
b.3.4 Environment
All experimental sessions were conducted in the University of War-
wick Economics Department DR@W Laboratory. This room contains
20 individual computer booths, shielded on 3 sides to ensure privacy
when decision making. Individuals were allocated to booths through
the drawing of a random ID card upon entry (as described in the
Procedure below). All participants were asked to wear headphones
(provided) during the experiment as the videos contained sound.
b.3.5 Pre Experiment
A blank Information Sheet, Consent form, blank sheet of paper and
pen were set out on each desk. The computer on each desk was loaded
up with the experiment log in page in the web browser. In the code of
the webpages the participants would visit, the videos were updated to
reflect the rolls of the die corresponding to that session.
b.3.6 During Experiment
Each participant took a random ID card upon entry and was asked
to sit at the corresponding computer. The following instructions were
read aloud:
Please do not touch the computer in front of you until
instructed.
Please make sure all mobile phones are switched off so
we are not disturbed during today’s session.
Please read the information sheet on the desk in front of
you, and, if you agree to participate in the session, please
sign the consent form. When you have completed the con-
sent form, please hold it in the air, and I will come around
and collect it. *Collect consent forms* Thank you for agree-
ing to participate in the session.
During today’s session, you will be asked to make a small
number of decisions which will, along with an element of
luck, determine you payoff for today’s session. The decisions
you submit on the computers will be entirely anonymous
and private, and your final payoff will be calculated by our
central computer.
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The instructions as to how to proceed with the session will
be given on the computer screen in front of you, but, if you
have any questions about an aspect of the session, please
raise your hand, and I will come to assist you privately.
During the session, you will see some videos which have
audio on them, so you should wear the headphones pro-
vided at all times to ensure that you can hear the video
without disturbing other individuals in the room. In front of
you, you have a pen and paper, which you may use at any
time to help you with, or make a record of, your decisions
in the session. We will destroy the paper after the session,
so any notes you make remain private.
Once you are ready to begin the session, please move the
mouse in front of you so that the log in screen is visible.
You may then login using the details on the ID card, and
follow the instructions on the screen to progress through
the session, without any further instruction from me.
Thanks
b.3.7 Post Experiment
The decisions taken in the session were downloaded from the website,
and converted into payments for the session based on the rolls of the
die specific to that session. The payment was placed inside an envelope,
labelled with the computer ID. The following instructions were then
announced:
We will now administer payment for the session
Please remember, you payment has been calculated by
our central computer based on the decisions you made in
today’s session, and the outcomes of any gambles which
you chose, so we are unable to answer any specific payment
related questions at this time.
I will bring round a box of envelopes which have your
session ID numbers on the front. Please take the envelope
which corresponds to your ID number and a payment re-
ceipt
Please then open the envelope, and complete the receipt
for the amount in the envelope.
Please then leave the pen, paper, ID card & headphones
on your desk, and hand the receipt form to me on the way
out.
Please remember to take all your personal belongings
with you.
Envelopes and receipt forms were then handed out to each participant.
Receipt forms were collected in by the door on the way out.
b.3.8 Information Sheet
The information sheet given to participants was as follows:
Information for participants - Decision Sessions
The project
192 appendix for chapter 3
The project is being run by the Economics department
of the University of Warwick. We plan to carry out a run
of research sessions with a number of students at the Uni-
versity of Warwick. The sessions take place in the DR@W
Laboratory, S2.82, on the second floor of the Social Sciences
building between the 29th and 30th November 2011 / on the
2nd December 2014.
Your participation
If you agree to participate in the project, you will partici-
pate in a single session of the project, on either the 29th or
30th November / on the 2nd December 2014. You will be asked
to make a small number of decisions during the session,
which will be fully explained and presented to you on the
computer screen. The decisions you make, coupled with an
element of luck, will determine your payoff for the session.
In accordance with the DR@W rules and regulations for lab
S2.82, all information we provide is accurate and truthful,
with no deception being used at any stage.
You will also be asked to complete a short questionnaire
during the session, which will ask some simple questions
about your own personal attributes. The answers to the
questionnaire will not be linked to your payment.
The entire process will be both anonymous and private
- anonymous in the sense that your decisions and answers
will be linked to an ID number, which will be randomly
determined by drawing an ID card on the way into the
lab, and will not be linked to your real name or university
ID, so there will be no way of linking your true identity
to any of the data we have collected. It will be private in
the sense that you will be asked to submit your decisions
and answers in privacy, with neither the researchers nor the
other participants able to see your answers, and your final
fee will be calculated automatically by a central computer.
The anonymous data generated in the session will be used
as the basis for at least one academic paper, and possibly
more. Since the data is anonymous from the moment the
study starts it will be impossible for anyone to link you to
the data that is used.
You will be asked to sign a consent form if you agree to
take part in the study and a receipt at the end of the session
when you are paid. Both of these documents will be kept in
a secure location for at least one year following the end of
the study and then destroyed.
Participation in the project is entirely voluntary and you
have the right to withdraw at any point without giving any
reason. However, if you do end your participation early you
may receive a reduced payment since the payment is related
to your decisions.
Potential benefits
You will receive a show-up fee of £5 for participating in
the session, which can either be guaranteed or traded away
depending on your decisions in the session. You will always
have the option to guarantee yourself the show-up fee for
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the session. Your decisions, coupled with an element of luck,
will determine your final payment for the session.
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